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Title: DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC DEBT AND FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Abstract: The subject of this doctoral dissertation is an analysis of determinants of the 
public debt accumulation and assessment of fiscal sustainability in Serbia and selected 
peer countries. The main goal is empirical quantification of the relations between public 
debt dynamics and its determinants and subsequent assessment of fiscal sustainability 
conditions. The methodology of empirical research is based on three macroeconomic 
concepts: debt accumulation identity, intertemporal budget constraint and fiscal reaction 
function. The focus of empirical research is on econometric modeling of public debt 
dynamics with respect to fiscal and non-fiscal determinants and forward-looking 
simulations of the public indebtedness indicators.  
 
The central part of the empirical research methodology is divided into four building 
blocks. The first methodological block is an exercise of debt accumulation 
decomposition to individual contributions of its determinants. The second block is a 
panel regression analysis that quantifies the impact of debt determinants (primary 
balance, real growth, inflation, real exchange rate, and interest rate) on the dynamics of 
actual and structural public indebtedness. The third block is a panel estimation of the 
reaction of fiscal policy stance to the debt accumulated in the past and cyclicality of 
economic output. Application of scenario analysis and stress testing to forward-looking 
simulations of the debt dynamics as a forth block completes research methodology. 
 
The results of empirical research imply that all four hypotheses are proved. Results 
from the regression modeling of public indebtedness confirm the dynamics of the debt 
covariates with non-fiscal and fiscal variables. Descriptive analysis of debt 
decomposition and econometric modeling of indebtedness impose that debt-deficit 
adjustments and cyclically-adjusted primary balance as the fiscal variables are the most 
important contributors to public debt dynamics. Estimated results from the empirical 
modeling of the fiscal reaction function reveal that in the post-crisis period, the fiscal 
stance of the Emerging European Countries (EEC) positively responded to accumulated 
debt, confirming third hypothesis. Scenario analysis and Monte Carlo debt simulations 
indicate that accumulation of public debt would be profoundly accelerated if EEC 
countries did not interrupt practicing pro-cyclical fiscal policy behavior after the global 
crisis outbreak in support of fourth hypothesis validity. 
 
Keywords: public debt, debt determinants, fiscal sustainability, fiscal reaction function, 
cost-risk analysis, panel regression, structural VAR, stochastic simulations 
 
Scientific field: Economics 
 
Narrow scientific field: Public Finance 
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Naslov: DETERMINANTE JAVNOG DUGA I FISKALNE ODRŽIVOSTI 
 
Rezime: Predmet doktorske disertacije je analiza determinanti akumulacije duga i ocena 
fiskalne održivosti Srbije i uporedivih zemalja. Osnovni cilj istraživanja je empirijska 
kvantifikacija odnosa između dinamike javnog duga i njenih determinanti u kontekstu 
ocene ispunjenosti uslova fiskalne održivosti. Metodologija empirijskog istraživanja je 
izvedena na osnovu tri makroekonomska koncepta: jednačina akumulacije duga, inter-
temporalno budžetskog ograničenja i funkcije fiskalne reakcije. Fokus empirijskog 
istraživanja je na ekonometrijskom modeliranju dinamike javnog duga kao funkcije 
fiskalnih i nefiskalnih determinanti i simuliranja budućih vrednosti indikatora javne 
zaduženosti. 
 
Centralni deo metodologije empirijskog istraživanja se sastoji iz četiri celine. Prvu 
metodološku celinu čini dekompozicija akumulacije duga na doprinose pojedinačnih 
determinanti. Drugu celinu čini panel regresiona analiza kojom se kvantifikuju uticaji 
determinanti duga (primarnog bilansa, realnog rasta, inflacije, realnog deviznog kursa i 
kamatne stope) na dinamiku stvarne i strukturne zaduženosti. Treći blok obuhvata panel 
estimaciju reakcije odluka fiskalne politike na akumulirani dug u prošlosti i cikličnost 
ekonomskog autputa. Primena scenario analize i simulacije budućih vrednosti javnog 
duga kompletira istraživačku metodologiju. 
 
Nalazi empirijskog istraživanja impliciraju da su sve četiri hipoteze u disertaciji 
dokazane. Rezultati regresionog modeliranja javne zaduženosti ukazuju na 
kovarijabilnost dinamike duga i fiskalnih i nefiskalnih determinanti. Deskriptivna 
analiza dekompozicije duga u kombinaciji sa ekonometrijskom modeliranjem 
zaduženosti potvrđuje da su usklađivanje duga i deficita i ciklično-prilagođeni primarni 
bilans, kao fiskalne varijable, najviše doprinosili akumulaciji javnog duga. Rezultati 
empirijskog modeliranja funkcije fiskalne reakcije evropskih zemalja u razvoju 
pokazuju da je u post-kriznom periodu postojalo pozitivno prilagođavanje odluka 
fiskalne politike nivoima akumuliranog duga. Scenario analiza i Monte Carlo simulacije 
impliciraju da bi u evropskim zemljama u razvoju akumulacija javnog duga bila 
značajno brža da nakon izbijanja globalne krize ove zemlje nisu prekinule sa 
praktikovanjem pro-ciklične fiskalne politike, u prilog validnosti četvrte hipoteze. 
 
Ključne reči: javni dug, determinante duga, fiskalna održivost, funkcija fiskalne 
reakcije, analiza troškova pod rizikom, panel regresija, strukturni VAR, stohastičke 
simulacije 
 
Naučna oblast: Ekonomija 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Subject and objectives of the research 
 
The concept of fiscal and debt sustainability draws on the idea that public debt cannot keep 
on growing relative to national income since this would require governments to constantly 
increase taxes and reduce public spending. The public debt sustainability as the global 
issue in economic policy gains global importance after the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis, which triggered the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The financial crisis and 
subsequent recession have led to the rapid deterioration of government finances in many 
European countries. Self-reinforcing effect on the deficits, the higher interest rates and 
declines in the creditworthiness of sovereign issuers have reduced the sustainability of 
future debt dynamics. The escalating yield spreads in the Euro area in 2010 have 
underlined how suddenly these mechanisms can cut off a sovereign borrower from the 
capital markets, with notable examples of Greece and Ireland being enforced to look for 
financial assistance from the EU member states and the IMF. Regarding the average EU 
and Euro area, countries from central and eastern Europe recorded considerably lower 
level of debt-to-GDP ratio. However, due to the tricky growth prospective and rising 
deficits in the aftermath of the crisis, the European Commission launched the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure in all of the New Member states. 
 
The widespread practice of inappropriate public debt management was mainly caused by 
the inadequate assessment of the public debt determinants' exposure to fiscal and 
macroeconomic risks. From the theoretical point of view, an increment of the gross public 
debt can be decomposed into two components: overall fiscal balance of the general 
government and debt-deficit adjustments, the latter reflecting sum of residual mismatches 
between stock and flow positions in government financial statements. Since the overall 
fiscal balance is the main driver of debt accumulation over time, analysis of its 
determinants and associated risks makes a crucial element of the fiscal sustainability 
assessment.  
 
Decomposition of the fiscal balance to primary balance and interest payments on debt 
accumulated in the past is the first step toward analysis of the public debt determinants and 
fiscal sustainability assessment. As a difference between public revenues and primary 
public expenditures, primary balance is a result of the fiscal policy decision making and 
thus represents the measurement of the fiscal policy stance. Consequently, it is mainly 
exposed to the risks of economic fluctuations and non-credible public financial 
management. On the other side, interest payments are mainly exposed to the market risks 
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of changes in interest and exchange rates, with respect to the public debt portfolio term and 
currency structure.  
 
The subject of this work is a theoretical and methodological discussion on the relations 
between public dynamics, its determinants, and fiscal sustainability assessment, as well as 
empirical analysis of these relations based on a sample of countries consists of Serbia and 
seven peer countries. The objectives of the research can be systematized in two areas: 
analysis and quantification of the transmission channels from public debt determinant 
toward public debt dynamics, and the reaction of the fiscal policy stance to the dynamics 
of the debt and its determinants. 
 
1.2 Research hypotheses 
 
The most of the theoretical, methodological and empirical research in this work revolves 
around the issues relevant for testing the following set of hypotheses: 
 
 H1: Dynamics of the public debt is correlated with change in non-fiscal and fiscal 
variables; 
 H2: Dynamics of the public debt is more sensitive to the impact of fiscal than non-
fiscal variables; 
 H3: Fiscal sustainability is conditional to the positive response of the primary 
balance to change in public debt; 
 H4: Pro-cyclical reaction of the fiscal stance to fluctuations of the economic 
activity jeopardizes fiscal sustainability. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
The methodology applied in this work consists of the following research methods: 
 
 The desk research method applied in the systematization of the theoretical and 
methodological concepts and results from the existing empirical studies, aiming to 
argue relevance of the hypotheses and specification of the empirical research 
procedures; 
 Methods of descriptive, comparative and correlation analysis to illustrate main 
stylized facts on dynamics of public debt and its determinants in the sample of 
selected countries from the Central and Eastern Europe; 
 Methods of financial mathematics and portfolio analysis applied in the cost-risk 
analysis of the Serbian debt portfolio; 
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 Method of panel regression analysis applied in modeling of the public debt 
dynamics and fiscal reaction in the sample of selected countries from the Central 
and Eastern Europe;  
 Methods of time series analysis (Unit root testing, Structural Vector Autoregression) 
applied in modeling and forecasting of the public debt determinants; 
 Method of Monte Carlo stochastic simulations applied in probabilistic forecasting 
of the public debt dynamics; 
 Method of scenario analysis and stress testing applied in the assessment of debt 
sensitivity to macroeconomic shocks. 
 
1.4 Scientific contribution 
 
The scientific contribution of this thesis reflects in a variety of aspects: 
 
 It provides comprehensive and original systematization of the relevant theoretical 
concepts for the proper operationalization of the methodology for public debt 
forecasting and fiscal sustainability assessment; 
 It makes links between public finance accounting standards and theoretical 
concepts of debt accumulation identity; 
 Opposite to existing literature, this thesis methodologically approaches to the issues 
of public debt dynamics’ analysis from the standpoints of both public debt portfolio 
management wherein gross borrowing requirements are key analytical input, and 
fiscal policymaking wherein net borrowing requirements are key analytical input; 
 The novel methodological approach to the debt forecasting and fiscal sustainability 
assessment based on the structural indebtedness and fiscal policy stance is proposed; 
 The practical methodological solution to the deterministic projections of the debt 
market determinants in the emerging economies with underdeveloped financial 
markets, such as Serbia, is proposed; 
 It contributes to the rare existing studies that empirically examines the issues of 
debt accumulation and fiscal sustainability in emerging European countries;   
 It underscores issues of econometric analysis of time series cross-section data 
(TSCD), that are usually neglected in similar empirical work; 
 Lack of evidence on the out-of-sample performance of the stochastic simulations of 
public debt dynamics, being one of the most important drawbacks of the existing 
empirical literature, is addressed;  
 Empirical results related to the identification of the country-specific characteristics 
of debt dynamics and fiscal policy stance, together with assessment of cross-
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country patterns between debt determinants, gives the solid ground to policymakers 
that can be further utilized in the forward-looking analysis of the fiscal 
sustainability. 
 
1.5 Structure of the work 
 
The introductory chapter of this thesis depicts the research subject, objectives and 
hypotheses, respective methodological framework for empirical analysis and scientific 
contribution.  
 
The second chapter provides a detailed discussion on the accounting metrics of the debt 
and informational content of the public debt statistics with respect to accounting standards 
and structure of the debt portfolio. The theoretical concept of the debt accumulation 
equation is introduced and then linked to the public finance accounting outcomes. 
Important distinctions are made between gross and net borrowing requirements, fiscal and 
non-fiscal determinants of the public debt, and transmission channels in which determinant 
affects debt dynamics are addressed. Eventually, scenario and stress testing as forms of 
debt sensitivity analysis are elaborated. 
 
The third chapter deals with the concepts that constitute the fiscal sustainability 
framework. More specifically, it provides theoretical and operational grounds of the 
concepts of Cost-Risk modeling, intertemporal budget constraint and fiscal reaction 
function. 
 
The fourth chapter gives a comprehensive overview of the relevant literature, systematized 
to cover separately theoretical and methodological findings on one side, and empirical 
research on the other. The shortcomings of the existing literature are briefly figured out. 
 
The first segment of the fifth chapter presents a comparative analysis of public 
indebtedness and its determinants in selected EEC countries (including Serbia), as well as 
with the exercise of public debt decomposition to the non-fiscal and fiscal contributions. 
The second segment deals with the same issues but in formalized way, throughout 
econometric estimation of the debt determinants’ impact on public debt dynamics. 
 
The sixth chapter gives methodologies and empirical results of the forward-looking 
analysis grouped into three segments: forecasting of debt determinants, forecasting of costs 
and risks of debt, and forecasting of public debt dynamics with the associated econometric 
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estimation of the fiscal reaction function. The empirical research has innovatively designed 
in form of out-of-sample analysis. 
 
The conclusion chapter presents the most important findings of the work, their implications 
on fiscal policy and limitations of the existing research and recommendations for future 
work.   
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2 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
THE PUBLIC DEBT DETERMINANTS’ ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 Public debt definition and statistics 
 
The term “public debt” has been colloquially associated with all forms of the financial 
liabilities of the state authorities or the state-owned entities. In the strict statistical sense, a 
proper measurement of public debt has been an issue profoundly discussed by the 
academic community, international organizations and government authorities for years. 
Development of the System of National Accounts and the European System of Integrated 
Economic Accounts brought about much standardization in debt accounting in European 
countries and facilitated cross-country comparable debt reporting. In this section I discuss 
some issues on public debt measurement and statistics. The discussion revolves around a 
couple of important issues on available public debt statistics, including international 
accounting standards, delimitation of the government and public sector and reporting 
statistics on public debt value and structure. 
 
2.1.1 Accounting standards 
 
The first attempt to promote standardized measurement of economic indicators on the 
international level originates from the United Nations (UN) international accounting 
guidelines in 1947. A couple of years later, the UN Statistical Commission published the 
System of National Accounts (SNA), aiming to provide a comprehensive conceptual and 
accounting framework for macroeconomic reporting. Since introduction, the SNA has been 
well accepted by the government authorities worldwide and become basis of individual 
countries’ national accounting, but also the central pillar of continuous efforts of the 
intergovernmental organizations aiming to achieve mutual standardization of accounting 
practices. The major advance toward this objective was achieved in 1993, when a new 
version of the SNA was released as the result of the mutual work of the United Nations, 
the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank and the European Commission (Eurostat) on 
harmonization of national accounting principles. Since this revision, the follow-up 
accounting frameworks, like European System of Accounting (ESA) of the EU or 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the IMF, have been harmonized with the SNA. 
The same group of organizations in 2008 published the latest version of the SNA, being 
currently in place. 
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Apart from the SNA, other important manuals dealing with the issues of compiling debt 
statistics include ESA Manual on Government Deficit and Debt (MGDD) and Government 
Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM). The first edition of ESA MGDD was published in 
1999, by the mutual efforts of Eurostat, European Commission (EC) and European Central 
Bank (ECB). It follows the ESA 95 conceptual framework, which after February 2000 has 
become legally binding for all EU member states. The main purpose of MGDD was to 
provide reliable and comparable statistics on government debt and deficits that can be 
further used for the evaluation of Maastricht criteria related to debt and deficit thresholds. 
The last edition of MGDD was published in 2014, and it is complementary with the newly 
adopted ESA 2010 accounting framework. The first edition of the IMF’s GFSM was 
published in 1986. As stated in a preface, the primary purpose of the Manual is “to provide 
a comprehensive conceptual and accounting framework suitable for analyzing and 
evaluating fiscal policy, especially the performance of the general government sector and 
the broader public sector of any country”. The third revision of GSFM published in 2014 
is currently in place, harmonized with the SNA 2008. 
 
2.1.2 Delimitation of the government and public sector 
 
The terms “government debt” and “public debt” are often used interchangeably, as I do in 
this work (if the difference is not emphasized). However, according to prevailing 
international accounting rules, there is a clear separation between (general) government 
sector and the public sector, which is an important issue in explaining the scope of debt 
statistics compiled by the statistical offices.   
 
One of the most important conceptual definition introduced by the SNA 1993 was 
delimitation of the resident institutional units into five mutually exclusive sectors: the non-
financial corporations, the financial corporations, the general government sector, the non-
profit institutions serving households and the households, which altogether make up the 
total national economy. This is particularly important from the point of measuring 
government and public debt since the clear delimitation of the government and public units 
is the first step toward debt statistics compiling. According to this definition, the general 
government sector consists of government institutional units, “unique kinds of legal 
entities established by political processes that have legislative, judicial or executive 
authority over other institutional units within a given area”. In economic sense, the 
authority of the government unit reflects in power to enforce fundraising activities over 
other institutional units, while these funds are typically spent on providing services to 
community either free or at economically insignificant prices, or transfers to other 
institutional units for the purpose of income redistribution. More particularly, government 
units that match such definition are grouped into four subsectors: central government, state 
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government, local government and social security funds. Social security funds are often 
considered, together with other budgetary and extrabudgetary users on the central level, as 
a part of central government, but can be alternatively grouped in separate subsectors, 
especially for the purpose of statistical reporting. 
 
However, the government units are not the only ones that make up the public sector. 
According to the SNA, the public sector consists of the general government sector and 
subsectors of financial and non-financial public corporations, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 
(IMF 2001, pp. 15). A corporation is defined as a public “if a government unit, another 
public corporation, or some combination of government units and public corporations 
controls the entity, where control is defined as the ability to determine the general 
corporate policy of the corporation” (SNA, 2009, pp. 71).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Definition of public sector 
Source: GFSM 2001, pp. 15 
 
In practice, it is not so trivial to distinguish public corporations from general government 
units. For that purpose, the SNA established a so-called “non-market rule”. According to 
this rule, all the public units that are non-market producers ought to be classified in the 
general government sector. The SNA 93 introduced the concept of “economically 
significant prices”, as a basic criterion to make a distinction between market and non-
market producers: if producer charges economically significant prices to consumers, then it 
is considered to be market producer and vice versa (SNA 1993, paragraph 6.45 and 6.5). A 
price is considered as economically insignificant “when it has little or no influence on how 
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much the producer is prepared to supply and is expected to have only a marginal influence 
on the quantities demanded” (EC, 2002, pp. 13). The ESA 95 introduced the “the 50% 
rule” as an additional benchmark for delimitation of public producers to public and general 
government units. This rule basically asserts that prices should be considered as 
economically significant if sales cover more than 50% of the production costs (EC 2002, 
pp. 14). 
 
Serbian public finance institutional framework is mostly aligned with SNA and ESA 
provisions. The scope of the Serbian public sector was defined for the first time by The 
Law on Net Income Reduction for Public Sector Employees1. According to the provisions 
of this Law, the public sector in Serbia covers the following entities: 
 Direct and indirect budget users of the Republic, autonomous province or local 
self-government;  
 National Bank of Serbia; 
 Public agencies founded by the Republic, autonomous province or local self-
government in line with relevant legislation (including all regulatory and 
supervision institutions, commissions, funds, councils and other entities); 
 All entities and organizations founded by the Republic, autonomous province or 
local self-government in line with relevant legislation; 
 All public enterprises founded by the Republic, autonomous province or local self-
government in line with relevant legislation, as well as entities founded by public 
enterprises; 
 Legal persons controlled by the Republic, autonomous province or local self-
government, either through more than 50% of ownership or more than 50% 
representatives in managing bodies.  
Following the scheme in Figure 2.1 and public sector definition by The Law on Net 
Income Reduction for Public Sector Employees, the public sector in Serbia can be grouped 
in the following three categories: 
 
1. Central government level: 
 Direct users of the Republican budget: parliament, President’s office, ministries, 
judiciary and other budget agencies; 
 Indirect users of the Republican budget (courts, schools, etc); 
 Mandatory social insurance funds: Pension Insurance Fund, Health Insurance Fund, 
Unemployment Fund and Military Health Fund. 
  
                                                        
1 RS Official Gazette 108/13  
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2. General government level: 
 Central government level; 
 Extrabudgetary funds: PE Roads of Serbia and Koridori Ltd; 
 Subnational governments: Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, local governments 
(cities and municipalities) and indirect budget users of local governments. 
3. Public sector: 
 General government level; 
 National Bank of Serbia; 
 Non-financial public corporations (such as Serbian Railroads, Serbiagas, etc); 
 Depositary public corporations, other than the national bank (banks controlled by 
the government such as Komercijalna Banka); 
 Other financial public corporations (such as Dunav Osiguranje). 
While official public finance accounting and reporting in Serbia is based on the previous 
classification, it usually covers only central and general government level. 
 
2.1.3 Definition of government debt statistics 
 
According to the SNA, debt in the broadest sense is defined as “all liabilities that require 
payment or payments of interest or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or 
dates in the future” (SNA, 2008, pp. 446). However, it does not provide a straightforward 
definition of the government or public debt, but only refers to the other manuals, like 
GFSM or MGDD for details on the debt recording (SNA, 2008, pp. 448). In addition, 
neither ESA 95 nor ESA 2010 (EC, 2002, pp. 197; Eurostat 2014, pp. 384) conceptual 
frameworks give any specific definition of government or public debt. Instead, the MGDD 
points out that the government debt statistics can be compiled from provisional definition 
of general government sector and valuation rules of financial liabilities given in ESA. 
According to these provisions, government debt can be compiled as the stock of 
government liabilities at their market value in the closing balance sheet of the general 
government sector. In other words, the stock of the government liabilities equals the sum 
of all liabilities of general government sector, including currency and deposits, securities 
other than shares, financial derivatives, loans, other accounts payable, and in some cases 
technical insurance reserves and shares, all recorded at market value (where applicable).2 
 
However, government debt statistic of the EU countries that is usually referred by the EU 
institutions and general public is compiled according to the government debt definition 
stemming from the provisions given in the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
                                                        
2 The ESA 95 definition, pp. 197; the ESA 2010 definition slightly differs, e.g. special drawing rights are also 
regarded as a possible source of liabilities.  
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(henceforth the Protocol), annexed to the Treaty on European Union (colloquially known 
as Maastricht Treaty). While the Maastricht Treaty obliges EU member states to avoid 
excessive deficits and high public debts, the Protocol defines quantitative criteria for 
surveillance of excessive deficits and indebtedness, as well as government debt definition: 
“debt means total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year and 
consolidated between and within the sectors of general government.”3 This definition has 
been supplemented by the EU Council regulation, which specifies components of 
government debt according to the ESA provisions on financial liabilities (No 3605/93, No 
479/2009). According to the Protocol, debt is calculated as a sum of the three ESA liability 
categories - currency and deposits, debt securities4 and loans - at the end of the given year. 
The government debt defined according to the Protocol and Council regulation is 
commonly referred to as the EDP debt or the Maastricht debt. 
 
The Maastricht debt and government debt according to the general ESA provisions differs 
in two important aspects5: the Maastricht debt is recorded at nominal value (approximated 
by face value) and it excludes some ESA categories from financial liabilities, like 
derivatives and other accounts payable. Other important aspects of Maastricht debt 
definition are related to the notion of gross and consolidated debt. Gross debt means that 
debt is measured on gross basis, without netting with government asset positions. 
Consolidated debt means that liabilities of some government unit that is held by some 
other government unit are not counted when debt statistic is compiled. It should be also 
mentioned that debt is recorded in national currency; if liabilities are denominated in 
foreign currency, they are converted into the national currency at the spot market rate 
prevailing on the last working day of a given year (ESA, 2014, pp. 387) 
 
While EU member states compile and report debt statistics using Maastricht definition, 
Serbia has national methodologies that define public debt. The current legislation stipulates 
two definitions of public debt, which in turn leads to the reporting of two values of public 
debt. The Law on Public Debt 6  defines public debt as a total of liabilities of the 
Government of Serbia (GoS) stemming from the: 
 
 Loans contracted and debt securities issued by the Republic. In reporting practice, 
this portion of the debt is referred as “direct” debt of central government level; 
                                                        
3 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol 12 
4 In the ESA 95, debt securities as ESA category also encompass derivatives, but derivatives were excluded 
from government debt definition given by the Protocol. The ESA 2010 separates debt securities and 
derivatives, by setting the derivatives to be particular category of ESA framework. 
5 EDP notification tables pp.3 
6 RS Official Gazette, 61/2005, 107/2009, 78/2011, 68/2015 and 95/2018 
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 Debt of local governments or legal entities which is guaranteed by the Republic. 
Guarantees to other entities can be approved only for debt issued to fund capital 
expenditure. In reporting practice, guarantees to legal entities are referred as 
“indirect” debt of the central government level. 
On the other hand, the Law on Budget System7  prescribes the definition of “general 
government debt” as a sum of direct and indirect debt of all government levels, including 
local governments and social security funds, on a consolidated basis. Thus, the difference 
in definition of the public debt imposed by these two laws comes from the different scope 
of the public sector units coverage. When compared to Maastricht definition, the definition 
stipulated by the Law on Budget system is closer in terms of units coverage, but there is a 
methodological difference in statistical treatment of guarantees. The issue of the 
guarantees treatment in debt statistics reporting is discussed in more detail in the 
subsection on contingent liabilities. Since recently, Serbian fiscal authorities have been 
also reporting the value of public debt according to Maastricht definition. 
 
In this work, the general use of term public debt in the rest of the text refers to government 
debt according to the Maastricht definition for the EU member states. In the case of Serbia, 
public debt refers to public debt definition stipulated by the Law on Public Debt, if the 
different definition is not particularly emphasized. 
 
2.1.4 Public debt structure 
 
The public debt portfolio is usually the largest financial portfolio in the country, taking into 
account the size of the public sector and the comprehensiveness of the public debt 
conceptual definition. While the international organizations provide general guidelines on 
definition of public debt for the purpose of national accounting, the government authority 
in charge for the public liabilities, in literature colloquially referred to as Debt 
Management Office (DMO) 8 , closely monitors and produces statistics and reports on 
features of public debt structure. The reporting on public debt structure in terms of scope, 
content and soundness is country-specific and primarily depends on organizational and 
institutional development of public financial management and administrative capacities of 
DMO staff. Nevertheless, several key features of the public debt structure are usually 
covered by DMO reporting regardless of its capacities, as shown in Figure 2.2. These 
features can be systematized as follows (Cosio-Pascal, 2009): 
 
                                                        
7 RS Official Gazette, 54/2009, 73/2010, 101/2010, 101/2011, 93/2012, 62/2013, 63/2013, 108/2013, 
142/2014, 68/2015, 103/2015, 99/2016, 113/2017, 95/2018 and 31/2019 
8 Serbian DMO is established as an administration under the authority of the ministry in charge of finance 
under the name Public Debt Administration (PDA). 
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Figure 2.2: Key aspects of the public debt structure 
Source: Cosio-Pascal 2009, pp. 27 
 
1. Residence of a creditor. The legislation on public debt usually recognizes the notions 
of “external debt” and “domestic debt”, according to the simple rule on residence of the 
creditor: regardless of the currency of the loan, if the creditor’s residence is abroad, the 
loan is considered as external, and if the creditor is a national resident, the loan is 
considered as domestic. In the case of emerging economies where domestic financial 
markets are still underdeveloped and shallow, external financing of the public debt tends to 
exceed domestic financing. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3, which shows structure of the 
Serbian public debt by residence of creditor. 
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Figure 2.3: Structure of the Serbian public debt by the residence of creditor 
Source: PDA data and own calculation 
 
2. The currency of denomination. Domestic debt denominated in domestic currency, and 
external debt denominated in respective foreign currency of the creditor’ country is an 
expected outcome of external borrowing, so that currency structure of the public debt 
corresponds to structure by the residence of creditors. In reality, developed countries with 
strong and stable currencies, like USA, Denmark or EMU, have both external and 
domestic debt denominated in domestic currency. On the other side, emerging economies 
with volatile exchange rates often face difficulties or impossibilities to borrow in nominal 
terms in the domestic currency, even at domestic markets. This phenomenon is well-
known as original sin (Eichengreen et al., 2002). Thus, currency of denomination is an 
exceptionally important aspect of public debt structure in emerging economies like newer 
EU member states, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Public debt of EU countries in 2017, breakdown by currency 
Source: Eurostat 
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3. Institutional sector. Following the definition of the public sector, all liabilities of the 
general government units, monetary authorities and public corporations are considered as 
public debt. Yet, the legislation on public debt may stipulate institutional arrangements of 
the private-public partnership, where borrowing of the private entities is considered as part 
of the public liabilities. Such arrangements are characteristic for the external borrowing 
and include loans with public guarantee for private banks and corporations, or inter-
company lending for private corporations that have joint ventures with public corporations 
(Cosio-Pascal, 2009). 
 
Central government debt is the most dominant component of the pubic indebtedness, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.5. The share of other general government subsectors may 
significantly vary across countries, depending on the administrative organization of the 
government and level of fiscal decentralization. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Public debt of EU countries in 2017, breakdown by general government 
subsectors 
Source: Eurostat 
 
4. Maturity. The generic approach to maturity in financial analysis classifies all financial 
instruments into short-term (maturity up to one year) and long-term (maturity above one 
year). In the context of debt management, there are two notions of the maturity concept: 
original maturity, which refers to total life length of the debt instrument, and residual 
(remaining) maturity, which refers to the time length remaining for the debt to be fully 
repaid. The informational content of the residual maturity statistics is particularly 
important in the risk analysis of public debt portfolio since amount of debt falling due in 
short period is exposed to same risks as short-term debt. Short-time financing is less 
preferred being perceived as more risky type of funding due to uncertainty about future 
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development of the market conditions, despite its lower interest rates stemming from the 
higher market liquidity and lower maturity risk premiums. Thus, long-term debt 
instruments dominate in the term structure of the government debt portfolio (Figure 2.6). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Public debt of EU countries in 2017, breakdown by initial maturity 
Source: Eurostat 
 
5. Type of instrument. According to the provisions Council Regulations, No 479/2009, 
government debt (Maastricht definition) comprises only the following instruments: 
 
 Currency and deposits: currency in circulation and all types of deposits in national 
and in foreign currency; 
 Debt securities: negotiable financial instruments usually traded on secondary 
markets or can be offset on the market, and do not grant the holder any ownership 
rights in the institutional unit issuing them. 
 Loans: financial instruments created through direct arrangements between creditor 
and debtor, either directly or through brokers, which are either evidenced by non-
negotiable documents or not evidenced by documents. 
 
Typical forms of debt securities are treasury bills and bonds. Treasury bills are short-term 
securities considered as the money market debt instruments traded at some discount rate at 
organized markets. Treasury bonds are the generic term applied to all government long-
term securities, however in the strict sense, long-term security is considered as a treasury 
note if its maturity is between 1 to 5 years, or bond if its maturity is over 5 years. 
Government loans may be contracted at prevailing conditions on financial markets. Yet, in 
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case of emerging and developing economies international creditors are often willing to 
provide loan funding at fixed interest rates lower than market rates; such loans are called 
concessional loans. In advanced countries, most dominant form of debt financing is 
issuance of debt securities, while particular ratio between securities and loans in the 
government debt countries may vary across countries, as shown in Figure 2.7. The share of 
currency and deposits in the government debt structure is normally low or neglectable.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Public debt of EU countries in 2017, breakdown by instrument 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Apart from the Maastricht definition of government debt, a broader view according to 
SNA considers some other liabilities of the public sector units as an integral part of the 
public debt, most importantly trade credits and arrears. Trade credits consist of claims or 
liabilities arising from the direct extension of credit by suppliers for transactions in goods 
and services, and advance payments by buyers for goods and services and for work in 
progress, while arrears are defined as liabilities which due date has expired (Cosio-Pascal, 
2009). 
 
6. Interest rates. Interest rate structure of public debt is closely connected concept to term 
structure of public debt portfolio, due to the similarities in the risk exposures to 
unanticipated changes in market interest rates; while short-term debt has to be refinanced 
at new interest rate, debt issued at variable interest rate has to be re-fixed at new interest 
rate. Accordingly, borrowing at variable rates is conceived as riskier for DMO managers, 
who tend to issue debt at fixed rates, while lenders tend to offer funding at variable interest 
rates. A public borrowing at variable interest rates is more frequently incurred in case of 
loans since debt securities are usually issued at fixed coupon rates. Consequently, the 
interest rate structure appears as an important indicator of public debt portfolio structure 
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for the emerging and developing countries which are often forced to finance deficits by 
contracting loans. These points are illustrated in Figure 2.8, which provides interest rate 
structure of Serbian public debt separated to the central and local government levels. The 
lenders perceive central government as less risky than local level, thus share of debt at 
variable interest rates in local government units is considerably higher when compared to 
central level. 
 
Central government debt Local government debt 
  
 
Figure 2.8: Structure of the Serbian public debt by interest rates 
Source: PDA data and own calculation 
 
7. Type of creditor 
 
Creditors of the public debt can be grouped according to several criteria, like residence of 
creditor (external and domestic, which was already discussed) or institutional sector (non-
financial and financial). An illustration of the debt structure according to these two criteria 
for EU countries is shown in Figure 2.9. While share of foreign-credited debt varies 
extensively among EU countries, domestic debt is mostly owned by the units from 
financial sector, as expected.  
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2.9: Public debt of EU countries in 2017, breakdown by debt holder 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Another useful consideration of debt creditors grouping is quality (Cosio-Pascal, 2009). 
According to this criterion, creditors can be regarded as either official – those whose 
resources for lending are coming from their public budgets, or private – those using private 
sources for lending. Official creditors can be further grouped to bilateral and multilateral. 
In the case a bilateral creditor the funding source is the budget of a single government, 
while in the case of a multilateral creditor, the funding source is various governments’ 
contributions to a money lending multilateral agency, such as the World Bank and the 
IMF. On the other hand, ownership of debt by private creditors depends on the type of debt 
instrument: while government debt securities are bought by all residential sectors (financial 
corporations, non-financial corporations and households), domestic debt in form of loans is 
usually owned by the private banks. 
 
2.1.5 Contingent liabilities  
 
Contingent liabilities are conceived as obligations that do not arise unless a particular, 
discrete event occurs in the future. The issue of contingent liabilities is regarded as an 
important subject in the analysis of the fiscal sustainability of emerging and developing 
economies. For instance, Anderson (2004) study of public debt dynamics shows that the 
activation of the contingent liabilities contributes nearly 50% to the increase in public debt 
in a sample of 21 emerging markets. 
 
It is clear that contingent liabilities fit neither SNA definition of government liabilities nor 
Maastricht definition of government debt. Nevertheless, lessons learned from historical 
experience imply that contingent liabilities can suddenly turn to public debt during the 
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economic downturns, such as the recent global crisis. Hence, treatment of the contingent 
liabilities remains one of the most debated issues in defining scope of public debt portfolio. 
As reads in GFSM (2014), explicit contingent liabilities are defined as legal or contractual 
financial arrangements that obliged government to acquire some liability if particular event 
occurs. Implicit contingent liabilities do not arise from a legal or contractual source but are 
recognized after a triggering condition or event is realized. More specifically, explicit 
contingent liabilities can be roughly grouped into:  
 
 One-off guarantees to liabilities of other entities, such as publicly guaranteed debt 
of public corporations; 
 Contingent liabilities that are not in the form of guarantees. Typical examples are 
legal claims stemming from the pending court cases, or indemnities against 
unforeseen tax liabilities arising in government contracts with other units. 
On the other hand, implicit contingent liabilities are related to the events wherein public 
expects that the government will acquire liabilities without having legal obligation to do 
so, for the sake of public interest. A typical example, very actual due to the accelerated 
population aging, is net implicit obligation for future retirement benefits, i.e. total of 
earned citizen’s pensions less total pension contribution. Other cases of implicit contingent 
liabilities comprehend expenditures for recovery from natural disasters, coverage of 
outstanding debt of local government units in case of default or stabilization of banking 
sector in case of banking crisis.  
 
Opposite to explicit contingent liabilities, probability of implicit contingent liabilities 
activation and amount of obligation which will occur is not easy to anticipate. 
Consequently, implicit contingent liabilities are mostly subject to fiscal vulnerability 
analysis, whereas fiscal statistics report information about explicit contingent liabilities. As 
previously discussed, Maastricht definition of public debt does not comprehend contingent 
liabilities as government debt. By contrast, both public debt definitions stipulated by the 
Serbian legislation (Law on Public Debt, Law on Budget System) conceive one-off 
guarantees as a part of public debt. Serbian public debt accounted in accordance with both 
national methodologies and Maastricht's definition is presented in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Serbian public debt, national and Maastricht definitions, end of 2018 
 
Debt definition Law on Public Debt Maastricht 
Law on Budget 
System 
Liability type RSD mil % of GDP RSD mil % of GDP RSD mil % of GDP 
Direct liabilities of the 
central government level 2,540,066 50.2 2,464,310 48.7 2,540,066 50.2 
Indirect liabilities of the 
central government level 153,838 3.0 96,658 1.9 153,838 3.0 
Other liabilities of central 
government 0 0.0 318 0.0 318 0.0 
Debt of local governments 26,298 0.5 63,074 1.2 63,074 1.2 
Debt of social security funds 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Public debt total 2,720,202 53.8 2,624,361 51.9 2,757,295 54.5 
 
Source: PDA data  
 
As reads from the table, Maastricht definition yields the lowest level of public debt, due to 
a large amount of guarantees (3% of GDP) which does not fall under the scope of 
Maastricht definition. Fiscal Council (2012) analyzed pros and cons of the national and 
international methodologies looking for a definition that will produce the most realistic 
assessment of Serbian public debt. The analysis concludes that appropriate solution should 
in a way reflects the probabilities of contingent liabilities (as well as arrears) activation. 
For instance, Council proposes the hybrid methodology that comprehends direct public 
debt and guarantees weighted by the probabilities of activation, whereby probabilities 
would be estimated from the financial conditions of the entities which debt is guaranteed. 
Yet, as of 2019 PDA public debt reporting remains attached to national methodologies.  
 
2.2 Debt accumulation equation 
 
The debt accumulation equation (DAE) is a workhorse of debt and fiscal sustainability 
analysis. It addresses changes in public debt over time to fundamental determinants of its 
dynamics and serves as a tool for the debt projections and subsequent debt sustainability 
analysis. In order to provide a detailed explanation of debt accumulation dynamics, this 
section builds up analytical framework that gradually shifts from the theoretical level of 
the debt accumulation mechanics toward practical issues of the debt servicing costs and 
fiscal balance measurements, all supported by the appropriate illustrations. 
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2.2.1 Mechanics of the debt accumulation 
 
As been previously discussed, public debt on the aggregate level is a sum of government 
liabilities that require payment of interest and principal. If the government liability 𝑖 , 
outstanding at time 𝑡, is denoted as 𝐿𝑖,𝑡, and government portfolio consists of 𝑁 liabilities, 
then the aggregate public debt 𝐷𝑡 reads as  
 
𝐷𝑡 = ∑ 𝐿𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 . (2.1) 
 
On the technical level, aggregate change of public debt at time 𝑡 is simply equal to a 
differential of public debt dynamics, 
 
∆𝐷𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡−1. (2.2) 
 
The essential theoretical question is what determines the level of public debt change. Since 
the liabilities outstanding at time 𝑡 − 1 require payments of interest and/or principal falling 
due at time 𝑡 , this will be for sure one of the debt change determinants. Besides, 
government operations require spending of financial resources, which are covered from the 
public revenue, such as taxes and social contributions. The net result of government 
operations will also influence the borrowing needs of government since any shortage of 
financial resources to fund operations has to be settled through issuance of new debt. 
Hence, expected change of public debt 𝐷𝑡
∗, in the most general sense, can be conceptually 
decomposed to two main components: debt servicing costs 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑡 and result of government 
operations 𝑅𝐺𝑂𝑡 (other than debt servicing operations):  
 
Δ𝐷𝑡
∗ = 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑡 + 𝑅𝐺𝑂𝑡. (2.3) 
 
Debt servicing costs are generic term encompassing all (accrued or cash) financial 
outflows9  stemming from the government liabilities from the previous period, 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑡 =
𝑓(𝐷𝑡−1). For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that: 
 
 all liabilities are either loans or securities (contingent liabilities or arrears are not 
considered as a public debt according to Maastricht definition, while the share of 
deposits and currencies in public debt is minimal, as illustrated in Figure 2.7 and 
thus neglected); 
 debt servicing costs of the public debt portfolio at time 𝑡 consists only of interest 
payments and principal payments falling due at time 𝑡 (seldom debt servicing costs 
                                                        
9 Accounting of public sector can be based on accrual or cash principle. 
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with minor impact on debt accumulation, like provisions and penalties, are 
neglected). 
Under this generalization, the composition of the debt servicing costs reads as 
 
𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑡 = 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡
𝑀, (2.4) 
 
where 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 and 𝐹𝑡
𝑀 are an aggregate amount of interest payments and amount of loans or 
security principals maturing at time 𝑡.  
 
On the other side, the result of government operations is public finance accounting 
category derived from the government financial statements. Accounting conventions 
propose several indicators of government operations’ result that differ in scope of 
operations coverage. It is important to underscore that interest and principal payments are 
also form of government operations, but their categorization in public finance accounting 
practice is different: interest payments are regarded as current expenditures, while 
principal payments are regarded as financial transactions. Two most important 
macroeconomic indicators of the government operations’ result exactly differ in coverage 
of debt servicing costs: 
 
1. Primary fiscal (government) balance 𝑷𝑩𝒕  – covers the result of all government 
operations except interest payments.  
 
2. Overall fiscal (government) balance 𝑶𝑩𝒕  – covers all government operations, 
including payment of both interest and principal. Since the interest payments are negative 
financial outflow, overall fiscal balance equals primary balance less interest payments, 
 
𝑂𝐵𝑡 = 𝑃𝐵𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 (2.5) 
 
The rationale to separate interest payments from other government operations in the 
context of fiscal sustainability analysis is coming from the fact that the structure of 
government balance may raise additional concerns about the solvency of public debt. Even 
if government runs stable level of primary deficit to GDP, overall deficit can increase over 
time due to an increase in interest payments. As overall balance covers result of all 
government operations, the most general form of debt accumulation equation can be 
written as a macroeconomic identity given as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑡
∗ = 𝐷𝑡−1 − 𝑂𝐵𝑡, (2.6) 
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where 𝐷𝑡
∗  and 𝐷𝑡  denote equation and actual values of government debt, respectively, 
while 𝑂𝐵𝑡 denotes overall government balance at time t. Alternatively, if primary balance 
is used as a measure of result of government operations, the previous equation reads as: 
 
𝐷𝑡
∗ = 𝐷𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝐵𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡, (2.7) 
 
Further, if the currency structure of debt portfolio is neglected and interest payment is 
simply calculated by applying uniform nominal interest rate 𝑖 to stock of outstanding debt 
from the previous year, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑡−1, debt accumulation equation can be rewritten as: 
 
𝐷𝑡
∗ = (1 + 𝑖𝑡)𝐷𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝐵𝑡. (2.8) 
 
This equation tells that two basic determinants of debt-creating flows are the interest rate 
and primary balance. Their riskiness is substantially different, as the interest rate is a 
variable determined by the financial markets’ forces and decisions of the monetary 
authorities, while primary balance is determined by the means of fiscal policy and 
governmental decisions. However, assumption on uniform debt structure and uniform 
interest rate may be over-simplistic, especially in case of emerging economies, which most 
likely borrow money from foreign markets or international creditors. The presence of debt 
instruments denominated in foreign currency, which debt servicing costs are counted at 
foreign interest rate, brings additional market risk issues in managing government debt 
portfolio. Thus, debt accumulation equation can be further modified to explicitly 
encompass effects of foreign interest rate and foreign exchange rate on debt-creating flows, 
 
𝐷𝑡
∗ = (1 + 𝛥𝑓𝑥𝑡)(1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑓)𝐷𝑡−1
𝑓
+ (1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑑)𝐷𝑡−1
𝑑 − 𝑃𝐵𝑡, (2.9) 
 
where 𝛥𝑓𝑥𝑡 is a depreciation of the foreign currency
10, 𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 and 𝑖𝑡
𝑑 are foreign and domestic 
interest rates, 𝐷𝑡−1
𝑓
 is nominal value of debt denominated in foreign currency, and 𝐷𝑡−1
𝑑  is 
nominal value of debt in domestic currency.  
 
The form of debt accumulation equation as given in (2.9) describes the basic mechanics of 
debt dynamics on the aggregate fiscal and macroeconomic levels. Also, it represents the 
first step in methodological procedure of the debt dynamics decomposition to fiscal and 
non-fiscal determinants, which is discussed later on. Nevertheless, empirical analysis 
requires practical measurement of the theoretical concepts such as overall and primary 
balance, as well as measurement of the debt servicing costs, to provide adequate fiscal 
sustainability assessment. The following subsections deal with measurement issues of debt 
                                                        
10 Exchange rate is measured as a relative price of local currency per unit of foreign currency 
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servicing costs and result of the government operations in financial and accounting 
practice. 
 
2.2.2 Arithmetic of debt servicing costs  
 
Since public debt portfolio consists of a large number of debt instruments, debt servicing 
costs on aggregate level equals the sum of respective debt servicing costs of each 
instrument 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡: 
 
𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑖=1
𝑁 , (2.10) 
 
where 𝑁  denotes the number of instruments in the portfolio. On a particular level, 
computation of the debt servicing costs may be complex tasks in case of the so-called 
“exotic” debt instruments, such as loans that include grace periods, tranches, provisions, 
penalties for non-execution, specific amortization formulae, etc. Yet, plain vanilla debt 
instruments can be roughly divided into two categories:  
 
 Bullet debt instruments, where the entire principal falls due at the end of the 
instrument lifetime, while interest is paid periodically on a regular basis. Such 
system of debt reimbursement is characteristic of notes and bonds. 
 Amortizing debt instruments, where certain amounts of principal are reimbursed 
over the lifetime of debt instrument, usually at the same time when interest is paid 
down. Such a system of reimbursement is characteristic of the loans.  
In case of bullet debt instrument 𝑗 (usually coupon bond), the interest payment is simply 
computed using the following formula: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐹𝑗,0(𝑖𝑗,𝑡/𝑘𝑗), (2.11) 
 
where 𝐹𝑗,0  is contracted debt principal of 𝑗 th instrument, 𝑘𝑗  is the frequency of 
compounding within a year, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡  is interest payment at time t, and 𝑖𝑗,𝑡  is respective 
annual coupon rate, which can be either fixed (commonly) or variable if it is indexed to 
some variable interest rate. Principal 𝐹𝑗,0 is fully repaid at the end of bond lifetime.  
 
Amortizing loan 𝑗  is usually reimbursed in the form of equal annuities, which are 
composed of both interest and principal payments:  
 
𝐴𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑗,𝑡
𝑀 , (2.12) 
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where 𝐴𝑁𝑗,𝑡 is annuity amount falling due at time t, decomposed to respective amounts of 
interest payment 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡 and principal payment 𝐹𝑗,𝑡
𝑀. An annuity can be directly computed 
applying the formula:  
 
𝐴𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐹𝑗,0/ [
1−(1+𝑖𝑗,𝑡/𝑘𝑗)
−𝑇𝑗 𝑘𝑗
𝑖𝑗,𝑡
], (2.13) 
 
where 𝑇𝑗 is the maturity of loan in years. Since principal is gradually amortized, interest 
rate at given time t is applied to the outstanding (unpaid) amount of principal 𝐹𝑗
𝑂 at time t-
1, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝐹𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑂 (𝑖𝑗,𝑡/𝑘𝑗) . The outstanding amount of principal at time t-1 is simply 
computed as difference between full amount of principal and sum of reimbursed principal 
payments, 𝐹𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑂 = 𝐹𝑗,0 − ∑ 𝐹𝑗,𝑘
𝑀𝑡−1
𝑘=1 . 
 
An illustration of the DSC computation is provided based on the simple mock portfolio 
that consists of four representative debt instruments: one T-bill, one T-bond with fixed 
coupon payments, two amortizing loans reimbursed at equal annuity schedule. The 
supposed characteristics of the portfolio debt instruments are given in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2:  Representative portfolio of debt instruments 
 
Debt portfolio A B C D 
Type of debt T-bill T-bond 
Fixed 
interest loan 
Floating 
interest loan 
Settlement date 1/1/17 1/1/17 1/1/17 1/1/17 
Maturity date 1/7/17 1/1/20 1/1/21 1/1/21 
Face value (original 
currency) 
200,000 500,000 2,560 3,250 
Currency RSD RSD USD EUR 
Exchange rate N/A N/A 117.19 123.08 
Face value (RSD) 200,000 500,000 300,000 400,000 
Reference interest rate 
discount rate, 
2.5% 
coupon rate, 
3.0% 
fixed rate, 
2% 
1Y LIBOR + 
3.5% = 5.2% 
Payment frequency 2 2 2 1 
Inflation-linked     
Market price (for 
securities) 
197,531 457,330 N/A N/A 
Yield to maturity (for 
securities) 
2.5% 3.5% N/A N/A 
 
Source: own calculation 
 
As reads from the table, all debt instruments are issued at 01/01/2017. The 6-month T-bill 
A and 3-year T-bond B are issued in RSD and sold at discount rates 2.5% and 3.5%, 
respectively. Concessional loan C in USD is contracted at 2% fixed interest rate, which is 
lower than the comparable discount rate of T-bond. Finally, loan D is contracted at floating 
rate, so its reference interest rate is composed of 1-year LIBOR plus 3.5% spread. Using 
the formulae for interest payments of bullet debt and annuity payment of amortizing debt, 
debt servicing costs of this mock portfolio can be easily computed. The schedule of debt 
servicing costs in RSD over the 4-year lifetime of total portfolio at 6-month time intervals 
is presented in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3:  Debt servicing costs of the representative portfolio of debt instruments 
 
Debt portfolio A B C D 
Debt 
servicing 
costs 
1/7/17 200,000 7,500 40,953   248,453 
1/1/18  7,500 40,953 113,356 361,808 
1/7/18  7,500 40,953   248,453 
1/1/19  7,500 40,953 113,356 361,808 
1/7/19   7,500 40,953   48,453 
1/1/20   507,500 40,953 113,356 661,808 
1/7/20     40,953   40,953 
1/1/21     40,953 113,356 154,308 
 
Source: own calculation 
 
Eventually, debt servicing costs of the total debt portfolio at a given period are computed 
simply as a sum of debt servicing costs of particular instruments. 
 
2.2.3 Traditional framework of the government operations accounting 
 
As previously discussed, the first edition of the IMF’s GFSM published in 1986 was the 
first comprehensive manual based on SNA principles, aiming to align national 
methodologies in public finance accounting. Until 2001, when second edition of the 
manual with significant methodological changes was published, majority of the countries 
compiled government finance statistics in compliance with GFSM 86 guidelines, using 
accounting principles of recording transactions on a cash basis. Since the introduction of 
the second edition of the GFSM in 2001 until present days, developed economies mostly 
adopted new practices of recording government transactions on accrual basis using new 
analytical framework of public finance accounting. On the other side, many emerging and 
developing countries, like Serbia, remain attached to the “traditional” cash-based 
accounting while struggling to introduce advanced accounting practices proposed by the 
newer versions of the GFSM. The traditional framework of recording government 
operations, according to the GFSM 1986 is presented in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4:  Government operations according to the GFSM 1986 
 
Revenue and grants Expenditure and net lending 
Revenue Current expenditures 
Revenue from taxes (including social security 
contributions) 
Goods and services 
Non-tax revenue Salaries and other compensations of 
employees 
Capital revenue (including disposal of fixed 
assets) 
Social security payments  
Grants Other goods and services 
 Interest payments 
Subsidies 
Transfers 
Capital expenditures and transfers 
Net lending 
Deficit (-) / Surplus(+) on a cash basis  
Financing (domestic or foreign) 
 
Source: https://www.minfin.bg/upload/1450/GFSM-2001-meta-EN.pdf 
 
The main result of the government operations defined by the GFSM 1986 is government 
deficit or surplus on a cash basis. The government deficit/surplus is regarded as a 
traditional measure of the overall fiscal balance 𝑂𝐵𝑡. 
 
As of 2018, Serbian fiscal authorities apply the nationally developed concepts and 
definitions of GFS based on the GFSM 1986 (IMF, 2018). The national methodology is 
stipulated in the Law on Budget System. The main features of the national methodology 
are: 
 
 the institutional coverage of the data corresponds to the consolidated general 
government. 
 Republican budget includes revenues (including grants) and expenditures 
(including activated guarantees, except those of PE Roads of Serbia) – all of which 
are included in overall fiscal balance.  
 financing includes all proceeds (including privatization proceeds) and expenses 
associated with transactions in financial assets and liabilities. 
 revenue covers tax revenue (according to the nature and base of the tax), non-tax 
revenue (including capital revenue) and grants;  
 expenditures covers current expenditures, capital expenditures, budget lending and 
activated guarantees.  
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 financing outflows covers foreign and domestic debt repayment and acquisition of 
financial assets  
 financing inflows covers foreign and domestic borrowing, privatization receipts 
and receipts from repayment of loans. 
An example of the public finance statistics for 2018 that is reported by the Serbian ministry 
in charge of finance is given in Table 2.5. Public finance statistics are compiled according 
to the described national methodology. In 2018, consolidated government deficit as a 
measure of overall balance was in surplus 0.6% of GDP, while primary balance was 
around 2.7% of GDP (overall balance + 2.1% of GDP interest expenditures). 
 
Table 2.5: Government financial statistics of the Republic of Serbia (in % of GDP) 
according to national methodology, year 2018 
 
Revenue and proceeds Expenditure and outflows 
Public revenue (including grants) 41.6 Public expenditure 41.0 
Current revenue 41.3 Current expenditure 36.5 
Tax revenues 36.0 Compensation of employees 9.3 
Personal income tax 3.5 Goods and services 6.8 
Corporate income tx 2.2 Interest payments 2.1 
Value added tax 9.9 Subsidies 2.2 
Excises and customs 6.6 Transfers 14.7 
Other tax revenue 1.5 Other current expenditure 1.4 
Social contributions 12.2 Capital expenditure 3.9 
Non-tax revenue 5.3 Activated guarantees 0.4 
Donations 0.3 Budget lending 0.1 
Consolidated government deficit/surplus 0.6 
Proceeds 8.7 Outflows 9.4 
Privatization proceeds 0.1 
Principal payment to domestic 
creditors 
5.2 
Proceeds from debt repayment 0.4 
Principal payment to 
international creditors 
4.0 
Domestic lending 5.9 
Acquisition of financial assets  0.2 
International lending 2.3 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, SRB 
 
2.2.4 Recent developments in government operations accounting 
 
In 2001, the IMF published second edition of the GFSM, wherein essentially different 
analytical approach to public finance accounting was introduced. Apart from switching 
from cash to accrual accounting, GFSM (2001) has introduced holistic approach to public 
finance reporting: similar to any other business entity in the private sector, government (or 
public sector in general) has its own assets, liabilities and operations that are recorded in 
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relevant financial statements. Therefore, statistics of the government operations in the 
context of comprehensive asset-liability management have to be aligned with reporting on 
government assets and liability positions. The third edition of GFSM published in 2014 
brought about some advances in the more precise and reliable recording of statistics, but 
framework and principles established by GFSM (2001) have not changed. 
 
According to the GFSM (2014), the government should stipulate analytical framework 
based on a set of the following financial statements: 
 
1. Balance sheet, which records the stock positions of government assets and liabilities, 
and respective net worth. The government assets position consists of non-financial11 and 
financial assets, while liabilities are always considered as a financial position in balance 
sheet. Consequently, net worth of the government equals is accounted as a sum of net 
investments in non-financial assets and net financial worth, whereby net financial worth is 
obtained by netting financial assets with liabilities. 
 
2. Statement of operations, which records all government transactions with other 
domestic or international entities. Government transactions are grouped into three 
categories: transactions affecting net worth (e.g. tax collection, compensation of 
employees), transactions in non-financial assets (e.g. investment in infrastructure building) 
or transaction in financial assets (e.g. sale of the equity of state-owned enterprises).  
 
3. Statement of other economic flows, which records changes in stock positions of assets 
and liabilities that come for reasons other than transactions. The majority of those changes 
are stemming from the revaluation of stock positions due to the price and exchange rate 
movements, or discovery of new assets (like the discovery of new natural resources).  
 
4. Statement of sources and uses of cash, which records cash inflows and outflows 
related to statement of operations. Such kind of financial statement is related to those 
countries which apply more advanced public sector accounting based on accrual 
accounting principles12.  
 
The full structure of the analytical framework that corresponds to the financial statements 
proposed by GFSM is presented in Figure 2.10. 
 
                                                        
11 Non-financial assets in government balance sheet include fixed assets (building and machineries), 
inventories, valuables and non-produced assets (land and natural resources). 
12 Serbia is still practicing cash-based public sector accounting, yet, introduction of the accrual accounting in 
public sector is long-term strategic objective of the public financial management reform programme. 
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Figure 2.10: Public finance analytical framework 
Source: GFSM(2014), pp. 68 
 
By the presented scheme of public finance accounting, several important analytical 
balances that summarizes result of the government operations can be derived:  
 
1. Gross operating balance. It equals the difference between government revenue and 
expense other than the consumption of fixed capital. The GFSM manual makes a 
difference between government expense, which includes only current transactions (such as 
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compensation of employees) and capital transfers, and government expenditure that counts 
both government expense and net investment in non-financial assets. Consumption of fixed 
assets is a concept close to depreciation in corporate finance – it reflects the decline in the 
current value of the stock of fixed assets owned and used by a government unit as a result 
of physical deterioration, normal obsolescence, or accidental damage (SNA, 2008).  
 
2. Net operating balance. Depending on the analytical purpose, the net operating balance 
can be computed and interpreted in two ways (as presented in Figure 2.10): 
 
 as a difference between government revenue and expense, including consumption 
of fixed assets, indicating a summary measure of the sustainability of the 
government operations; 
 as a sum of net investments in non-financial assets and net financial worth, 
reflecting a change of net worth (of the initial balance) due to government 
transactions. 
Since many governments in emerging and developing countries do not compile statistics 
on the consumption of fixed assets, they usually report only net operating balance. 
 
3. Net lending/borrowing position. Depending on the analytical purpose, Net 
lending/borrowing position can be computed and interpreted in two ways (as presented in 
Figure 2.10): 
 
 as a difference between government revenue and expenditure (expense plus net 
investment in non-financial asset), reflecting a change in a net financial position 
due to the government transactions; 
 as a difference between net acquisition in financial assets and net incurrence of 
liabilities, showing to which extent government is either financing other domestic 
sectors in the domestic economy or abroad, or spend the financial resources 
generated by other sectors in the domestic economy or from abroad. 
These three indicators of the government operations’ results are the public finance 
accounting categories, which are regularly reported by the countries that follow GFSM 
2001 or GFSM 2014 methodology, like EU countries. This is illustrated in Table 2.4 which 
presents the statement of general government operations13 of the Republic of Croatia being 
the newest EU member. 
 
                                                        
13 While Croatian fiscal authority applies GFSM 2001, it still compiles data on cash basis principle 
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Table 2.6: Government financial statistics of the Republic of Croatia (in 000 HRK) 
according to GFSM 2001 methodology 
 
No. Description 2016 2017 2018 
Transactions affecting net worth 
1 Revenue 150,088,571 158,056,575 161,906,779 
2 Expense 150,558,643 152,714,569 155,436,095 
 Net-gross operating balance (1-2) -470,072 5,342,006 6,470,684 
 Change in net worth: transactions (31+32-33) 7,849,473 8,085,706 7,215,850 
Transactions in non-financial assets 
31 Net acquisition of non-financial assets    
 Net lending/borrowing (1-2-31) -8,319,545 -2,743,700 -745,166 
 Transactions in financial assets and liabilities 
(33-32) 8,319,545 2,743,700 4,866,951 
32 Net acquisition of financial assets -3,138,858 -2,850,381 9,918,410 
33 Net incurrence of liabilities 5,180,687 -106,681 10,663,576 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, HRV (2018) 
 
The net lending/borrowing as a result of government operations is obviously the closest to 
the concept of government deficit/surplus, as defined in GFSM (1986). For example, the 
ECB official statistics recognize the net lending/borrowing as measure of government 
deficit/surplus. The question is whether government deficit/surplus (regardless of the 
GFSM definition) is indeed the best possible proxy for the theoretical concept of overall 
balance from the debt accumulation equation. To address this question, especially for the 
purpose of fiscal analysis, GFSM (2014) prescribes the definition of the “overall fiscal 
balance” as a fiscal indicator rather than accounting category. Formally, overall fiscal 
balance is defined as a “net lending/net borrowing adjusted through the rearrangement of 
transactions in assets and liabilities that are deemed to be for public policy purposes (also 
called policy lending/borrowing” (GFSM, 2014, pp. 83).  
 
Following this definition, there is a recommendation to make a distinction between 
transactions in financial assets and liabilities depending on the purpose – whether they 
were acquired or disposed for public policy or liquidity management. While there is no 
clear rule how to make this distinction, general guidelines suggest that financial assets or 
liabilities acquired for the reasons such as supporting new industries, assisting public 
corporations, or helping troubled business sectors should be treated as public policy-related 
transactions. While theoretically accurate, the main issue in practical computation of this 
government operations’ indicator is additional information requirement, since information 
from Statement of operations is insufficient to differentiate public policy-related from 
  
 
 
35 
 
liquidity management transaction. Accordingly, literature on fiscal analysis is still using 
accounting definitions of government deficit/surplus (net lending/borrowing) as a measure 
of overall fiscal balance. 
 
2.2.5 Borrowing requirements and debt funding strategy 
 
It is clear from the previous discussion that government deficit/surplus (net 
lending/borrowing) as a result of the government operations represents a measure of the 
government financing needs, which in the literature are also called borrowing 
requirements. In the context of historical analysis, government deficit/surplus indeed 
depicts how much money the government can lend or must borrow to remain in fiscal 
equilibrium. Yet, when the debt accumulation mechanics is considered from the forward-
looking point of view, two important practical issues emerged: 
 
 How much money government really can lend or has to borrow, since a certain 
portion of debt falling due today needs to be refinanced tomorrow? 
 If the government has to borrow, how it will fund lack of financial resources? 
 
The corroboration of the former issue is given in Table 2.7, which shows the analytics of 
the gross borrowing requirements as a total of government financing needs. Gross 
borrowing requirements are defined as a “net lending/net borrowing during a particular 
reporting period plus debt maturing within that reporting period.” (GFSM, 2014, pp. 83). 
In the context of fiscal sustainability analysis, debt maturing in a certain period is equal to 
the total debt redemptions, which needs to be refinanced in the next period, as illustrated 
below. 
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Table 2.7: Definition of the gross borrowing requirements 
 
 
 
Source: Blommestein et al. (2010), pp. 3 
 
 
From the historical point of view, gross borrowing requirements are less relevant fiscal 
indicator since the term, interest and currency structure of the liabilities incurred to fund 
government financing needs are already familiar information. From the forward-looking 
point of view, the gross borrowing requirements are crucial analytical input for the DMO, 
since DMO is legally empowered to manage public debt actively and thus to determine 
term, interest and currency structure of the liabilities that will incur to fund financing 
needs. In other words, the DMO anticipates gross financing needs for a certain period of 
time and makes funding strategy, i.e. decision what combination of debt instruments will 
be issued to close financing gaps. As defined by the OECD staff, “The funding strategy 
entails decisions about how the borrowing requirements or needs are going to be financed 
(e.g. by using long-term bonds, short-term securities, nominal or indexed bonds, etc.). 
Clearly, total gross borrowing requirements should be the same as total expected or 
projected funding amounts.” (Blommestein et al., 2010, pp. 3) 
 
While debt accumulation mechanics explained by the equation (2.9) provides an important 
theoretical insight into the mechanics of debt formation over time, its application, in 
reality, is limited by two important issues. First, the DAE in (2.9) operates in terms of net 
borrowing requirements, which is not suited for the forward-looking analysis of debt 
dynamics in the case of DMO, which has authority to manage debt dynamics actively, 
including debt refinancing. Second, theory of debt accumulation is not particularly concern 
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with “stock-flow” relationship between debt (stock variable) and interest 
payments/government balance (flow variables). Indeed, from the theoretical view, this is 
irrelevant issue, but it is clear that in practice there is a big difference in managing public 
debt on a short-term or long-term basis. Like any other strategic decision, debt funding 
strategy is planning document that covers time horizon of at least one year. In practice, the 
DMO staff anticipate the gross borrowing requirements for a certain period of time (one 
year) and then decide on type of instruments and its characteristics (maturity, interest rate, 
currency) aiming to optimize debt servicing costs/risks and ensure fiscal sustainability. The 
issues of public debt costs/risks optimization and fiscal sustainability assessment are 
discussed in the following chapters. In this subsection focus is on development of debt 
accumulation mechanics, which is more suited for practical assessment of forward-looking 
debt dynamics as a basis for making debt funding strategy. 
 
Let's assume that DMO is analyzing possible debt funding strategies for the one-year 
period 𝑡. If the beginning of the period 𝑡 is noted with 𝑡, 𝑏 and end of the period with 𝑡, 𝑒, 
then mechanics of the debt accumulation imposes that anticipated closing value of the 
public debt at the end of the period  𝐸(𝐷𝑡,𝑒
∗ ) should equal the sum of existing debt at the 
beginning of the period 𝐷𝑡,𝑏
𝐸𝑋  and anticipated value of the overall balance for the given 
period 𝐸(𝑂𝐵𝑡), 
 
𝐸(𝐷𝑡,𝑒
∗ ) = 𝐷𝑡,𝑏
𝐸𝑋 +  𝐸(𝑂𝐵𝑡).  (2.14) 
 
The existing debt 𝐷𝑡,𝑏
𝐸𝑋  consists of two components: the fraction of liabilities that will 
outstand by the end of the period 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑂
 and a fraction of debt that will mature by the end 
of given period 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑀
, 
 
𝐷𝑡,𝑏
𝐸𝑋 = 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑂 + 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑀 ,  (2.15) 
 
so equation (2.14) can be rewritten as  
 
𝐸(𝐷𝑡,𝑒
∗ ) = 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑂 + 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑀 +  𝐸(𝑂𝐵𝑡).  (2.16) 
 
To formalize connection of the borrowing requirements, debt funding strategy and debt 
accumulation mechanics, net borrowing requirements 𝑁𝐵𝑅𝑡  and gross borrowing 
requirements 𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡 for the period 𝑡 are defined and introduced to the DAE. Following the 
discussion on borrowing requirements, it is evident that 𝑁𝐵𝑅𝑡  matches the anticipated 
value of overall balance at the beginning of the period, 𝑁𝐵𝑅𝑡 =  𝐸(𝑂𝐵𝑡), which can be 
further decomposed to a difference between projected interest payment on the existing debt 
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𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐸𝑋 , which are already projected by the DMO staff, and the anticipated value of 
primary balance 𝐸(𝑃𝐵𝑡) 
 
𝑁𝐵𝑅𝑡 = −𝐸(𝑃𝐵𝑡) + 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐸𝑋.  (2.17) 
 
On the other side, 𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡  matches sum of the anticipated value of overall balance/net 
borrowing requirements and existing debt maturing over the given period, which is also 
projected by the debt redemption plan,  
 
𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑀 +  𝐸(𝑂𝐵𝑡) = 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑀 +  𝑁𝐵𝑅𝑡.  (2.18) 
 
Accordingly, the anticipated value of public debt at the end of the period equals sum of 
existing debt outstanding by the end of given period and gross borrowing requirements 
 
𝐸(𝐷𝑡,𝑒
∗ ) = 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑂 +  𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡.  (2.19) 
 
To fund 𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡, the government needs to either issue new debt or sell some financial assets. 
If only borrowing option is considered, then previous equation can be rewritten 
“terminologically” so that anticipated value of the debt by the end of period is decomposed 
more intuitively as a sum of “old”, i.e. existing debt 𝐷𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑂 = 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑂
and increment of “new” 
debt 𝐸(Δ𝐷𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑊) = 𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡 which will be issued to fund borrowing requirements and keep 
public finance in equilibrium, 
 
𝐸(𝐷𝑡,𝑒
∗ ) = 𝐷𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑂 + 𝐸(Δ𝐷𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑊) = 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑂 + 𝐹𝑡,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑀 − 𝐸(𝑃𝐵𝑡) + 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐸𝑋.  (2.20) 
 
What would happen if the DMO wants to forecast the dynamics of the public debt one 
period ahead? First, the outstanding value of existing debt at the end of period 𝑡  (or 
beginning of the period 𝑡 + 1) is considered. A portion of this debt will mature over 𝑡 + 1, 
while the rest will outstand by the end of 𝑡 + 1, 
 
𝐷𝑡+1,𝑏
𝐸𝑋,𝑂 = 𝐹𝑡+1,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑂 + 𝐹𝑡+1,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑀 .  (2.21) 
 
Of course, 𝐹𝑡+1,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑂
 will continue to generate interest payments 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡+1
𝐸𝑋  over the period 𝑡 + 1. 
The same logic holds for the debt issued during the period 𝑡,  
 
𝐸(Δ𝐷𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑊) = 𝐸(𝐹𝑡+1,𝑒
𝑁𝐸𝑊,𝑂) + 𝐸(𝐹𝑡+1,𝑒
𝑁𝐸𝑊,𝑀),  (2.22) 
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under the reasonable assumption that portion of newly issued debt is short-term, i.e. 
maturing up to one year. Again, in the period 𝑡 + 1 government operations other than 
interest payments will generate primary balance 𝑃𝐵𝑡+1, which can be only forecasted at 𝑡. 
The gross borrowing requirements for 𝑡 + 1 relative to the beginning of the period 𝑡 then 
will then count as 
 
𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡+1
𝐸𝑋 + 𝐹𝑡+1,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑀 − 𝐸(𝑃𝐵𝑡+1) + 𝐸(𝐹𝑡+1,𝑒
𝑁𝐸𝑊,𝑀) + 𝐸(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡+1
𝑁𝐸𝑊),  (2.23) 
 
and consequently forecasted value of public debt by the end of period 𝑡 + 1 equals portion 
of existing debt in 𝑡, 𝑏 that will outstand at 𝑡 + 1, 𝑏, a portion of newly issued debt in 𝑡 that 
will outstand at 𝑡 + 1, 𝑏 and gross borrowing requirements outstand at 𝑡 + 1 
 
𝐸(𝐷𝑡+1,𝑒
∗ ) = 𝐹𝑡+1,𝑒
𝐸𝑋,𝑂 + 𝐸(𝐹𝑡+1,𝑒
𝑁𝐸𝑊,𝑂) + 𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡+1.  (2.24) 
 
Using this pattern of forward-looking recursion, forecasts of the public debt dynamics can 
be extended beyond 𝑡 + 1 period.  
 
To explain how the debt funding strategy is developed, let's assume that DMO optimizes 
funding of borrowing requirements over only two parameters: first, over term structure (to 
minimize exposure to interest rate/refinancing risks) and then over currency structure (to 
minimize exposure to foreign exchange rate volatility). The result of such optimization will 
be weights of each debt type in borrowing requirements over both parameters, 𝜔𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝑆 for the 
term structure and 𝜔𝑘,𝑡
𝐶𝑆  for currency structure, such that  
 
𝐹𝑘,𝑗,𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑊 = 𝜔𝑘,𝑡
𝐶𝑆 𝜔𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝑆  𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡.  (2.25) 
 
Since the DMO aims to keep public finance in balance, 𝐸(Δ𝐷𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑊) = 𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡 , then a 
weighted sum of all newly issued debt instruments should equal anticipated debt increment 
 
𝐸(Δ𝐷𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑊) = ∑ ∑ 𝐹𝑘,𝑗,𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑁𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑁𝐾
𝑘=1 = ∑ ∑ 𝜔𝑘,𝑡
𝐶𝑆𝑁𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑁𝐾
𝑘=1 𝜔𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝑆  𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡 .  (2.26) 
 
where 𝑁𝐾  counts number of available currency options, 𝑁𝐽  counts available maturity 
options, and  𝜔𝑘,𝑡
𝐶𝑆 𝜔𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝑆  is a specific weight in 𝐺𝐵𝑅𝑡  for each debt type regarding the 
combination of maturity and currency structure (j,k). For example, if government can 
borrow in local currency, EUR and USD (𝑁𝐾 = 3), and does not prefer maturities over 10 
years (𝑁𝐽 = 10), then there will be in total 30 options to issue debt instruments (𝑁 = 𝑁𝐾 ∗
𝑁𝐽) with respect to currency and maturity. Decisions about weights of each debt type to 
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fund gross borrowing requirements with proper argumentations (regarding debt costs/risks 
optimization and fiscal sustainability) make the core of debt funding strategy.  
 
 
2.3 Non-fiscal and fiscal determinants of the public debt 
 
Since macroeconomic view on debt sustainability is more oriented toward relative (to 
GDP) than absolute indicators, the DAE can be rewritten in relative terms as 
 
𝑑𝑡
∗ = (1 + 𝛥𝑓𝑥𝑡)(1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑓)
𝐷𝑡−1
𝑓
𝑌𝑡
+ (1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑑)
𝐷𝑡−1
𝑑
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑝𝑏𝑡 , (2.27) 
 
where 𝑌𝑡 is a nominal GDP, 𝑑𝑡 and 𝑝𝑏𝑡 are the values of debt and primary balance relative 
to GDP, respectively. Decomposition of nominal current GDP growth (1 + 𝑔𝑡) to real 
growth contribution (1 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡) and inflation contribution (1+𝜋𝑡) (measured by the change 
of GDP deflator): 
 
𝑌𝑡 = (1 + 𝑔𝑡)𝑌𝑡−1 =  (1 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1 + 𝜋𝑡)𝑌𝑡−1, (2.28) 
 
then the DAE can be completely expressed in relative terms as 
 
𝑑𝑡
∗ =
(1+𝛥𝑓𝑥𝑡)(1+𝑖𝑡
𝑓
)
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1+𝜋𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1
𝑓
+
(1+𝑖𝑡
𝑑)
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1+𝜋𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1
𝑑 − 𝑝𝑏𝑡 . (2.29) 
 
If lagged foreign debt to GDP ratio is expressed as a fraction of total public debt to GDP 
ratio, 𝑑𝑡−1
𝑓
= 𝜔𝑡−1𝑑𝑡−1, then the previous equation can be rearranged to  
 
𝑑𝑡
∗ =
1
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1+𝜋𝑡)
  (2.30) 
[𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛥𝑓𝑥𝑡(1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑓)𝜔𝑡−1𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑓
𝜔𝑡−1𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑑(1 − 𝜔𝑡−1)𝑑𝑡−1] − 𝑝𝑏𝑡.  
 
The final step in decomposition of the DAE to regular debt-creating flows requires 
simplifying assumption on uniform interest rate, computed as weighted sum of foreign and 
domestic interest rates, 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔𝑡−1𝑖𝑡
𝑓
+ (1 − 𝜔𝑡−1)𝑖𝑡
𝑑 . The additional simplifying 
assumption that 𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 is approximately equal to 𝑖𝑡 and a couple of arithmetic transformation 
gives debt accumulation decomposed to main debt-creating flows 
 
𝑑𝑡
∗ − 𝑑𝑡−1 =
𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)−𝑟𝑔𝑡+𝛥𝑓𝑥𝑡𝜔𝑡−1(1+𝑖𝑡)
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1+𝜋𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑏𝑡 , (2.31) 
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This equation unfolds fundamental regular sources of debt creation, and consequently, 
sources of systematic risks. The regular identified debt-creating flows can be further 
divided between  
 
 Automatic debt-creating flows – debt increments driven by non-fiscal variables, 
i.e. which are not under control of fiscal policy; 
 Primary balance – debt increment as a direct result of government operations 
other than interest payments, i.e., under control of fiscal policy. 
In reality, equation and actual values of public debt are never in equilibrium, due to uneven 
and non-systematic changes of asset or liability positions in government balance sheet not 
included in primary balance by accounting standards. These one-off changes are known as 
debt-deficit or in more general sense “stock-flow” adjustments. The majority of debt-
deficit adjustments (DDA) can be attributed to government fiscal operations and 
considered as fiscal drivers of public debt dynamics. Such kind of DDA is also “identified” 
debt creating flows, like privatization receipts or recognition of contingent liabilities 
activation. On the other side, unidentified DDA usually stems from some accounting 
mismatches (full discussion on debt-deficit adjustments is provided later in this section). 
Addition of debt-deficit adjustments 𝑑𝑑𝑡 (relative to GDP) gives final form of the DAE in 
terms of actual debt: 
 
𝑑𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡−1 =
𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)−𝑟𝑔𝑡+𝛥𝑓𝑥𝑡𝜔𝑡−1(1+𝑖𝑡)
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1+𝜋𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1 −  𝑝𝑏𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡. (2.32) 
 
From the debt accumulation equation (2.11) follows that debt increment over time is a 
function of four non-fiscal variables: interest rate, inflation, real growth rate and foreign 
exchange rate, and two fiscal variables: primary balance and debt-deficit adjustments, as it 
reads below: 
 
∆𝑑𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑖𝑡, 𝜋𝑡, 𝑟𝑔𝑡, 𝛥𝑓𝑥𝑡, 𝑝𝑏𝑡 , 𝑑𝑑𝑡). (2.33) 
 
2.3.1 Fiscal determinants of the public debt 
 
Opposite to non-fiscal determinants of the public debt, which impact on the dynamics of 
public debt is proportional to past values of debt as follows from equation (2.32), fiscal 
determinants are direct contributors to the current value of public debt. In that sense, short-
run transmission mechanics and direction of impact of fiscal determinants on debt are quite 
straightforward and stem directly from arithmetic in (2.32) equation, e.g. 3% surplus in 
primary balance to GDP (or in debt-deficit adjustment) reduce public debt to GDP at 
exactly 3%. 
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Primary balance 
 
Nevertheless, things get less straightforward when dynamic aspects of the transmission 
mechanism between primary balance and public debt are scrutinized. This can be 
illustrated by the case in which the government is running an overall deficit over the 
prolonged period.  When debt accumulation in absolute terms is considered (equation 2.6), 
it is clear that it will inevitably increase current level of debt in absolute terms. However, 
the DAE in relative terms (2.11) tells that if GDP grows at high rates, it can offset 
contribution of the overall fiscal balance to the debt increment. When GDP growth exceeds 
contribution of the overall deficit to the public debt dynamics, it is possible for government 
to stabilize long-term debt to GDP and achieve fiscal sustainability, even if it runs the 
deficit all the time. To corroborate this claim, the DAE representation in (2.9) is simplified 
by neglecting the real and nominal aspects of GDP growth and assuming that complete 
public debt is denominated in domestic currency (and thus exchange rate as a debt 
determinant can be omitted from the computations). After the simplification, the DAE 
reads as 
 
𝑑𝑡
∗ =
(1+𝑖𝑡)
(1+𝑔𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑏𝑡 .  (2.34) 
 
Furthermore, the latter equation can be rewritten in terms of debt increment Δ𝑑𝑡: 
 
Δ𝑑𝑡 =
(𝑖𝑡−𝑔𝑡)
(1+𝑔𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑏𝑡 ,  (2.35) 
 
to illustrate the point that public debt dynamics essentially depends on the values of 
primary balance and the difference between the nominal interest rate and nominal growth, 
which is known in the literature as the “interest-growth” differential. 
 
The intention of the government to keep public debt to GDP ratio s basically means that 
public debt will be stabilized over time at some steady-state 𝑑̅, 𝑑̅ = 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑑𝑡−1, and the 
debt increment accordingly will equal zero, Δ𝑑𝑡 = 0. If this assumption is made, it is 
possible to compute so-called “debt-stabilizing” primary balance 𝑝𝑏̅̅ ̅𝑡  that keeps public 
debt in steady-state equilibrium: 
 
𝑝𝑏̅̅ ̅𝑡 =
(𝑖𝑡−𝑔𝑡)
(1+𝑔𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1.  (2.36) 
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This equation tells particularly important aspects of the bi-directional causality in dynamic 
relation between the primary balance and public debt: while debt accumulation mechanics 
implies contemporaneous direct effect of primary balance on change in public debt, fiscal 
sustainability condition implies impact of lagged public debt on primary balance 
throughout the fiscal policy-making. In other words, public debt history is an important 
input of current fiscal policy stance.  
 
Let's assume that fiscal authority computed value of debt stabilizing primary balance based 
on the previous equation and relevant inputs. An important question that arises inevitably 
is to what extent fiscal authority can really achieve targeted value of primary balance since 
primary balance in accounting sense represents the result of government operations other 
than debt servicing costs? Even on the intuitive level it is clear that pursuing exact value of 
primary balance is an extremely complex task since government needs to be in full control 
of its revenues and expenditures. On the other side, standard macroeconomic identities, 
such as those in IS-LM macroeconomic framework, considers government revenues as an 
endogenous variable, i.e. function of GDP. The exact value of the taxes and contributions 
eventually collected will depend on the respective accounting basis, which is in turn 
determined by the size of respective GDP components. Since the size of GDP in a market 
economy is driven by the economic fluctuations beyond government control, the best shot 
that government can do is to anticipate economic fluctuations as accurate as possible and 
to adjust primary balance according to anticipated fluctuations. Besides, some components 
of the government expenditures such as social transfers to unemployed are arguably 
associated with economic fluctuation and also needs to be taken into account to properly 
target specific value of primary balance. 
 
In order to extend the analysis of the fiscal sustainability toward effects of the economic 
output fluctuations, primary balance can be further decomposed to the cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance (CAPB) and so-called “automatic stabilizers” 𝑎𝑠𝑡, as given below: 
 
𝑝𝑏𝑡 = 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑡 + 𝑎𝑠𝑡 .  (2.37) 
 
The cyclically-adjusted primary balance is interpreted as a value of primary balance that 
would be observed when the economic output is at potential value (Mourre et al., 2013). It 
depicts character of the discretionary fiscal policy and represents traditional measure of 
fiscal stance. On the other side, traditional measure of the economic cyclicality is output 
gap, which is defined as a difference between actual and potential value of economic 
output (GDP). In regard to the fiscal stance, fiscal policy can be considered as counter-
cyclical if CAPB moves in the opposite way to economic cycle, for example if government 
increases CAPB during economic downturns when output gap goes bellow zero; the 
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opposite holds for pro-cyclical fiscal policy, when CAPB moves in the same direction as 
output gap. The second component of the primary balance, automatic fiscal stabilizers, 
indicates the fraction of the primary balance directly influenced by cyclical fluctuations in 
the economy. More precisely, automatic stabilizers refer to fiscal categories that 
automatically react to the economic cycle without any intervention by fiscal policy 
authorities (Angelovska Bezovska et al, 2011). 
 
In the older literature on fiscal policy, CAPB had been also called “structural” primary 
balance, but in recent years concept of structural primary balance has been further 
extended to adjust primary balance for transitory impacts other than economic cyclicality. 
The GFSM (2014) defines structural primary balance as “primary fiscal balance, after 
removing the impact of cyclical movements in revenue, expenditure, and the effects of 
unusual or one-off events.” (GFSM, 2014, pp. 83). In the context of fiscal policy analysis, 
use of structural policy as a measure of fiscal stance has obvious advantages relative to 
actual primary balance, as underscored by the Ademmer et al. (2016): 
 
 Cyclicality of actual balance is significant because tax revenues are highly pro-
cyclical, and social transfer payments (especially unemployment insurance 
payments) are counter-cyclical.  
 During recessions, the actual balance deteriorates, even though this reflects neither 
short-term changes in policy nor long-term changes in fiscal sustainability  
 One-off  revenues or expenses are not the result of current policy, but instead the 
result of accounting decisions which do not reflect the current operations of the 
government 
Since the CAPB (or structural PB) is arguably a more appropriate measure of fiscal policy 
stance than actual balance, the use of CAPB as a fiscal input in public debt sustainability 
analysis seems reasonable. The use of at least CAPB instead of actual is especially 
important in any kind of fiscal analysis over the period when economic fluctuations were 
pronounced, as in period surrounding global economic turmoil.  The main problems with 
practical application of CAPB-based approach to fiscal sustainability are measurement 
issues; removal of the transitory components from the actual value of balance, as well as 
calculation of the potential GDP is not a trivial task. In recent years computation of 
CAPB/structural balance became the widespread practice of fiscal authorities, but 
methodology is still not unified. An illustration of comparative overview of the actual, 
primary and structural balance from Serbian Fiscal Strategy is presented in Table 2.8.  
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Table 2.8: Actual, cyclically-adjusted and structural values of primary balance, Serbia 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, SRB (2017), pp. 69 
 
The methodological issues of potential GDP calculation and primary balance adjustment 
are discussed later in the text. 
 
Debt-deficit adjustment 
 
Debt-deficit adjustment (also known as stock-flow adjustment or reconciliation) measures 
the difference between overall fiscal balance and change in debt, which in theory should be 
equal according to the underlying macroeconomic identity of debt accumulation, as 
illustrated by equation (2.31). In reality, the sum of liabilities incurred never matches 
overall fiscal balance, i.e. net lending/borrowing as defined by GFSM (2014). The example 
of Croatian Statement of operations, given in Table 2.6, illustrates that point: according to 
the table, net borrowing in 2016 was 8,319,545,000 HRK, while amount of net liabilities 
incurred was 5,180,687, 000 HRK which means that 3,138,858,000 HRK of the overall 
balance was financed by the surplus in net acquisition of financial assets.  
 
In terms of GFSM framework, OECD (2017) defines accounting identity that relates debt-
deficit adjustment to other items from government finance statistics as follows: debt-deficit 
adjustment = government balance + net purchase of financial assets - net incurrence of 
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non-debt liabilities + revaluations of liabilities + other changes in the volume of liabilities. 
The net acquisition of financial assets is usually the major component of the debt-deficit 
adjustment, but not the only one. In a more generic sense, debt-deficit adjustments reflect 
the difference between recorded fiscal balance and recorded government borrowing needs, 
and can be divided into three groups ECB (2014): 
 
 Transaction in main financial assets – typically change of deposits held by the 
government or other public units which constitutes the general government sector;  
 Time-of-recording differences – typically reflect mismatch in time recording of 
liability (being immediately recorded as an expenditure) and cash outflow of its 
payment (if delayed, reduce current borrowing requirements);  
 Valuation effects – typically reflect market-to-face value adjustments between 
recording of debt at face value and financial transactions at market value. 
In their paper, Hagen & Wolf (2006) cited the public finance circumstances that usually 
leads to discrepancy between the overall balance and debt increment: 
 
 Issuance of zero-coupon bonds to cover deficit. If a bond that has a face value 150 
EUR is issued at discount rate for 130 EUR to cover a deficit, the liability incurred 
(according to Maastricht definition) is recorded at nominal value of 150, so debt-
deficit adjustment will be 20 EUR;  
 Revaluation of debt denominated in foreign currency. The volatility of exchange 
rates changes the face value of the debt in foreign currency, without having any 
impact on the fiscal balance;  
 A mismatch between a deficit that is measured in accrual terms and debt that is a 
cash concept. For example, if government sold some “doing business” licensees, 
this will count as revenue and reduce deficit in the year of selling, however, debt is 
only reduced when the cash receipts from selling licenses are used to terminate 
some liability.  
 Privatization  and equity injections in public companies.  
 Transactions in financial assets. The selling of financial assets reduces gross debt, 
however, it has no effect on the fiscal balance when recorded by the EDP definition. 
Within the GFSM framework, revaluation of liabilities is recorded under other economic 
flows. An example in Table 2.9 demonstrates the statistical treatment of refinanced debt 
which has been revaluated. In context of debt-deficit adjustment, case of public sector unit 
as a debtor is of particular interest. Since existing debt instrument of 100 was refinanced 
by new instrument of 95, existing liability of 100 is terminated and new liability incurred 
of 95 is recorded as financial transaction, while revaluation is recorded under other 
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economic flows. Eventually, closing value of debt is 95, while revaluation value is 
considered as debt-deficit adjustment. 
 
Table 2.9: Statistical treatment of debt revaluation 
 
 
 
Source: Task Force on Finance Statistics (2013), pp. 57 
 
Since its components are the result of government operations, debt-deficit adjustment can 
be clearly considered as a fiscal determinant of the public debt dynamics. As long as the 
DDA and its components are the result of sound statistical recording and can be clearly 
attributed to the results of the government operations, the reliability of deficit and debt 
records is not a subject of concern. For example, the IMF methodology of debt 
sustainability analysis makes a difference between identified and residual components of 
debt-deficit adjustment, whereby identified are further grouped into the privatization 
receipts, change in governmental deposits, contingent liabilities and net lending outside 
budget, while residual includes changes in assets.  
 
If the components of debt-deficit adjustments are not a result of some intentional fiscal 
activity, these should tend to cancel out over time. Indeed, Table 2.10 shows that average 
DDA per annum in most Euro area countries was less than 1 percentage point over the 
period 1999 – 2006.  
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Table 2.10: Debt-deficit adjustments in Euro area 1999-2005 
 
 
 
Source: ECB (2007), pp. 91 
 
Large and persistent DDA that have a negative impact on debt developments may give 
cause for concern since it can be the result of the incorrect recording of government 
operations and in turn can lead to large ex-post upward revisions of deficit levels (EC, 
2003). However, this is not always the case: exceptionally large levels of DDA in 
Luxemburg and Finland stemming from the financial investment that reads in Table 2.10 
reflects accumulation of assets in social security funds to prepare for anticipated implicit 
contingent liabilities imposed by future pension payments (ECB, 2007). 
 
2.3.2 Non-fiscal determinants of the public debt 
 
The first step in the elaboration of the non-fiscal impact on public debt dynamics is 
distinction between real and monetary public debt drivers since these variables are very 
different with respect to the underlying fundamentals. While a value of GDP is determined 
by the utilization of domestic production function factors (labor, capital, technology and 
natural resources) and global economic cyclicality, inflation, exchange rates and interest 
rates are variables predominantly determined by the result of the domestic monetary 
operations and spillovers from international financial markets. In this subsection I analyze 
transmission mechanics in which non-fiscal determinants affect public debt dynamics, with 
specific focus on the intertwining between monetary public debt drivers. 
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Interest rate(s) 
 
The simplified version of the DAE representation (2.7) in absolute terms shows that public 
debt dynamics are nominally driven by only two determinants: interest expense 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 and 
primary balance 𝑃𝐵𝑡  (currency structure of debt portfolio is neglected). Since 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 =
𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑡−1, as given in (2.8), impact of interest rate on public debt in nominal terms seems 
pretty straightforward: increase in nominal interest rate leads to proportional increase in 
nominal public debt 𝐷𝑡.  
 
Nevertheless, the main analytical issue of such approach to debt dynamics analysis in 
practice is a lack of natural “single” interest rate that can be applied to the aggregate value 
of lagged public debt to compute directly aggregate value of interest expense. Indeed, in 
reality interest expense 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 on aggregate level is nothing else but a sum of the interest 
payments of the particular debt instruments 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 = ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 . If currency structure of 
debt portfolio is also considered, under the restrictive assumption that domestic and 
interest rates are equal, interest payment for any instrument in a debt portfolio will be 
determined by the respective nominal interest rate and currency depreciation, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑓𝑖(𝑖𝑖,𝑡, Δ𝑓𝑥𝑖,𝑡). Furthermore, any nominal interest rate can be further decomposed to real 
interest rate and inflation rate using the famous Fisher formula: 
 
(1 + 𝑖𝑖,𝑡) = (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡)(1 + 𝜋𝑡)  (2.38) 
 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡  denotes real interest rate of debt instrument 𝑖. If a product od 𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡  and 𝜋𝑡  is 
arguably considered to be very small values, the Fisher equation can be simplified and 
reads as 𝑖𝑖,𝑡 ≈ 𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡. Besides, any real interest rate for particular debt instrument can 
be decomposed to the real “risk-free” interest rate 𝑟𝑧𝑡 , (usually measured by the real 
interest rate on T-bills), and risk premium 𝑟𝑝𝑚𝑖,𝑡  that depends on specific riskiness of 
given instrument (which in case of Government predominantly represents maturity risk 
premium) 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑧𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑚𝑖,𝑡  (2.39) 
 
Taking everything into account, aggregate interest expense of public debt can be 
considered as a function of risk-free interest rate, set of respective 𝑁 risk premiums, set of 
𝑄 nominal depreciations (𝑄 counts for currencies of denominations present among debt 
instruments), and inflation rate, 
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𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 = 𝑓 (𝑟𝑧𝑡; {𝑟𝑝𝑚𝑖,𝑡}𝑁; {Δ𝑓𝑥𝑗,𝑡}𝑄; 𝜋𝑡)  (2.40) 
 
From the previous, it is clear that no uniform natural interest rate can reflect such 
complexity of underlying factors that determine interest rate expense. Thus, in analysis of 
dynamic relations between public debt and interest rate(s) two options are possible: 
 
1. Use of implied interest rate. A simple workaround consists of computing the so-called 
“implied” interest rate by dividing the current interest payment with the stock of 
outstanding debt from the previous period. Such practice is typically applied in 
macroeconomic type of fiscal sustainability analysis. This approach brings about a couple 
of advantages. First, it is very simple to apply and it does not require data on individual 
interest rates, maturity or currency structure of the debt. Second, the implied interest rate 
reflects influence of both interest rates and exchange rates on the pace of change in interest 
expense. Third, its application allows that aggregate interest expense from national 
accounts’ statistics directly enters as an input to the debt accumulation equation. The main 
disadvantage of this approach, of course, is impossibility to explicitly discriminate 
contribution of particular interest and exchange rates’ changes to debt increment. Implied 
interest rate 𝑟𝑡 is simply computed as: 
 
𝑟𝑡 =
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐷𝑡−1
= 𝑓 (𝑟𝑧𝑡; {𝑟𝑝𝑚𝑖,𝑡}𝑁; {Δ𝑓𝑥𝑖,𝑡}𝑄; 𝜋𝑡)  (2.41) 
 
and clearly it is a function of all aggregate interest expense’ drivers. 
 
2. Use of individual interest rates. Such an approach is “bottom-up” type, which means 
that individual interest rates are applied to individual instruments to compute individual 
interest payments, which are summed up to compute aggregate interest expense: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 = ∑ 𝑖𝑖,𝑡Δ𝑓𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑖=1   (2.42) 
 
Consequently, it is computationally extensive and requires very detailed information about 
the structure of debt and related interest rates. Despite these limitations, it is frequently 
used by public debt portfolio managers in cost/risk optimization analysis, especially in 
countries with developed financial markets and statistics. When applied to fiscal 
sustainability analysis, this approach is usually simplified, wherein simplification is 
achieved throughout grouping similar types of debt instruments into public debt sub-
portfolios. 
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Exchange rate(s) 
 
The impact of exchange rate depreciation (or appreciation) on public debt dynamics is 
quite similar in case of interest rate. From the DAE nominal representation in (2.9) directly 
follows that nominal depreciation leads to proportional increase in nominal value of public 
debt over two channels: value of those outstanding liabilities and those current interest 
payments, which are denominated in foreign currency; both of them get more expensive if 
valuated in local currency units. If the cost of depreciation is denoted as 𝐹𝑋𝐶𝑡 and portion 
of debt in foreign currency as 𝐷𝑡
𝑓
, under the assumption that domestic and foreign nominal 
interest rates are equal, cost of depreciation equals sum of these two components 
 
𝐹𝑋𝐶𝑡 = Δ𝑓𝑥𝑡𝐷𝑡−1
𝑓
+ Δ𝑓𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑡−1
𝑓
  (2.43) 
 
In case the public debt portfolio comprises debt instruments denominated in different 
currencies, it is impossible to have single measure of aggregate nominal depreciation. On 
the portfolio level, the aggregate value of the cost of depreciation equals sum of individual 
costs, 𝐹𝑋𝐶𝑡 = ∑ 𝐹𝑋𝐶𝑞,𝑡
𝑄
𝑞=1 . Consequently, cost of depreciation will be a function of 
uniform nominal interest rate and a set of 𝑄 nominal depreciations.  
 
For the purpose of exchange rate forecasting, which is an important issue for estimation of 
the future debt servicing costs, essential question is what determines its dynamics. The 
standard macroeconomic theory relies on three important concepts to explain how 
exchange rates interact with monetary variables: 
 
1. Law of One Price and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
2. International Fisher Effect (IFE) 
3. Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP)  
 
1. The fundamental theory about relations between prices and nominal exchange rate, 
known as the Law of One Price, suggests that on the perfect markets price of any good in 
domestic country should be equal to a product of nominal exchange rate and price of this 
good in foreign country, otherwise there will be opportunity for trading arbitrage. For 
instance, if the price of 1kg tomato costs 1.5 EUR in some EU countries and RSD/EUR 
exchange rate is 120, then price of 1kg tomato in Serbia should be equal 180 RSD. If price 
of 1kg tomato in Serbia is 200 RSD, one can purchase tomato in EU, sell in Serbia and 
makes arbitrage (risk-free) profit of 20 RSD per kg of tomato. The direct consequence of 
the Law of One Price is equality of purchasing powers among currencies, underpinning the 
popular concept of absolute Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Thus, nominal exchange rate 
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can be thought of as a relationship between average price level in domestic country 𝑃𝑡
𝑑 
over average price level in foreign country 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
: 
 
𝑓𝑥𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑑
𝑃𝑡
𝑓  (2.44) 
 
where superscript PPP denotes the theoretical value of exchange rate if the PPP hypothesis 
holds. Consequently, average domestic price level is equal to a product of nominal 
exchange rate and average price level in foreign country, 𝑃𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑓𝑥𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑓
. The concept of 
absolute PPP is considered too restrictive since the weights and basket of goods used in the 
computation of the average price level differs across countries. Instead, less restrictive 
concept of relative PPP appears as more realistic; according to relative PPP, nominal 
exchange rate depreciation14 equals ratio between domestic and foreign index general price 
index 
 
∆𝑓𝑥𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃 =
(1+𝜋𝑡
𝑑)
(1+𝜋𝑡
𝑓
)
− 1 ≈ 𝜋𝑡
𝑑 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑓
  (2.45) 
 
In a simplified version, relative PPP equals inflation differential between domestic and 
foreign inflation, with straightforward interpretation that higher rate of domestic relative to 
foreign inflation has to be offset by nominal depreciation of exchange rate in order to 
preserve equality of purchasing powers. 
 
2. If the relative PPP holds, the Fisher equation in (2.38) can be further extended to include 
exchange rate. Based on a simplified version of the Fisher equation, the inflation rate can 
be approximated as a difference between nominal and real interest rates, 𝜋𝑡 ≈ 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡. If 
the capital markets are assumed to be perfectly mobile, then real interest rates among 
countries will be arguably equal. If the approximated value of inflation is inserted into 
equation of relative PPP (2.45), it follows that   
 
∆𝑓𝑥𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃 = (𝑖𝑡
𝑑 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡) − (𝑖𝑡
𝑓
− 𝑟𝑖𝑡) = 𝑖𝑡
𝑑 − 𝑖𝑡
𝑓
.  (2.46) 
 
The hypothesis that differences in nominal interest rates reflect changes in exchange rates, 
is known as the International Fisher Effect. 
 
                                                        
14 For the sake of terminological simplicity, depreciation in this text generally refers to a change in exchange 
rate, whilst depending on the direction of change it can be appreciation as well.  
  
 
 
53 
 
3. The theory of interest rate parity represents in some way generalization of the IFE 
hypothesis, with an emphasis on forward-looking aspects. The IFE as specified in (2.46) 
operates with nominal interest and exchange spot rates in continuous framework, 
neglecting that in reality exchange rate depreciation is measured over a discrete period of 
time, as well as discrete nature of interest rate term structure. On the other side, the UIP as 
a basic interest rate parity concept formalizes relationship between maturity of interest 
rates and the period of exchange rate depreciation. If the term structure is added to 
analytical framework, nominal spot interest rate becomes a function of its maturity noted 
as 𝑗, 𝑖𝑗;𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑗). For the sake of simplicity, let's assume that analysis is limited to 1-year 
spot interest rate 𝑖1;𝑡. In that case, the UIP principle requires that expected debt servicing 
costs on 1-year loan should not depend on the currency of borrowing. If expected exchange 
rate depreciation over one year is noted as 𝐸(∆𝑓𝑥1;𝑡), than the UIP in quantitative terms 
reads as: 
 
(1 + 𝑖1;𝑡
𝑑 ) = (1 + 𝐸(∆𝑓𝑥1;𝑡)) (1 + 𝑖1;𝑡
𝑓 ). (2.48) 
 
The notion of the UIP is stemming from the assumption on the perfect mobility of capital 
and no-arbitrage principle: a debtor should be indifferent today between borrowing in 
domestic currency at rate 𝑖1;𝑡
𝑑  or borrowing in foreign currency at the rate 𝑖1;𝑡
𝑓
 regardless of 
the spot exchange rate, since expected depreciation one-year ahead will equal debt 
servicing costs in both currencies. 
 
The validity of PPP and UIP remains one of the most debated concepts in economic 
literature. When absolute PPP is considered, it is reasonable to expect that it has failed 
empirical testing; apart from abovementioned inconsistency in measuring average price 
level across countries, absolute PPP relies on assumption of free trading on perfect 
markets. In reality, of course, vast majority of free trade and market failures, like import 
and export duties, imperfect competition (monopolies, price differentiation), existence of 
non-traded goods (like housing) or local consumers’ preferences result in country-specific 
price distortions that leads to violations of absolute PPP. However,  empirical studies also 
provided a lot of evidence that nominal depreciation tends to deviate from inflation 
differential, especially in the short run, while in the very long run relative PPP is found to 
be more consistent with empirical data.  2.11 shows example of long-run relationship 
between USD/EUR actual and PPP exchange rates, illustrating short- and mid-term 
deviations of the PPP from actual exchange rates.  
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Figure 2.11: Actual USD/EUR and PPP exchange rates 
Source: Bekaert & Hodrick (2018) 
 
Proponents of the PPP develop an exchange rate model based on PPP and general 
monetary approach, which strives to explain how monetary variables explain long-term 
adjustments of the exchange rates. The underlying idea is that price level in some countries 
reflects relationship between money supply and money demand. While money supply 𝑀𝑆 
is exogenous variable, money demand 𝑀𝐿  is a function of nominal interest rate and 
economic output 𝑌, 𝑀𝐿 = 𝑀𝐿(𝑖, 𝑌). Additionally, from the Fisher equation given in (2.38) 
follows that nominal interest rate depends on inflation. The average price level then reads 
as 
 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡
𝑆/𝑀𝑡
𝐿(𝑖𝑡(𝜋𝑡), 𝑌𝑡)  (2.49) 
 
since the monetarist approach assumes that in the long-run inflation has no effect on 
economic output. Having this representation of price levels, nominal exchange rate can be 
expressed in terms of domestic and foreign money supplies: 
 
𝑓𝑥𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃 =
𝑀𝑡
𝑆,𝑑/𝑀𝑡
𝐿,𝑑(𝑖𝑡
𝑑(𝜋𝑡
𝑑),𝑌𝑡
𝑑)
𝑀𝑡
𝑆,𝑓
/𝑀𝑡
𝐿,𝑓
(𝑖𝑡
𝑓
(𝜋𝑡
𝑓
),𝑌𝑡
𝑓
)
  (2.50) 
 
From the previous equation follows that monetary factors have the subsequent long-term 
impact on nominal exchange rate depreciations: 
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 Money supply: a shock in the domestic (foreign) money supply causes proportional 
depreciation (appreciation) of exchange rate; 
 Nominal interest rate: a shock in the domestic (foreign) interest rate causes a fall in 
domestic (foreign) money demand and a subsequent depreciation (appreciation) of 
exchange rate. Additionally, prolonged money supply growth will result in inflation, 
which in turn will increase nominal interest; 
Because of the widespread empirical corroboration of the PPP hypothesis’s failure, more 
general approach to exchange rate theory is proposed, to support view that deviations of 
the actual from equilibrium PPP values can be long-term outcomes. Such a generalized 
monetary approach introduces a concept of real exchange rate 𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡 , which enters into 
absolute PPP equation (2.44) as given  
 
𝑓𝑥𝑡 = 𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑑
𝑃𝑡
𝑓 = 𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡𝑓𝑥𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃.  (2.51) 
 
The real exchange rate reflects persistent deviations between actual PPP exchange rates. If 
equation (2.51) is rearranged as 
 
𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡 = 𝑓𝑥𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑓
𝑃𝑡
𝑑 ,  (2.52) 
 
real exchange rate can be understood as a ratio between the value of foreign consumption 
basket expressed in domestic currency over the value of domestic consumption basket. In 
other words, it reflects at which rate foreign consumption basket can be traded for 
domestic consumption basket in terms of real purchasing power. From the latter it is 
stemming that real exchange rate is a function of relative demand for domestic and foreign 
goods; for example, if the demand for domestic products goes up, the real exchange rate 
will appreciate and vice versa. When the monetary approach is integrated with concept of 
real exchange rate, then three possible situations in which real factors impact nominal 
exchange rate can be identified: 
 
 Increase in demand for domestic output: since both domestic output 𝑌𝑡
𝑑 and foreign 
output 𝑌𝑡
𝑓
 do not change, price levels also do not change  (as reads from equation 
2.49 and 2.50), so the nominal exchange rate will appreciate following appreciation 
of real exchange rate.  
 Increase in demand for foreign output: since the price levels will not change, 
nominal exchange rate will depreciate following the depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. 
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 Increase in supply for domestic output: the real exchange rate will depreciate, but 
rise in domestic output will reduce domestic price level through increase in money 
demand (equation 2.49) and 𝑓𝑥𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃  will depreciate (equation 2.50). The overall 
effect will be ambiguous. The same prediction of ambiguous overall effect holds 
for change in supply of foreign output.  
Summarizing previous discussion, two important conclusions about nominal exchange rate 
dynamics arise: 
 
 If the PPP is assumed to hold, dynamics is utterly explained through foreign 
exchange  rate adjustments to monetary factors: according to the relative PPP, 
nominal depreciation is a function of domestic and foreign inflation, ∆𝑓𝑥𝑡 =
𝑓(𝜋𝑡
𝑑 , 𝜋𝑡
𝑓), while according to the IFE and the UIP, nominal depreciation is a 
function of domestic and foreign interest rates, ∆𝑓𝑥𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑖𝑡
𝑑 , 𝑖𝑡
𝑓); 
 If the PPP is not assumed to hold, dynamics is explained both through the change 
of real exchange rate and change in relative prices (that reflects depreciation of PPP 
nominal exchange rates), ∆𝑓𝑥𝑡 = 𝑓(∆𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡, ∆𝑓𝑥𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃). 
 
Economic output 
 
Use of GDP as an aggregate measure of economic output has become universally accepted 
worldwide, but scope of covered economic activities and accounting standards of GDP 
computation may differ between countries. As of 2018, EU countries count GDP according 
to ESA 2010 accounting standards, and GDP data from earlier years, based on ESA 95, 
have been adjusted to match new standards, too. Since ESA 2010 is obligatory for EU 
countries, Serbian Statistical Office has recently aligned national accounting with ESA 
2010 and quarterly series of GDP data are revised back to 2006. 
 
In the subsection about primary balance as a public debt dynamics determinant, the 
importance of the potential GDP for the proper determination of the fiscal policy stance 
has been emphasized. The potential GDP is theoretical concept and its quantification is not 
a trivial task – it depends on understanding what the term “potential” means. In the 
broadest sense, potential GDP reflects the idea of the efficient frontier of production 
function and can be thought as the level of output produced when workforce is fully 
employed and its capital stock is fully utilized. The phrase “fully employed workforce” in 
potential GDP definition does not have literal meaning, but rather that level of 
unemployment is reduced down to so-called natural rate of unemployment, in line with 
famous Okun’s Law that links output gap and unemployment gap. In that manner, actual 
economic output can be considered as a function of potential GDP, which reflects inner 
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productive capacities of the economy, and output gap that in modern globalized economic 
environment reflects economic fluctuations which is usually driven by global cyclicality: 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑡
𝑝
, 𝑜𝑔𝑡)  (2.53) 
 
Yet, estimation of the potential GDP using production function theory and 
macroeconomics laws is quite demanding activity even for international organization such 
as the IMF or FED, thus there is a widespread practice of backward-looking estimation of 
the potential GDP by smoothing and extracting trends from GDP historical data. The basic 
idea of computing potential GDP as a smooth trend of actual GDP time series relies on 
state-space modeling. State-space models are class of statistical models that represents 
some actual variable as a sum of unobserved components which are driven by stochastic 
processes. Consequently, economic output as an observed variable can be decomposed to 
sum of three unobserved components: trend, cyclical variations and seasonal variations, as 
given in the equation bellow (Hindrayanto et al., 2014): 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡,  (2.54) 
 
where 𝑦𝑡  stands for economic output, 𝜏𝑡  for trend and 𝑐𝑡, 𝑠𝑡 and 𝑣𝑡 for cyclical, seasonal 
and irregular variations, respectively. In state-space terminology, this equation is called 
measurement equation, in which observed variable is decomposed into unobserved 
components (state variables). If each of the state variables follow some autoregressive 
stochastic process of the first order, than their joint dynamics can be depicted by the 
following equation, 
 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝑇𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡,  (2.55) 
 
where 𝑧𝑡 is a vector of unobserved components, 𝑇 is a transition matrix and 𝑤𝑡 is random 
error which is usually assumed to be identically independently normally distributed 
variable, 𝑤𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷𝑁(0, Σ𝑤𝑤). This equation is called transition equation.  
 
Of course, there is an issue how to estimate vector of unobserved components 𝑧𝑡  and 
transition matrix 𝑇  which describes evolution of state variables. The frequently used 
solution of this problem, proposed by Kalman (1960), use procedure of linear filtering that 
consists of four steps: initialization, prediction, correction and likelihood construction. 
Then 𝑇 and 𝑧𝑡 (including trend component that represents potential economic output) can 
be estimated by maximizing constructed likelihood function using numerical optimization, 
since there is no analytical solution to this problem. For more details on Kalman 
procedure, see for example Pichler (2007). 
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Beside Kalman filtering, another popular solution to computation of potential GDP based 
on state-space representation of economic output was proposed by Hodrick and Prescott 
(1997), which is known in the literature as HP filtering. HP filtering is based on the 
following state-space representation of the economic output (Cardamone, 2016): 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡;   (2.56) 
𝜏𝑡 = 2𝜏𝑡−1 − 𝜏𝑡−2 + 𝑤𝑡. 
 
Since transition coefficients are predetermined in HP state equation, the simple HP filter 
gives an estimate of the unobserved variable as the solution to the following minimization 
problem: 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ (𝑌𝑡 − 𝜏𝑡)
2 + 𝜆𝑇𝑡=1 ∑ [(𝜏𝑡+1 − 𝜏𝑡) − (𝜏𝑡 − 𝜏𝑡−1)]
2𝑇−1
𝑡=2   (2.57) 
 
where 𝜆 is a smoothing parameter that defines smoothness of the trend and depends on the 
data frequency of the time series.  
 
 
2.4 Public debt sensitivity to macroeconomic shocks 
 
In most general sense, sensitivity analysis is an analytical tool that quantitatively appraises 
how much value of some economic variable will change if value of one or more of its 
determinants change. Since the fiscal sustainability analysis is a forward-looking concept, 
sensitivity of the public debt to changes in its determinants makes the crucial aspect of the 
sustainability assessment. While existing literature and debt management practice propose 
a vast number of possible approaches to analysis of pubic debt sensitivity to 
macroeconomic shocks, the most important aspects that should be taken into account to set 
up adequate analytical framework can be roughly condensed in two crucial dimensions: 
 
 Calibration of the shocks: whether the shocks are calibrated arbitrary or based on 
some quantitative modeling? 
 Spillover of the shocks: whether a shock in one debt driver affects public debt 
independently or throughout interaction with other debt drivers? 
 
It is intuitively clear that public debt sensitivity analysis is more complex and 
computationally extensive in case when shocks are calibrated based on quantitative 
modeling and/or when a shock in one determinant affect values of other variables, relative 
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to case when shocks are arbitrary calibrated and/or when impact of a shock in one 
determinant is isolated from other determinants. Since the objective of this subsection is 
introduction to the basic elements and issues of debt sensitivity analysis, here I focus on 
the practices of the arbitrary calibration and isolated shock impacts, while the issues of 
model-based calibration and shock’ spillovers are discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
For this purpose, the IMF DSA Debt Sustainability Assessment (DSA) methodology was 
used as an illustrative example of the arbitrary calibrations of the shocks. The DSA has 
been routinely exercised by the IMF country teams and reported in respective country 
reports. In 2013, DSA methodology was upgraded to deal with interdependency of the 
public debt determinants, but former versions were based on the debt sensitivity analysis 
with respect to isolated shocks. 
 
2.4.1 Arbitrary calibration of the shocks 
 
A colloquial term “shock” in macroeconomics usually evokes unanticipated, sudden, 
temporary and sharp rise or fall in some variable, that has detrimental impact on the 
anticipated values of other variables and macroeconomic equilibrium. In that context, idea 
of macroeconomic shocks implies existence of so-called “baseline” scenario, which refers 
to the expectations and anticipations about the most probable development of the 
macroeconomic variables over certain period of time. However, in more general sense 
shock does not necessary need to be neither temporary, sharp, detrimental, nor completely 
unanticipated or sudden. What is of the utmost importance to declare some change in 
variable as a “shock” is that such change reflects deviation from its baseline forecast. 
Thus, arbitrary calibration of the shock is nothing else but making assumptions how much 
value of certain variable will deviate relative to its baseline expectation, and against which 
sensitivity analysis will be applied. If the shock is calibrated arbitrary, size of this 
deviation is primarily set based on some form of subjective reasoning, conjectures, beliefs 
or sentiments. 
 
Framework of arbitrary shock analysis is usually implemented in deterministic manner, 
meaning that shock in some variable is specified by three parameters: i) size; ii) direction; 
iii) length of duration and frequency of occurrence.  
 
1. Size of the shock. It’s intuitive that direction of the shock is determined to be 
detrimental (but not necessary), since analysts are primarily interested in worse case 
scenario. Size of the shock may be specified with respect to baseline referent value of 
given determinant in the following ways:  
 
 as a percentage change, for example 10% increase in primary balance; 
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 as a change in percentage or basis points, for example increase in interest rates for 
2 percentage points;  
 as a fraction of dispersion measure of determinant variable volatility over certain 
period, typically standard deviation (which is special case of previous specification), 
for example fall in GDP for one standard deviation of the GDP dynamics in last 10 
years. 
Since determinants within debt sensitivity analysis framework are measured in 
percentages, either as rates (interest rate, GDP growth rate, depreciation of exchange rate) 
or proportions (primary balance to GDP), it is very important to be precise when defining 
and interpreting a size of shock. In case of primary balance, one possibility is to define size 
of shock as a percentage change, e.g. 25% growth of PB/GDP ratio, relative to some 
baseline value. If, fore example, baseline value is 3%, then value of the “shocked” variable 
will be 3.75%. This corresponds to definition of size of shock as 75 basis points increase in 
PB/GDP baseline value. 
 
2. Direction of the shock. when sensitivity analysis is performed, analyst is usually 
interested for adverse shocks, and the type of shock is determined by its direction. If shock 
is defined in relative terms as percentage increase of some referent value, one should be 
careful about a sign of the baseline value. In other words, if shock is defined as percentage 
change of baseline value, it can result in shock with unwanted direction. For instance, if 
baseline value of depreciation is -10% (i.e. 10% appreciation), then shock defined as 25% 
of the baseline value will actually result in -2.5% size of shock which is not adverse in 
terms of impact on debt dynamics. In order to avoid confusion, popular choice is to state 
size of shock as a fraction of standard deviation, as its value is always positive, and then to 
give appropriate sign. This procedure is also backed up by economic and statistical 
reasoning, as the standard deviation is the most correct measure of random variable 
dispersion and compatible with size of the average. 
 
3. Adjustment of the shock to the length of duration and frequency of occurrence. 
Generally speaking, shock can be related to one specific period in time or to time span of 
several consecutive periods. Accordingly, size of shocks could be treated as temporary or 
persistent, which accumulates over time. For instance, permanent annual increase in 
inflation rate of 2.5 percentage points over the period of 5 years will result in size of 
accumulated shock for approximately 12.5 percentage points over the whole period. The 
preferred size of accumulated shock has to be aligned with time frequency of the data 
analyzed, too. For example, if the shock in exchange rate is specified as 25% annually and 
applied to quarterly data, it does not mean that that exchange rate will depreciate for 25% 
regarding the value of real exchange rate from previous quarter, but from the value of 
respective quarter one year ago.  
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One example of the arbitrary shock calibrations in the context of debt sensitivity analysis, 
based on former IMF DSA methodology, is presented in Table 2.11. 
 
Table 2.11:  The IMF DSA scheme of arbitrary calibrated shocks 
 
 
Alternative 
scenarios 
(A1-A2) 
 
Permanent shock 
over the entire 
projection period 
 
 
 
 
A1. Historical 
Key variables are 
at their historical 
averages 
 
 
 
 
 
A2. Primary 
balance 
No policy change 
(constant primary 
balance) 
 
 
Bound tests 
(B1-B5) 
 
Temporary 
shocks  
B1. Real interest rate 
Real interest rate is at 
baseline plus certain  fraction 
of  standard deviation 
B2. Real GDP growth 
Real GDP growth is at 
baseline minus certain  
fraction of  standard deviation 
B3. Primary Balance 
Primary balance is at 
baseline minus certain  
fraction of  standard deviation 
B4. Combination of B1-B3 
Each reduced only by certain  
fraction of standard 
deviations. 
B5. Depreciation 
One-time nominal 
depreciation of certain 
percent  
 
 
Source: Summary of DSA assessment from various country reports 
 
As seen from the table, if the shocks are considered in the most general sense as any 
deviation from the baseline, two types of the debt sensitivity analysis can be performed: 
 
Scenario analysis. Scenario analysis can be thought of as the most generic framework to 
assess expected outcomes of some economic activity under the scenarios alternative to 
baseline case. The coverage of “shocked” variables within given scenario can vary, from 
only one up to all relevant determinants. In case of the IMF DSA debt sensitivity, scenario 
analysis considers future debt outcomes in cases of macroeconomic forecasts being 
alternatives to the baseline scenario, not necessary detrimental as the alternatives can be 
also optimistic. Some of the possible alternatives “historical scenario”, in which debt 
determinants are conjectured at their historical averages, or so-called “no fiscal policy 
change” in which primary balance is kept constant and equal to last recorded actual value. 
In such kind of alternative scenarios, shocks are permanent in nature. 
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Stress testing. Stress testing is a standard risk management tool applied in many areas of 
financial and economic analysis, the most notably in banking risk management. Stress 
testing can be thought of as a special case, i.e. “worst case” scenario analysis, which 
examines what would happen with given economic variable if one ore more of its 
determinants take extremely unfavorable value in the near future. The IMF DSA stress 
testing analysis, also known as “bound tests”, applies one ore two arbitrary calibrated 
temporary shocks to debt sensitivity analysis.  
 
2.4.2 Public debt sensitivity to isolated shocks 
 
As being said earlier, impact of a shock in one determinant on public debt can be 
considered as isolated, i.e. independent from other debt determinants, or alternatively 
throughout the possible spillover to other determinants (under assumption that debt 
determinants are interdependent), which in turn change their values relative to anticipated 
baseline scenario and thus additionally affects public debt. The previous discussion about 
public debt determinants points out existence of their interdependence, dismantling realism 
of the isolated shock conjecture. However, simplicity of isolated shock approach makes it 
very useful to get intuition of the public debt sensitivity, while due to low data and 
computational requirements such approach is still very popular choice among economic 
analysts. 
 
The convenient way to start discussion about sensitivity of public debt to macroeconomic 
shocks is more general sense is to make further decomposition of automatic debt-creating 
flows to particular contributions of real interest rate, real GDP growth and exchange rate as 
follows, based on the DAE representation in relative terms (2.32) and the IMF DSA 
methodology: 
 
1) Real interest rate contribution (RIRC) to change in public debt, as a function of nominal 
interest rate, inflation, real growth and lagged debt: 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑡 =
𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1+𝜋𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1; (2.58) 
 
2) Real GDP growth contribution (RGC) to change in public debt, as a function of real 
growth, inflation and lagged debt: 
 
𝑅𝐺𝐶𝑡 =
−𝑟𝑔𝑡
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1+𝜋𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1; (2.59) 
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3) Exchange rate depreciation contribution (ERDC) to change in public debt, as a function 
of nominal exchange rate, interest rate, share of debt in foreign currency, inflation and 
lagged debt: 
 
𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑡 =
Δ𝑓𝑥𝑡𝜔𝑡−1(1+𝑖𝑡)
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1+𝜋𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1. (2.60) 
 
On the other side, according the relative DAE (2.32) contributions of the fiscal 
determinants PB/GDP and DDA/GDP are straightforward: change of PB/GDP or 
DDA/GDP in x% results in change of debt to GDP for exactly x%. Using such approach, 
historical path of public debt can be decomposed to fiscal and non-fiscal contributors. 
Decomposition of the Serbian public debt (Maastricht definition) on quarterly data for 
2017-2018 is presented in Figure 2.12 as an illustration. The decomposition exercise is 
applied using implied interest rate to compute real interest rate contribution, while 
contributions of RSD/EUR and RSD/USD are separated.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Decomposition of Serbian public debt (Maastricht definition) to fiscal and 
automatic (non-fiscal) contributions 
Source: own calculation 
 
This Figure basically illustrates how the debt increments over time can be presented as a 
sum of individual contributions of fiscal and non-fiscal determinants. As expected, real 
interest rate contribution lifted debt, while real growth contribution reduced it. On the other 
hand, strong debt-reducing contributions of primary balance over whole period and 
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RSD/USD for several quarters is a result of specific economic circumstances, which 
reflects successful fiscal consolidation and RSD appreciation stemming from improved 
balance of payment. 
 
A logic of historical decomposition of public debt to fiscal and non-fiscal contributors can 
be utilized for the forward-looking debt sensitivity analysis. Within the framework of 
isolated shocks conjecture, all debt determinants are assumed to be independent from each 
other and lagged debt as well. Following the relative DAE in (2.38) and debt 
decomposition approach of the IMF DSA, sensitivity of public debt to isolated shock in 
non-fiscal determinant x can be also decomposed to a sum of partial derivatives of the 
particular contributions: 
 
𝜕𝛥𝑑𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡
=
𝜕𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡
+
𝜕𝐸𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡
+
𝜕𝑅𝐺𝐶𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡
+
𝜕𝑝𝑏𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡
+
𝜕𝑑𝑑𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡
   (2.61) 
 
Since a primary balance, debt-deficit adjustments and RGCt are not functions of interest 
rate, shock in nominal interest will affect only real interest and exchange rate depreciation 
contributions as reads 
 
𝜕𝛥𝑑𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡
=
1+Δfxtωt−1
(1+rgt)(1+πt)
dt−1  (2.62) 
 
In case of interest rate shock, only contribution of real exchange rate depreciation will be 
affected: 
 
𝜕𝛥𝑑𝑡
𝜕𝛥𝑓𝑥𝑡
=
𝜔𝑡−1(1+𝑖𝑡)
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1+𝜋𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1  (2.63) 
 
Being a denominator of the DAE in relative terms, real growth shock affects each 
component of the decomposed debt increment, even primary balance and debt-deficit 
adjustment since 𝑝𝑏𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡 = [𝑃𝐵𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷𝑡]/[𝑌𝑡−1(1 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1 + 𝜋𝑡)]. When overall effect 
of change in real growth is taken into account, change in debt increment reads as 
 
𝜕𝛥𝑑𝑡
𝜕𝛥𝑟𝑔𝑡
= − [
(1+𝜋𝑡)
2+𝑖𝑡−𝜋𝑡+Δ𝑓𝑥𝑡𝜔𝑡−1(1+𝑖𝑡)
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)
2
] 𝑑𝑡−1 −
[𝑃𝐵𝑡+𝐷𝐷𝑡]𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)
2(1+𝜋𝑡)
  (2.64) 
 
Set of equations (2.61) – (2.64) explains how debt sensitivity to shocks in public debt 
determinants is quantified. Once when shocks are calibrated, public debt dynamics can be 
easily projected assuming isolated impact of the shocks.  
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2.5 Public debt portfolio risk indicators 
 
The previous section illustrates that debt sensitivity analysis is not an easy task, even in 
case when the most simplistic approach of arbitrary calibration and isolated impact of 
shocks is applied. From the standpoint of DMO, the main issue with debt sensitivity 
analysis is that it requires development of forward-looking macroeconomic scenarios and 
mechanics of shock transmissions that goes beyond a scope of DMO usual business. 
Therefore, for the purpose of short run debt management, DMO in practice use simple risk 
indicators which computations are completely based on debt portfolio data. In that context, 
interest rate and refinancing risk are main points of interest, since those risks have high 
impact on debt sustainability and public finance liquidity, especially in developed 
countries wherein amortizing loans at fixed rates and debt in foreign currency makes small 
fraction of public debt portfolio. In this section I present a set of simple risk indicators that 
provide preliminary insight in public debt portfolio exposure to interest and refinancing 
risks15, which are frequently found in DMO reports from various countries. With support 
of adequate information system, these indicators can computed on a regular basis using 
only data on public debt portfolio.  
 
2.5.1 Interest rate risk 
 
Financial literature on interest rate risk indicators is usually considered with risk exposure 
of investors to changes in market interest rates. I also follow this approach for simplicity in 
explanation, but in case of public debt management the government is actually issuer of the 
debt securities and thus stands at the opposite side of cash flows streams. 
 
From the standpoint of debt issuer, it is hard to clearly separate interest rate and 
refinancing risk tracking. For both domestic and foreign currency debt, changes in interest 
rates affect debt servicing costs of existing debt at floating rates on reset dates, as well as 
refinanced debt by new issuance. Financial literature usually considers duration (Macaulay 
and modified) and Average Time to Re-fixing (ATR) as interest risk rate indicators, while 
Average Time to Maturity (ATM) is considered as refinancing risk indicator. However, 
these three indicators actually have the same computational background as they present 
weighted times of debt instruments’ cash flow payments that could be described by the 
following formula: 
 
                                                        
15 This section summarizes author’ expertise on risk management practices stemming from the part-time 
work at the Serbian Public Debt Administration over the period of 10 years. 
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𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝐴𝑇𝑅/𝐴𝑇𝑀 =
∑ 𝑡𝜔𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
∑ 𝜔𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 (2.65) 
 
The different choice of weighting methods allows to gradual switching of focus from 
interest rate to refinancing risk tracking. This issue will be further explained in more 
details. 
 
Duration 
 
The Macaulay duration (henceforth duration) is the most widely used interest rate risk 
indicator in portfolio debt management. The term duration has a special meaning in the 
context of bonds: it is a measurement of how long it takes for the investor to repay price of 
a bond by its internal cash flows. Duration can be viewed as a weighted average time to 
maturity of a financial instrument as well as for the whole portfolio, including both 
payments of interest and principal, where the weights are the present value of the cash 
flows. Mathematical expression for duration of single debt instrument is given by 
following equation: 
 
𝐷 =
∑ (𝑡/𝑘)
𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑡
(1+𝑦𝑡𝑚/𝑘)𝑡
𝑇𝑘
𝑡=1
∑
𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑡
(1+𝑦𝑡𝑚/𝑘)𝑡
𝑇𝑘
𝑡=1
=
∑ (𝑡/𝑘)𝑃𝑉𝑡
𝑇𝑘
𝑡=1
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 (2.66) 
 
where 𝑇 is maturity in years,  𝑘 is frequency of coupon payments 𝑦𝑡𝑚 is yield to maturity 
(YTM) which is internal rate of return that equals discounted cash flows over the bond 
maturity and its market price, 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑡 is debt servicing cost at time t (coupon payments at 
first 𝑇 − 1 periods and coupon plus principal at period T). 
 
In the context of interest risk framework duration is usually included throughout the 
concept of so-called Hicks sensibility (henceforth sensibility).  Intuitively, concept of 
sensibility can be explained in the following way: the yield to maturity of the bond, as the 
measure of the rate of return, consists in nominal market risk-free interest rate enhanced by 
set of risk premia (that was discussed in subsection 2.3.2); thus, any swing in market 
interest rates will change the yield to maturity and in addition market value of bond. This 
mechanism could be roughly mathematically expressed as: 
 
𝑃1 ≈ 𝑃0 − ∆𝑖𝐷𝑚𝑃0 (2.67) 
 
where 𝐷𝑚 is modified duration (MD):  
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𝐷𝑚 =
𝐷
1+𝑦𝑡𝑚/𝑘
 (2.68) 
 
It is obvious that, ceteris paribus, a higher (modified) duration leads immediately to larger 
swing in bond prices when the interest rates are swinging from the standpoint of investor. 
Nevertheless, interpretation of duration from the standpoint of debtor is not so 
straightforward as in case of investors, having in mind that change of the interest rate does 
not affect nominal amounts of cash flows to be paid by debtor (if only typical fixed coupon 
bonds are issued). Thus, in this context duration is only sensible to use in the broader 
framework accompanied with refinancing risk analysis.  
 
Therefore, previous discussion on duration and sensitivity implies following conclusions: 
 
 Duration indicates the time length in which changes in market interest rates will not 
affect the nominal payment obligations; the closer duration to zero is, the smaller 
the period for interest re-fixing is and in turn exposure to risk of increase in interest 
rate. From the standpoint of government as a debt issuer, debt instruments with 
higher duration carry less risk than bond with lower duration. 
 Debt instruments with higher duration are more sensitive to change in interest rate. 
Sensitivity analysis shows that the higher (modified) duration is, the higher loss in 
the sense of opportunity cost is realized for the debt issuer when interest rates 
decrease. 
 
Although duration has very straightforward calculation in the single market debt 
instrument’ analytical framework, it suffers from the several serious computational 
shortcomings when it is applied to complex portfolios like government debt portfolio, apart 
from some more general conceptual shortcomings (like missing to capture non-linear 
relationship between interest rates and prices):  
 
 Portfolio of government debt of emerging countries usually comprises numerous 
non-market debt instruments (loans at fixed rates). Though in theoretical sense non-
market debt instruments also decrease in value when interest rates increase, 
duration could not be directly computed, as the market price of debt is not known. 
Thus, duration could not be calculated without some additional assumption on 
either market price or YTM, which diminishes analytical value of duration 
indicator and makes interpretation ambiguous.  
 Theoretically, duration of portfolio could be calculated as the weighted average of 
single durations, where weights are share of each security’ market value to the total 
market value of portfolio. Nonetheless, the main computational problem for the 
  
 
 
68 
 
duration of portfolio in practice comes from the fact that each security has its own 
yield to maturity opposite to the concept of modified duration, which takes into 
account just a single yield for the sensitivity analysis. In addition, using numerous 
YTM for the cash flows discounting makes calculation of durations 
computationally very extensive.  
 Government debt securities in financial markets that lack a depth are usually not 
traded on regular basis at secondary market. Consequently, it is not always possible 
to pick market prices for all issued securities at particular date (if some of them are 
not traded), as it is required to calculate duration.  
In order to overcome these problems, international organizations usually recommend to 
arbitrary select some YTM and to use it as a single discount rate with respect to the 
currency of debt instrument indexation. For example, in analysis of Serbian public debt, 
World Bank used to apply 4% discount rate for USD and EUR loans and 12% for RSD 
loans, while in case of market debt instruments sum outstanding debt payments is 
considered as approximation of market value of debt instrument. 
 
Weighted Average Interest Rate 
 
Weighted average interest rate on government debt provides an information on average 
cost of public debt and it is useful indicator for the purpose of international comparisons. 
Basically, it is computed by following formula: 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑅 = ∑ 𝜔𝑗𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  (2.69) 
 
where 𝑖𝑗 is interest rate of particular debt instrument i (or YTM in case of market debt 
instrument), while weights are given by particular instrument principal value over the total 
value of all principals in debt portfolio. 
 
𝜔𝑗 =
𝐹𝑗
∑ 𝐹𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 (2.70) 
 
However, in practice such calculation of WAIR requires YTM for market instruments, 
which are usually unknown or unreliable at other dates apart from auction date at emerging 
financial markets.  
 
Average Time to Re-fixing 
 
The Average Time to Re-fixing (ATR) gives information on the exposure of the debt 
portfolio to changes in interest rates. High ATR will indicate low risk, because this will 
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imply that a relatively low share of the debt will have its interest rates re-fix (or reset) in a 
short period of time. 
 
Opposite to the duration, ATR doesn’t take into consideration neither interest of coupon 
payments nor discounted values of cash flows for the calculation, just the value of 
principal payment. As ATR does not require information on YTM, it could be applied to 
the whole debt portfolio. ATR is calculated by the following formula: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝑅 =
∑ 𝑡𝐹𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
∑ 𝐹𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 (2.71) 
 
where t is a time of interest payment first reset (in regard to the instrument that payment is 
related to) and 𝐹𝑡 is principal value of the debt instrument which interest payment is re-set 
at the time t.  
 
2.5.2 Refinancing (rollover) risk 
 
Refinancing risk is a risk that debt will have to be rolled over at an unusually high cost or, 
in extreme cases, cannot be rolled over at all. For countries that have unimpeded access to 
capital markets refinancing risk is a risk that government need to pay higher interest rates 
at a moment of next loan issue. For countries with difficult access to capital markets this 
notion primarily relates to the likelihood that public debt may be difficult or even 
impossible to refinance because of too high costs or too short maturities of the loans 
available.  
 
Generally, as the level of accumulated government debt over time increases, probability 
that government could not be able to pay it rises and consequently investors require higher 
risk premium for new debt issues. However, as there is no straightforward relationship 
between level of debt and required risk premium, it is very complicated to execute analysis 
similar to Hicks sensitivity, i.e. to compute change in cost of borrowing with respect to 
change in debt level without engaging complex econometrical models. Thus, in practice 
Debt Management Offices usually use set of indicators which provide more qualitative 
insight in possible issues with debt rollover. Classical refinancing risk indicators in debt 
management comprise Average Time to Maturity, redemption profile and residual 
maturity. 
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Average Time to Maturity 
 
Average Time to Maturity (ATM), gives information on the length of the debt’s life, i.e. 
average residual maturity. It is the simple for calculation, as it takes into account only time 
to maturity and principles of each debt instrument. ATM for the portfolio is calculated 
according to the same mathematical formula as for the ATR,  
 
𝐴𝑇𝑀 =
∑ 𝑡𝐹𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
∑ 𝐹𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 (2.72) 
 
where t is a time of residual maturity of debt instrument while 𝐹𝑡 is principal value of the 
debt instrument which matures at the time t.  
 
It is obvious that although ATM is just natural extension of duration and ATR. However, it 
is usually considered in financial literature as refinancing or rollover risk indicator as 
because it takes into account in full the residual maturity of floating rate debt. 
 
Redemption profile 
 
The redemption profile is graphical indicator which shows distribution of the payment of 
debt portfolio across the time. Idea that lies behind is very simple: wherever large amounts 
of debt to be paid are concentrated at certain point in time, government face possible issues 
with debt refinancing and increase in cost of new dent issue. Basic calculation of 
redemption profile could be extended to the sub-portfolio levels, i.e. it can show also 
redemption profile structure in regard to currency or interest rate structure. 
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3 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
A term “fiscal sustainability” is colloquially used to describe a situation wherein the public 
finances appear to be in a condition which does not indicate, ceteris paribus, concerns 
about keeping fiscal and macroeconomic stability over a longer period of time. While 
intuition behind notion of the fiscal sustainability is clear, analysis of the fiscal 
sustainability requires more rigorous conceptual definition and subsequent 
operationalization of the methodology. Table 3.1 summarized several definitions of the 
fiscal sustainability from the existing literature: 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of fiscal sustainability definitions 
 
Source and publication Definition 
European Commission (2019) 
European Semester Thematic 
Factsheet: Sustainability Of 
Public Finances  
The sustainability of public finances, also referred to as fiscal sustainability, 
is the ability of a government to sustain its current spending, tax and other-
related policies in the long run without threatening its solvency or 
defaulting on some of its liabilities or promised expenditures. 
European Commission (2018) 
Fiscal Sustainability Report 
2018 
Generally speaking, fiscal (or debt) sustainability is broadly understood as 
the ability of a government to service its debt at any point in time 
IMF (2014)  
Fiscal and Debt Sustainability 
The government is able to achieve a fiscal stance that allows it to service 
public debt in the short, medium and long run 
 without debt default or renegotiation:  
 without the need to undertake policy adjustments that are 
implausible from an economic or political standpoint;  
 given financing costs and conditions it faces. 
IMF (2011) 
Modernizing the Framework 
for Fiscal Policy and Public 
Debt Sustainability Analysis. 
The fiscal policy stance can be regarded as unsustainable if, in the absence 
of adjustment, sooner or later the government would not be able to service 
its debt 
Adams et al. (2010) 
Fiscal Sustainability in 
Developing Asia 
Fiscal sustainability is the state wherein the government budget can be 
smoothly financed without generating explosive increases in pubic debt (or 
money supply) over time. 
Akyüz (2007) 
Debt Sustainability in 
Emerging Markets: A Critical 
Appraisal 
The concept of fiscal sustainability draws on the idea that public debt 
cannot keep on growing relative to national income because this would 
require governments to constantly increase taxes and reduce spending on 
goods and services. 
 
As reads in the table, conceptual definitions proposed by the intergovernmental 
organizations or academic literature put a sustainability focus to ability of government to 
service its debt/liabilities without major correction of the fiscal policy stance. In more strict 
sense, concept of public debt sustainability can be considered as the first step in 
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operationalization of the fiscal sustainability concept: short-, mid- and long-term public 
debt sustainability is perceived as a necessary and sufficient condition to claim fiscal 
sustainability, too. Hence, terms “public debt sustainability” and “fiscal sustainability” are 
often used interchangeably, as I do in this work. 
 
In the section on debt sensitivity analysis, it was discussed that “perfect” methodological 
approach to debt sustainability assessment should reflect not only possible development of 
the debt dynamics over time, but also risks associated with different scenarios and shocks 
occurrence. Also, operationalization of the methodology for debt sustainability assessment 
is conditional on the purpose: while macroeconomic and fiscal authorities are more 
interested in assessing level of debt dynamics with an objective to actively manage fiscal 
policy, DMO is more interested in assessing debt servicing costs over time with an 
objective to optimize cost-risk trade-off. This two analytical flows are schematically 
presented in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Scheme of analytical flows in fiscal sustainability assessment  
Source: author 
 
The previous scheme illustrates how public debt analytical framework is used in practice to 
generate policy decisions that in the long run will preserve debt sustainability. The 
government institutions in charge for macroeconomic and fiscal policy produces the 
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baseline macroeconomic scenario with associated assumptions, that is aligned with 
medium-term fiscal framework, national budget and other mid- and long- term strategic 
documents on economic and fiscal policies. On the other side, DMO provides relevant 
input information on existing debt structure (type of instruments, currency, interest and 
term structure) and information on yields and rates on the level of individual instruments. 
These two types of inputs are combined to perform cost-risk analysis of public debt. Cost-
risk analysis provides the most generic public debt analytical framework, as debt 
sensitivity analysis can be thought of as a special case of cost-risk analysis. Debt 
sensitivity analysis is combined with fiscal reaction analytics to produce optimal decision 
on the fiscal policy stance. In similar manner, DMO uses cost-risk analysis for cost-risk 
trade-off optimization, to produce debt management strategy that meets main objective of 
the public debt management defined as “ensure that the government’s financing needs and 
its payment obligations are met at the lowest possible cost over the medium to long run, 
consistent with a prudent degree of risk.”16 Eventually, envisaged long-term outcome of 
the both analytical outputs is debt/fiscal sustainability, such as defined in the Table 3.1. 
 
Since the focus of this work is on the fiscal side of the debt management process, this 
chapter is organized in three sections following right-hand side of the Figure 3.1. First 
section presents the basic principles of the public debt cost-risk modeling. Second section 
deals with particular issues of debt sustainability assessment. Third section discusses fiscal 
reaction function as an important segment of the fiscal policy making. 
 
3.1 Cost-Risk modeling 
 
A risk-based approach to public debt sustainability assessment originates from an idea that 
risk management tools, widely used in managing business and financial risks of the 
business entities, can be applied on the level of national economy in managing government 
debt to ensure fiscal solvency and macroeconomic stability. In the most generic sense, the 
risk management is considered as a process of identifying, assessing and controlling threats 
to an entity’s activities. A risk as the term refers to a corollary of uncertainty that consists 
of two components:  
 
 the risk likelihood that specific outcome will occur;  
 the risk exposure of the specific activity to the impact of this outcome.  
 
In order to control risk associated with some activity, it needs to be properly measured. 
According to the Holton (2009), in the context of risk management there is distinction 
                                                        
16 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pdm/eng/guide/pdf/appendix.pdf 
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between a risk metrics - the attribute of risk being measured, and a risk measure being the 
operation that quantifies the risk attribute. For example, risk metrics may be volatility of 
portfolio debt servicing costs, and standard deviation is a measure of volatility. The risk 
measures can be separated to those quantifying only risk likelihood, only risk exposure or 
those combining both likelihood and exposure (Holton, 2009). Volatility, e.g. is a measure 
of likelihood that some outcome will occur, while Value-at-Risk is a measure that 
combines volatility with risk exposure, counting the maximum possible loss for given 
probability. 
 
According to Wheeler (2004), risk management lies at the heart of public debt 
management and makes crucial link between the formulation and implementation of debt 
management strategies. Risk management is important to both sides of public debt 
management process, for the formulation of the debt management strategy but also for the 
strategy implementation on the operational level. On the strategic side of debt management 
and fiscal policy, policy planners and external auditors typically apply complex 
macroeconomic models and risk management methodologies to measure mid- to long-term 
risks associated to public debt attributes. While particular choices of underlying model’ 
specification differs across countries and institutions, methodology of public debt risk 
assessment basically combines some form of forward-looking risk management tools and 
theoretical concept that describes evolution of the debt cost/level in order to transform 
macroeconomic inputs to risk measures output. The architecture of public debt cost-risk 
modeling is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Cost-risk modeling architecture  
Source: author 
 
The aim of such methodology is to provide the following output: 
  
 
 
75 
 
 
 Estimation of cost/level of debt for the specified period when model inputs are the 
most expected outcomes of macroeconomic variables (baseline scenario). It gives 
the path of the cost or share of debt in GDP, assuming that no external shocks or 
shifts in macroeconomic environment will occur in the observed period; 
 Estimation of cost/level of debt under the different assumptions on key variables 
changes (risky scenarios). Risky scenarios allow estimation of path of cost/debt 
assuming either different macroeconomic polices/financing strategies or external 
shocks occurrences; 
 Estimation of debt cost/level risk exposure throughout a comparison between 
baseline and alternative outcomes, or/and estimation of likelihood of alternative 
outcomes. 
 
Therefore, cost-risk analysis represents basic framework for estimation of change in debt 
servicing cost associated with change of main risk factors driving its level. Debt sensitivity 
analysis can be thought of as a special case of cost-risk analysis. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, debt sensitivity analysis estimate debt dynamics under some alternative 
and/or risky scenario. If some risk estimation procedure is included in analysis to depict 
risky scenario occurrence, than the output of debt sensitivity analysis will consist of both 
forecasted debt servicing costs and associated risk measurement, as illustrated in the Figure 
3.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Cost-risk framework of scenario analysis 
Source: Velandia-Rubiano (2002) 
 
This cost-risk analysis is generally derived from risk management practice of institutional 
investors dealing with large portfolios of securities. It is closely related to the Markowitz 
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theory of portfolio optimization and Value-at-Risk (VaR) evaluation, two concepts that 
exploits trade-off between risk and return (or cost) for the purpose of risk management. 
Although these two concepts are primarily developed for the purpose of investment 
management, they can be easily modified for the benefit of securities’ issuer. Basically, 
portfolio optimization is a procedure that aim to minimize risk of portfolio return 
(objective function) subjected to given targeted value of portfolio expected return as a 
constraint, or the other way around – by maximizing expected return for chosen level of 
riskiness. Optimization is achieved throughout proper choice of portfolio weights across 
individual securities. Similar approach can be applied to government portfolio of debt 
instruments, with expected debt servicing cost as a constraint and minimization of its 
riskiness as an objective function.  
 
Basic idea of VaR is to estimate level of loss in portfolio value that will not be exceeded at 
a given level of confidence and for a given time span. From the standpoint of debt 
instrument issuer, VaR can be mirrored to Cost-at-Risk (CaR) modeling, where CaR 
represents debt servicing cost that will not be exceeded at a given confidence level and 
time span. Optimal weights of portfolio and CaR value can be obtained either by analytical 
closed-form or numerical solution, depending on how debt servicing costs and risk are 
modeled in particular cases.  
 
While portfolio optimization has some theoretical advantages over Cost-at-Risk modeling, 
CaR approach is by far quite more present in the risk management practice of debt 
management offices, due to its lower computing requirements and easiness of 
implementation. Cost-at-Risk may be defined in absolute or in relative terms. Absolute 
value of CaR counts change in value of debt servicing cost for the given time period, 
relative to the initial value at the beginning of the period. Relative CaR counts change in 
value of debt servicing costs under some risky scenario, relative to expected debt servicing 
cost under the baseline scenario of expected dynamic of risk factors. In that context, cost-
risk framework in Figure 3.3 may be interpreted as an illustration of a relative CaR. 
 
3.2 Debt sustainability modeling 
 
As emphasized by Chalk & Hemming (2000), most of the analytical discussions on debt 
sustainability revolve around a representative agent model in which the government 
satisfies two types of constraints in order to preserve fiscal solvency: static budget 
constraint in each period and intertemporal budget constraint in the long-term horizon. 
While intertemporal budget constraint approach provides an important theoretical 
background of the fiscal sustainability concept, its empirical application is possible only to 
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certain extent. In this section I provide theoretical framework of the fiscal sustainability 
concept which utilizes intertemporal budget constraint.  
 
Within the fiscal sustainability theoretical framework, intertemporal budget constraint can 
be derived from the static budget constraint. Static budget constraint in the context of the 
debt accumulation equation corresponds to the DAE formulation given in (2.8), that value 
of current debt equals sum primary balance, current interest payment and debt from the 
previous period. A derivation of the intertemporal budget constraint presented in this work 
follows debt accumulation in relative terms, based on Giammarioli et al. (2007), but it can 
be derived also in absolute terms. If equation (2.8) is rewritten in relative terms as 
 
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
=
−𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
+
(1+𝑖𝑡)𝐷𝑡−1
(1+𝑔𝑡)𝑌𝑡−1
 (3.1) 
 
public debt dynamics can be considered as a sum of current fiscal stance 
−𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
 and 
inheritance of past fiscal policies 
(1+𝑖𝑡)𝐷𝑡−1
(1+𝑔𝑡)𝑌𝑡−1
. From the equation (3.1) follows that 
stabilization of the 
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
 over time in case when interest rate 𝑖𝑡 is higher than GDP growth rate 
is possible only if primary balance is proportionally in surplus. However, static budget 
constraint is an accounting identity and does not impose any restriction on fiscal stance 
until lenders are willing to finance primary deficits. Nevertheless, if the government keeps 
running fiscal deficit for the prolonged period of time, additional borrowing will only be 
possible if lenders are confident that government finances will remain sound and solvent in 
the long run. Therefore, intertemporal budget constraint provides the answer on the 
question what restrictions on current and future fiscal policies should be satisfied to 
maintain long-term debt sustainability. The starting point in derivation is rearrangement of 
(3.1) by moving lagged debt to the left-hand side of the equation: 
 
𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
=
(1+𝑔𝑡)
(1+𝑖𝑡)
(
𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
+
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
). (3.2) 
 
From the (3.2) follows that at any point in time value of debt-to-GDP can be expressed 
recursively as a function of one-period ahead primary balance and debt, 
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
=
(1+𝑔𝑡+1)
(1+𝑖𝑡+1)
(
𝑃𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
+
𝐷𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
). Lets assume that debt sustainability is examined over certain future 
period of time [1, … , 𝑇 − 1] . In such case, initial value of the debt-to-GDP can be 
recursively written as  
 
𝐷0
𝑌0
=
(1+𝑔1)
(1+𝑖1)
𝑃𝐵1
𝑌1
+
(1+𝑔1)…
(1+𝑖1)…
(1+𝑔𝑇)𝑃𝐵𝑇
(1+𝑖𝑇)𝑌𝑇
+
(1+𝑔1)…
(1+𝑖1)…
(1+𝑔𝑇)𝐷𝑇
(1+𝑖𝑇)𝑌𝑇
,  (3.3) 
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where 𝐷𝑇 referes to the terminal value of debt. The intuition behind this equation is that 
current value of debt in equilibrium long run case equals sum of discounted primary 
balances in each period and sum of discounted terminal value of debt, where 
(1+𝑔1)…
(1+𝑖1)…
(1+𝑔𝑇)
(1+𝑖𝑇)
 
is respective discount factor for the period t. If for a sake of simplicity discount factor is 
denoted as 𝜌𝑡 and written in recursive manner as 
 
𝜌𝑡 =
(1+𝑔1)
(1+𝑖1)
𝜌𝑡−1, 𝜌0 = 1  (3.4) 
 
then the equation (3.3) can be simplified to expression 
 
𝐷0
𝑌0
− 𝜌𝑇
𝐷𝑇
𝑌𝑇
= ∑ 𝜌𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
.  (3.5) 
 
The left-hand side of this equation can be interpreted as the net present value of the debt. 
The net present value of the public debt will be either positive if the sum of discounted 
primary surpluses exceeds a sum of discounted primary deficits or negative in opposite 
case. Yet, the equation (3.5) still does not impose debt sustainability condition since the 
lenders can be confident about government ability to service debt beyond the time period 
[1, … , 𝑇 − 1] . Therefore, in the next step limited long-run horizon of the analysis is 
extended up to infinity, as given in the equation bellow 
 
𝐷0
𝑌0
− lim
𝑇→∞
𝜌𝑇
𝐷𝑇
𝑌𝑇
= ∑ 𝜌𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
.  (3.6) 
 
In the similar manner, intertemporal budget constraint in absolute terms reads as (Chalk 
and Hemming, 2000): 
 
𝐷0 − lim
𝑇→∞
R𝑇𝐷𝑇 = ∑ R𝑡
∞
𝑡=1 𝑃𝐵𝑡,  (3.7) 
 
where R𝑇 is discount factor R𝑇 =
1
(1+𝑖1)
R𝑡−1. Both equations (3.6) and (3.7) tell that the 
intertemporal budget constraint can be satisfied even in case that discounted value of 
terminal debt is positive if government runs primary deficits forever by rolling its debt 
over and borrowing to finance its deficits. However, running primary deficits forever is 
basically a Ponzi scheme and such outcome is not feasible in case of the finite number of 
agents, as shown by O’Connel & Zeldes (1988): if some debtor holds government debt 
forever, she will have lower consumption in at least one period and consequently lower 
welfare when compared to a situation wherein she does not hold debt at all. Since rational 
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agents are not willing to keep government debt forever if the government is running a 
Ponzi scheme, a no-Ponzi restriction lim
𝑇→∞
𝜌𝑇
𝐷𝑇
𝑌𝑇
≤ 0 (or lim
𝑇→∞
R𝑇𝐷𝑇 ≤ 0 in case of absolute 
debt)  is regarded as a necessary condition to maintain fiscal sustainability. If  a no-Ponzi 
restriction is taken into consideration, fiscal sustainability can be operationalized in 
relative terms as  
 
𝐷0
𝑌0
≤ ∑ 𝜌𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
,  (3.8) 
 
or in absolute terms as 
 
𝐷0 ≤ ∑ R𝑡
∞
𝑡=1 𝑃𝐵𝑡.  (3.9) 
 
The fiscal sustainability condition imposes that fiscal policy has to respect present value 
budget constraint, i.e. that fiscal policy is sustainable if the present value of the primary 
balances (to GDP) is greater than or equal to the current level of public debt (to GDP).  
 
Representation of the fiscal sustainability condition based on intertemporal budget 
constraint provides an important theoretical background for the debt sustainability 
assessment, but also has several limitations (Jha, 2012): it is difficult to apply, government 
does not have sufficient control over the future revenues, and historical data has limited 
usability for long-term predictions. These limitations further impose difficulties in practical 
application of conditions in (3.8) and (3.9) for several reasons: 
 
 Since the sustainability conditions hold for an infinite time, one can always argue 
that any short- to mid-term problems with large deficits can be offset by 
sufficiently large primary surpluses in the future, and vice versa. 
 The sustainability conditions do not impose any constraints on the structure and 
relationship between public revenues and expenditures. 
 If fore some reason lenders are reluctant to buy debt in the short to mid run, 
government may experience serious illiquidity or insolvency issues even if long-
term fiscal sustainability condition is satisfied. Such example was the Mexican 
sovereign default in 1995, although Mexico’s debt in 1993 was quite low at 30% of 
GDP (Jha, 2012). 
 
In regard to the difficulties for the practical application of the public debt sustainability 
condition, numerous empirical-based methodologies with greater focus on the mid-term 
sustainability (like the abovementioned IMF DSA), have been proposed in the literature. 
They will be discussed in the literature review section.   
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3.3 Fiscal reaction function 
 
The discussion on fiscal reaction function is basically discussion on relationship between 
fiscal sustainability and cyclical behavior of fiscal policy, i.e. on relationship between 
government debt, fiscal balance and economic output. In order to satisfy its intertemporal 
budget constraint, government generally has two possibilities to finance outstanding debt – 
first by future fiscal revenues and second trough increase in monetary base. If the 
government is “well-behaved” i.e. responsible in respect to long-term budget constraint, 
only first possibility is expected to be in place, and primary balance should be adjusted to 
level of government debt to preserve fiscal sustainability. Indeed, it can be shown that 
debt-stabilizing primary balance is fully in compliance with the intertemporal budget 
constraint; “A succinct and convenient way to articulate the no-Ponzi game condition is in 
terms of the interest rate–growth differential” (Jha, 2012, pp. 20). It is useful to recall that 
debt-stabilizing primary balance (introduced in subsection 2.3.1) is defined as 𝑝𝑏̅̅ ̅𝑡 =
(𝑖𝑡−𝑔𝑡)
(1+𝑔𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1. In the context of the intertemporal budget constraint, lets assume situation in 
which the government is running a fiscal deficit that is financed by the further 
accumulation of the future debt. If the interest rate on this debt is lower than the growth 
rate, (𝑖𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡) < 0, and if unit elasticity of government revenues with respect to GDP is 
assumed, then, ceteris paribus, growth rate of public revenues will be higher than the rate 
of debt accumulation. Consequently, the debt will stabilize in the long-run at the steady-
state level that is below the current level of debt and fiscal sustainability condition will  be 
satisfied. The opposite holds for the situation in which growth rate is higher than interest 
rate. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that in practice government will not hold debt at targeted steady 
state in each period up to infinity, for several reasons. First, debt-deficit adjustments 
weaken the identity relation between overall fiscal balance and debt increment. Second, 
targeted value of debt-stabilizing primary balance is not continuous variable in reality. 
Indeed, decision on target value of primary balance in the period t is usually made by the 
mid-term fiscal strategy and budget, which is prepared and adopted by the end of year t-1 
based on the forecasts of the interest rate and growth rate. Third, even if it is assumed that 
values of interest and growth rate are accurately forecasted, there is always a great chance 
that government will face some unanticipated temporary expense or that some component 
of the public revenues will not be collected according to the budget. Fourth even if it is 
assumed that government is capable to execute budget fully according to the plan, scope of 
the fiscal policy is more comprehensive than simply pursuing continuously stable debt, and 
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thus decision on the targeted value of primary balance, at least in the mid run, can be 
driven by the fiscal policy goals other than long run fiscal sustainability maintaining. 
 
The latter issue is closely connected with the active role of the fiscal policy in achieving 
broader range of macroeconomic goals than solely fiscal sustainability. Since the rise of 
Keynesian economics, governments all around the world use fiscal policy tools to interfere 
economic activity, especially to maintain stable growth and employment during the periods 
of economic turmoil. In such case, running primary deficits for the prolonged periods of 
time to stimulate economic activity will be priority objective of fiscal policy rather than 
keeping stable public debt. 
 
Since the primary balance in reality will vary around debt-stabilizing value, public debt-to-
GDP ratio will vary, too. If the government behaves in responsible manner, it is expected 
that primary balance will covariate in the same direction as one-period lagged debt; the 
higher debt in the period t-1 should impose the stronger response of the government in 
terms of generated current primary surplus. Therefore, the government is regarded as 
responsible if the current primary balance reacts positively (in mathematical sense) to the 
debt accumulated in the past.  
 
On the other side, active role of fiscal policy in maintaining economic activity imposes 
counter-cyclical reaction of the fiscal policy stance. The counter-cyclical response of the 
fiscal policy stance implies that government should generate primary deficits when 
economic activity is below potential, or generate fiscal surpluses when activity is above 
potential. Behaving both in counter-cyclical and responsible manner at certain 
circumstances can be conflicting objective, such as in case of a country with high 
government debt during the downturn in business cycle. While persuading counter-cyclical 
expansionary fiscal policy is arguably good decision to stimulate GDP growth, it can 
eventually increase government indebtedness and even seriously endanger fiscal solvency. 
Actually, dilemma whether the government should opt for expansive counter-cyclical 
response of fiscal policy stance or stabilize debt by reducing primary deficits has become 
reality for many indebted old EU member states since outbreak of global economic crises 
in late ‘00s.  
 
Taking everything into account, fiscal policy stance can be represented as a function of the 
lagged debt and output gap as a measure of economic cyclicality, 
 
𝑏𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑑𝑡−1, 𝑜𝑔𝑡), (3.10) 
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where 𝑏𝑡 refers in general to fiscal balance used as a measure of fiscal policy stance. This 
relationship is known in the literature as the Fiscal Reaction Function (FRF). While overall 
fiscal balance can be also used, the previous discussion on intertemporal budget constraint, 
fiscal sustainability condition and fiscal reaction imposes that primary balance is more 
appropriate measure of primary stance. Additionally, in the subsection 2.3.1 it has been 
argued that cyclical-adjusted or structural value of primary balance has obvious advantages 
as a measure of fiscal stance relative to actual (headline) primary balance.  
 
Fiscal reaction function can be formulated in the form of fiscal rule, analogue to  
representation of the monetary reaction function in form of the famous Taylor rule. If, for 
example, a CAPB is used as an indicator of fiscal stance, the FRF can be formulated in 
form of fiscal rule 
 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑡 = 𝛽𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾𝑜𝑔𝑡,   (3.11) 
 
where 𝛽 > 0  and 𝛾 > 0 , in line with the previous theoretical discussion: positive 𝛽 
corresponds to the responsible reaction of fiscal stance to the dynamics of accumulated 
debt (with respect to intertemporal budget constraint), while positive 𝛾 corresponds to the 
counter-cyclical reaction to cyclical fluctuations of economic activity.  
 
The main methodological issue in formulation of the policy response to indebtedness and 
cyclicality, consistent with fiscal policy rule as in (3.11), is a proper computation of the 
CAPB or structural primary balance as an accurate measure of fiscal policy stance. Larch 
& Turrini (2009) classified methodologies of calculating CAB into two approaches: direct 
estimation of cyclically-adjusted revenue and expenditure based on regression models, and 
correction of headline balance for estimated cyclical component. The latter has been 
widely adopted by international organization, either in “disaggregated” 17  version (e.g. 
Girouard & Andre, 2005, for the OECD) or “aggregated” version (e.g. Fedelino et al., 
2009, for the IMF). Some authors also refer to this approach as “conventional”, to 
distinguish it from more complex methodologies of balance adjustment (e.g. IMF, 2007). 
According to this approach (aggregated version), adjustment of government balance that 
distinguishes “automatic” from “discretionary” effects is based on supposed constant 
elasticities of revenue and expenditure to output gap fluctuations: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑂𝐵𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡 (
𝑌𝑡
𝑝
𝑌𝑡
)
𝜂𝑅
− 𝐺𝑡 (
𝑌𝑡
𝑝
𝑌𝑡
)
𝜂𝐺
,  (3.12) 
 
                                                        
17 With respect to the particular budgetary items 
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where 𝜂𝑅  and 𝜂𝐺  are revenue and expenditure elasticity to output gap. It can be shown that, 
if output gaps are small, equation (3.12) can be approximated by equation (3.13)18, so that 
𝑐𝑎𝑜𝑏𝑡 is now obtained by subtracting the temporary component of the budget balance from 
the overall value 𝑜𝑏𝑡 (both 𝑐𝑎𝑜𝑏𝑡 and 𝑜𝑏𝑡 are expressed relative to actual GDP): 
 
𝑐𝑎𝑜𝑏𝑡 = 𝑜𝑏𝑡 − (𝜀𝑅 − 𝜀𝐺) ∗ 𝑜𝑔𝑡,  (3.13) 
 
where 𝜀𝑅 and 𝜀𝐺  are parameters of revenue and expenditures reaction to output gap, and 
𝑜𝑔𝑡 is current output gap as a percentage of potential GDP. Of course, if differences in 
reaction of budget components to output gap are assumed, disaggregation of overall budget 
sensitivities with respect to its components may be better solution. European Commission 
(2005) used disaggregated sensitivity parameters calculated as 𝜀𝑗 = 𝜂𝑗
𝐵𝐼𝑗,𝑡
𝑌𝑡
  to estimate 
cyclical effects for EU countries, where 𝜂𝑗  is elasticity and 𝐵𝐼𝑗,𝑡  is a nominal value of 
given budgetary item. However, use of sensitivities in someway leads to inconsistency in 
𝑐𝑎𝑜𝑏𝑡 estimation, as subtracted temporary component is expressed in units of potential 
output, while overall balance is expressed in units of actual output. This was criticized by 
Mourre et al. (2013), who propose use of semi-elasticities instead of sensitivities, 
calculated as 𝑠𝜂𝑗 = 𝜀𝑗 −
𝐵𝐼𝑗,𝑡
𝑌𝑡
, which corrects inconsistency in previous methodology and 
will be used in future estimation of EU countries cyclical effects. 
 
Beside theoretical issues, practical problem remaining is how to calculate particular 
elasticities of revenue and expenditure components with respect to GDP fluctuations. 
Girouard & Andre (2005) proposed methodology 19  based on separate estimation of 
elasticities to output gap for each GDP-sensitive budgetary item: personal income tax, 
social security contributions, corporate income tax and indirect taxes for revenues, together 
with unemployment-related spending for expenditure. This approach requires demanding 
computation of both the elasticities of revenue and expenditure components with respect to 
their base, and the reaction of the different tax or expenditure bases to the output gap. 
Then, estimated elasticities of particular revenue’ components 𝜂𝐺,𝑖  (or 𝜂𝐺,𝑈  for 
expenditure20) are averaged using the share of each on the total current tax burden 
𝑅𝑖
𝑅
 (or 
𝐺𝑈
𝐺
 
for spending) as weight. 
 
                                                        
18 For details of calculation, see Mourre et al. (2013). 
19 This methodology is developed within General Economic Analysis Division of the OECD Economics 
Department, so this is also often referred in literature as OECD (2005). 
20 Actually, there is no averaging of expenditure’ elasticities as only unemployment-related spending 𝐺𝑈  is 
sensitive to GDP. 
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Calculating elasticities according to Girouard & Andre (2005) requires longer time series 
of revenue and expenditure components for computation of steady weights and even more 
important, for reliable regression-based estimate of elasticities. European Commission 
(2005) applied this approach, based on 1995-2004 values of budgetary items, and reported 
empirical estimation of overall elasticities, showing that average elasticity of revenue and 
expenditure for EU 25 countries is very close to one and zero, respectively. Fedelino et al. 
(2009) use this result to propose simplified methodology for adjustment of primary balance 
in countries with low data availability. They suppose unit elasticity of revenue and zero 
elasticity of primary expenditures, which transforms equation (3.12) to: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑂𝐵𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡 (
𝑌𝑡
𝑝
𝑌𝑡
) − 𝐺𝑡.   (3.14) 
 
Interest spending 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 is treated as an exogenous component of expenditure, which is a 
kind of a compromising solution. Clearly, it is non-discretionary component of 
expenditures being beyond direct control of the fiscal authorities, but also not cyclical in 
the same way as revenue and expenditure components are 21 . If interest spending is 
subtracted from government expenditure, than equation (3.14) could be rewritten as: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡 (
𝑌𝑡
𝑝
𝑌𝑡
) − 𝑃𝐺𝑡,  (3.15) 
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵𝑡 = 𝐶𝐴𝑂𝐵𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡  and 𝑃𝐺𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡  are cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance and primary expenditure, respectively. The question remaining is whether balance 
ought to be scaled by potential or actual GDP in equations (3.14) and (3.15). Mourre et al. 
(2013) argue properly that use of actual GDP for scaling is not correct, as actual GDP is 
also strongly affected by business cycle. However, policy makers and the public do not 
prefer to use potential GDP in analysis and reporting, as pointed out by Fedelino et al. 
(2009), who discuss the issue of “trade-off between analytical rigor and convenience of 
commonly used indicators”. 
 
Previously discussed methodologies basically propose guidelines for adjustment of balance 
for automatic changes of its components, stemming from GDP fluctuations. Although 
cyclical fluctuations are reasonably considered as the largest and most persistent non-
discretionary component of balance, recent empirical analyses reveals evidences that they 
are not the only source of temporary deviations of revenue and expenditure from their 
permanent values. In the most general sense, one can argue that any variable affecting the 
                                                        
21 While revenue and expenditure are directly affected by cyclical fluctuations of GDP, interest spending is 
affected indirectly by cyclical conditions, mostly throughout the interest and exchange rate transmission 
channels. 
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government revenue or expenditure may become source of transitory deviations of balance 
from its discretionary value. According to Bornhorst et al. (2011), all of these factors can 
be classified in two categories: one-off changes in budgetary items and so-called “beyond-
the-cycle” factors, whose fluctuations are likely to cause temporary deviations of revenue 
and expenditure from their steady values, but not perfectly correlated with business cycle. 
 
One-off components of budgetary items are usually depicted as transitory changes in 
revenue or expenditure that affect government fiscal position only in year when realized 
(or with very limited influence in subsequent years). Gali & Perotti (2003) depict such one-
off components as “non-systematic” or “exogenous” change of balance that is consequence 
of exogenous political processes or extraordinary non-economic circumstances. Joumard et 
al (2008) emphasized that appropriate assessment of fiscal stance, in addition to cyclical 
adjustments, should be based on an fiscal indicator that effectively eliminates impact of 
one-offs and maintain consistency if applied to group of countries for the purpose of 
comparative analysis.  
 
Beyond-the-cycle adjustment is related to idea that balance ought to be corrected for 
macroeconomic fluctuations other than those of output. As mentioned, even interest 
spending as a component of expenditure is sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations, 
however this concept is predominantly oriented toward the revenue side of balance. 
Roughly, we can categorize two groups of factors affecting the revenues: fluctuations of 
prices and fluctuations of output structure. First group considers two types of prices 
changes with respect to the influence on tax bases or elasticities: assets (real estate and 
equity) and commodity (or terms of trade) prices. Bornhorst et al. (2011) make a good 
point on these differences, arguing that cyclical adjustment only for output gap could miss 
the nature of revenue fluctuations, as economic expansion driven by asset price boom will 
have large effects on revenue than expansion based on commodity prices, since 
consumption is typically more heavily taxed than export. Indeed, empirical work confirms 
relevance of adjustment for price fluctuations. Turner (2006) compares cyclically adjusted 
balance by standard OECD method (Girouard & Andre, 2005) with balance additionally 
corrected for commodity prices for Australia, finding that during exceptional periods of 
rapid change in commodity prices these two measures can be very different. Daude et al. 
(2010) examines effects of commodity cycles for the group of Latin American countries 
and conclude that they may be as relevant as economic cycles due to significant impact on 
total fiscal revenues. Morris & Schukneht (2007) analyze impact of equity and real estate 
prices on fiscal revenues for 16 OECD countries by adjusting balances for both business 
and asset price cycles, and argue that asset price movements might be “missing link” that 
explains unexplained changes in CAB.  Price & Dang (2011) develop comprehensive 
methodology of balance adjustment for asset prices and point out that conventionally 
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adjusted balance ought be corrected to the extent in which asset prices fluctuations are 
uncorrelated to the output cycle. 
 
Adjustment of balance for output composition impact stems from idea that aggregate 
output gap cannot capture effects of unbalanced growth, i.e. that components of 
government revenue and expenditure might be in different phases of the cycle 
(Bouthevillain et al. 2001). Consequently, use of steady weights for revenue and 
expenditure components when cyclically adjusted, as in EC (2005), may be inappropriate. 
Bouthevillain et al. (2001) analyze this issue for European countries and find evidences 
that composition effects stemming from unbalanced growth haven’t been significant for 
the euro area as a whole, but can be particularly important at the country level. Recent 
papers on this topic were mostly concerned with adjustments of indirect tax revenue for 
effects of absorption fluctuations, as a special case of adjustment for output composition 
effects (Bornhorst et al., 2011). Basically, if absorption is boosted by current account 
(external) imbalances, this will create increase in revenue that will be captured by cyclical 
fluctuations of output (internal imbalances) only to the level in which they correspond to 
the fluctuation of absorption. IMF (2007) analysis of Bulgarian economy reveals that 
fluctuations of all tax components during boom years were related to external rather than 
internal imbalances, and consequently new methodology for proper adjustment of balance 
for both absorption and output cycles is proposed (CAAB). Latter researchers, who 
adopted this methodology, find that CAAB and CAB can significantly differ. Lendvai et 
al. (2011) estimate CAAB for EU countries and compare it to conventional CAB, and 
show that neglecting the absorption adjustment could have mattered substantially for a 
proper assessment of structural fiscal positions. Dobrescu & Salman (2011) calculate 
CAAB for wider sample of 59 advanced and emerging countries and show that ignoring 
absorption cycles leads to biased estimation of fiscal stance up to 1.5 percent of GDP.  
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4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The subject of this work covers variety of the economic topics with exceptionally high 
number of related studies. Issues of the fiscal sustainability gained particular attention 
during the recent sovereign debt crisis, followed by proliferation of the related empirical 
literature. Since the full scope overview of the debt/fiscal sustainability related studies 
would be an immense task, literature overview provided in this chapter is predominantly 
dealing with the papers that are closely related to the empirical research conducted in the 
Chapter 6. More specifically, focus of review of the theoretical and methodological work is 
on the studies that generally deals with the issues of uncertainty and risks surrounding 
projections of public debt levels and costs. In review of empirical work, focus is 
additionally narrowed down to studies dealing with application of fiscal reaction function 
and projections of debt determinants within fiscal sustainability analysis framework. 
 
4.1. Review of theoretical and methodological findings 
 
Putting government debt together with temporary deviations of government balance and 
GDP on the explanatory side of budget deficit equation could be traced to the work of 
Barro (1979), on so-called tax-smoothing hypothesis. Under the certain assumptions on 
cost of tax collection, he hypothesized that optimal tax policy requires application of 
uniform tax rate to smooth revenues over time and satisfy inter-temporal constraint. Huang 
& Lin (1993) point out important implication of optimal taxation, that optimal tax rate is 
solely determined by permanent components of expenditure and aggregate output. In his 
later work, Barro (1986) set tax-smoothing model of deficit, with expected inflation, 
measure of temporary government spending, temporary shortfall of output and changes in 
interest rate on the explanatory side. While analyzing fiscal solvency in USA, Bohn (1998) 
adopted rationale of Barro’s tax-smoothing model that fiscal policy decisions ought to be 
driven by permanent component of expenditure and output22. Main legacy of the Bohn’s 
(1998) milestone work reflects in essential specification of FRF as a model-based 
framework of fiscal policy analysis, and interpretational claim that as long as primary 
deficit positively reacts to debt, government respects inter-temporal budget constraints and 
fiscal policy is responsible.  
 
Consideration of tax smoothing as debt management objective became first mainstream 
line of reasoning about public debt governance and open the discussion on the issue of 
                                                        
22 Permanent component of output as a tax basis determines permanent level of revenue. 
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optimal debt structure23 that should provide a hedge against macroeconomic shocks to the 
government budget, that is, by choosing a portfolio of securities with returns that co-vary 
negatively with government consumption and positively with the tax base and, thus, output 
(Lucas & Stokey, 1983; Barro, 1995; Bohn, 1990; Missale, 1997). Licandro & Masoller 
(2000) provide analytical solution for the optimal debt structure, considering the tax 
smoothing as the government’ debt management policy objective. Missale (2000) proposed 
similar approach in regard to “Stabilization and Growth Pact” introduced to European 
Monetary Union that has been limited budget deficit of member countries to 3%, by stating 
budget stabilization as debt management approach objective and set the analytical solution 
for the optimal debt structure.  
 
In general, budget stabilization or tax smoothing approach provides important insights in 
decision making process in public debt management and emphasized importance of the 
correlation matrix between key macroeconomic variables like inflation, GDP growth and 
interest and exchange rates for the optimization of debt structure. However, tax smoothing 
approach as public debt management objective was criticized in terms of its practical 
accuracy. Alesina, Roubini & Cohen (1997) argue that debt managers ignore the budget 
stabilization approach because budgetary policy is not driven by tax smoothing motives. 
They claim that governments put up with the welfare losses caused by tax rate fluctuations. 
De Haan & Wolswijk (2005) attribute the lack of practical application of the budget 
stabilization approach to the fact that countries find it difficult to investigate how the 
various macroeconomic variables affect the debt costs and the balance. Furthermore, it is 
not known what shocks (demand or supply shocks) a country may expect. As a result, it is 
practically impossible to determine the right hedge for the budget balance in advance. 
Additional critics that could be addressed to this approach is that it says little about 
exposure of debt portfolio to risk and costs of debt. 
 
New line of academic reasoning has started at the beginning of the 00’s with Bergström & 
Holmlund (2000) work24 which introduced new approach to debt management that set 
minimization of debt costs as an objective of their public debt management model. Their 
numerical 25  approach comprises modeling of the inflation, GDP, short and long-term 
                                                        
23 The optimal debt composition is derived by looking at the relative impact of the risk and costs of the 
various debt instruments on the probability of missing a well-defined stabilization target, e.g. the 
stabilization of the debt ratio at some target value ( OECD 2005, pp. 13) 
24  This working paper of Swedish Debt Management Office is usually cited as initial comprehensively 
developed framework for minimizations of public debt cost by majority of other relevant authors. 
According to Silva, Cabral & Baghdassarian (2006), Granger (1999) on behalf of Portugal Debt Agency 
presented related framework limited to stochastic considerations of interest rates only at World Bank 
Second Sovereign Debt Management Forum. 
25 The results are obtained by simulations instead of applying analytical solutions. 
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interest rates and exchange rates using stochastic processes in order to capture stochastic 
nature of risk factors and calculate costs of debt under different financing strategies.  
 
An incentive to development of new approach was given by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), which “Guidelines for the Public Debt 
Management”, issued in 2001, states that the main objective of public debt management is 
“to ensure that the government’s financing needs and its payment obligations are met at 
the lowest possible cost over the medium to long run, consistent with a prudent degree of 
risk”. In practical sense, it means that governments should look for such debt structure that 
minimize potential loss of adverse shocks and market movements by efficient management 
of the risks. Additionally, Guidelines clearly stated six types of the risk26 that governments 
should manage. 
 
Cost minimization approach was widely accepted by debt management authorities 
worldwide and included as public debt management objective in associated strategies 
(Wheeler, 2004). Requirements for building the cost and risk trade-off analysis framework 
by IMF and WB Guidelines directed researchers to further developments of appropriate 
risk assessment methodology, mostly based on use of Cost-at-Risk approach. 
Implementation of CaR methodology for risk assessment faced the difficulties, as for other 
probability density functions than normal, especially those with a tail of the distribution 
that is not exponential, the statistical indicators can not be easily evaluated in a closed form 
(Bernaschi, Missale & Vergni, 2009). Consequently, major development of the 
comprehensive methodology for risk assessment of public debt is based on numerical 
approach and stochastic simulations of cost and debt dynamics under the different 
scenarios of financing strategies in similar spirit of Bergström & Holmlund (2000) and 
Bergström, Holmlund & Lindberg (2002). Several pioneering examples of cost-risk 
stochastic simulation frameworks include: 
 
 Bodler (2002, 2003) construct a simple reduced-form model describing the joint 
evolution of the economic business cycle, the government's financial position, and 
the term structure of interest rates. In addition, he later upgrades this methodology 
with explicit modeling of CaR, which was previously introduced as risk assessment 
tool by Danish National Bank (1998) in very similar spirit to Value-at-Risk 
approach;  
 Hahm & Kim (2004) combine the concept of the efficient frontier from Markowitz 
portfolio theory with CaR penalties and provide a framework to identify and 
achieve a benchmark portfolio structure for government debt based upon the trade-
off between expected debt service cost and risk; 
                                                        
26 These are market, rollover, credit, settlement, liquidity and operational risk. 
  
 
 
90 
 
 National Bank of Denmark (2006) presented its CaR model gradually developed 
for several years, first for the management of the interest-rate risk on the domestic 
debt and later expanded to include foreign debt and the assets of the central-
government debt for measuring the trade-off between costs and risks; 
 Pick & Anthony (2006) made the simulation framework consists of three building 
blocks: a macroeconomic model of inter-related equations for modeling output gap, 
the primary net financing requirement, inflation and the short interest rate; yield 
curve models of interest rates; and the debt strategy simulation component which is 
used to compute the cost and risk measures for given debt strategy. 
 Renne & Sagne (2008) propose similar to latter framework, with one main block 
comprises the vector autoregression modeling of GDP growth, inflation, short-term 
interest rate, and rate spread, with two additional blocks for modeling of the yield 
curves and dynamics of the primary fiscal balance.  
 
Stochastic simulation modeling as an approach to public debt management have been 
applied in decision making process by several debt management authorities, including the 
National Bank of Canada (Bodler, 2002; 2003), the Swedish National Debt Office 
(Bergström & Holmlund, 2000; Bergström, Holmlund & Lindberg, 2002), National Bank 
of Denmark (2006), Brazilian National Treasury (Silva, Cabral & Baghdassarian, 2006), 
Dutch Treasury (2007), etc. For an overview of general algorithm of stochastic debt 
strategy simulation modeling in OECD countries see Risbjerg & Holmlund (2005). For 
more general overview of the advances in risk management practices within public debt 
management in OECD countries is given by OECD Public Debt Management Working 
Group (2005). General overview of the cross-country involvement of risk management 
into the national debt strategies in regard to currency, interest rate and refinancing risk is 
presented by Melecky (2007a). 
 
There are several critics that could be addressed to cost minimization approach and its 
application to public debt management. Missale (2000) criticize this approach conceptually 
arguing that the objectives of minimizing the expected cost of debt servicing relative to 
desirable level of risk is of little help operationally. Bernaschi, Missale & Vergni (2009) 
point to the danger of assuming the cost-risk minimization of the interest expenditure as 
the main objective of debt management, which reflects in choice of sub-optimal debt 
strategies when minimization of the interest expenditure comprise too short horizon or 
does not consider that risk premiums may reflect a fair price for insurance. Additional 
critic could be addressed to the use of numerical approaches in the proposed frameworks, 
which do not provide an explicit analytical solution that would guide conceptually to the 
choice of optimal structure, and thus serve as a base for a more judgmental analysis 
(Melecky, 2007b). Also, majority of the proposed frameworks are concerned primarily 
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with analysis of market risks, more specifically interest rate risks, while influence of the 
risks from the fiscal side is neglected and not included in stochastic simulations. In 
addition, in analysis asset side of the government balance is also usually neglected. 
Vlenadia (2002) propose an asset-liability management (ALM) approach to risk 
assessment of public debt which combine CaR and portfolio optimization with ALM 
approach usually used in financial institutions.  
 
IMF Sustainability Assessment (DSA) framework for Market Access Countries27 (MAC) 
was introduced in 2002 and refined in 2003 and 2005. The latter framework for low 
income countries 28  (LIC) was developed jointly with the World Bank in 2005. DSA 
framework is primarily based on debt accumulation equation and thus belongs to the 
financing gap approach29 to public debt sustainability assessment (Tran-Nguyen & Tola, 
2009). Essentially, it allows sensitivity analysis and stress testing of debt under different 
scenarios of economic policies and macroeconomic shocks.  
 
In regard to the existing literature, both debt sustainability and cost minimization approach 
are mainly based on numerical approach and share the common cost and risk assessment 
tools (CaR measures, stochastic simulations, scenario analysis, stress testing). However, 
public debt sustainability approach is primarily subjected to stress testing and sensitivity 
analysis of public debt dynamics under the different scenarios of government economic 
policy or possible exogenous shocks. Thus related outcome of the debt sustainability 
approach is usually some indicator on debt distress, like probability of default (Garcia & 
Rigobon, 2004; Xu & Ghezzi, 2003; Gray, Merton & Bodie, 2007 or Gapen at al, 2008). 
 
DSA was widely criticized, from the conceptual level (Wyplosz, 2011) to methodological 
level, as it is highly standardized and implemented in deterministic manner with quite 
unrealistic assumptions on size and probabilities of possible shocks (Debrun, Celasun & 
Ostry, 2006; Gray at al, 2008). Despite shortcomings of traditional DSA-based fiscal 
sustainability analysis which often does not take into account the effects of uncertainty, the 
IMF’s framework for fiscal sustainability analysis is quite useful to the practicing 
economist (Burnside 2004). In order to include uncertainty in the fiscal sustainability 
analysis, several different approaches have been taken to model the interaction between 
economic variables in stochastic simulation studies. 
 
                                                        
27 See Assessing Sustainability, Information Note on Modifications to the Fund's Debt Sustainability 
Assessment Framework for Market-Access Countries (2002),  Sustainability Assessments – Review of 
Application (2003) and Methodological Refinements (2005) 
28 See Operational Framework for Debt Sustainability Assessments in Low-Income Countries - Further 
Considerations (2005) 
29 For detailed discussion on main approaches to public debt sustainability, see Tran-Nguyen & Tola (2009) 
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 Barnhill & Kopits (2003) apply the VaR methodology to estimate the distribution 
of government net value taking into account the evolution of the whole public 
sector balance sheet and implicit government liabilities in regard to volatility and 
co-movements of key risk variables to public sector vulnerability.  
 Xu & Ghezzi (2003) model the flows in the government budget as stochastic 
processes in order to estimate default probabilities, using a system of Brownian 
motions as the basis for their simulation. In addition, they map obtained default 
probabilities into a term structure model to compute fair pricing of the 
government’s debt. 
 Mendoza & Oviedo (2004) propose a quantitative framework for the equilibrium 
dynamics of public debt of a two-sector small open economy subject to random 
income shocks, given tax and expenditure policies. This framework emphasizes 
macroeconomic uncertainty and the transmission mechanism by which this 
uncertainty affects debt dynamics when asset markets are incomplete and public 
debt is a dollarized. 
 Giavazzi & Missale (2004) paper connect cost minimization approach with debt 
sustainability as they set stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio as the objective 
function. Their setup differs than the other approaches as it provides analytical 
solution for the optimal weights of the components in government debt portfolio.  
 Ferrucci & Penalver (2003) present a model that calculates the distribution of 
future paths of the debt to GDP ratio by running the forecasts on key 
macroeconomic variables, generated from a VAR modeling. These distributions 
can be used to measure the probability of certain debt outcomes and to assess debt 
sustainability. Garcia & Rigobon (2004) work propose the similar approach. They 
simulate paths of public debt under the various scenarios of possible shocks for the 
Brazilian economy and compute probabilities that the simulated debt to GDP ratio 
exceeds a given threshold deemed risky. Lewis (2004) applied their methodology 
to Jamaican data. 
It is important to emphasize that all of these approaches are subjected and applied to the 
emerging market economies. Burnside (2004) gives an excellent overview of Barnhill & 
Kopits (2003), Xu & Ghezzi (2003) and Mendoza and Oviedo (2004) models and their 
application to the data of Latin America emerging economies. However, Ferruci & 
Penalver (2003) and Garcia & Rigobon (2004) works became the basis for the most 
exploited research direction as they are closely subjected to the IMF (2002, 2003) Debt 
Sustainability Assessment (DSA) framework.  
 
In addition to DSA related frameworks, several different approaches that include 
uncertainty in the debt sustainability assessment are proposed, most notably Hostland & 
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Karam (2006) macroeconomic model consists of a few reduced form equations for 
aggregate demand/supply dynamics and the inflation process and Gray, Merton & Bodie 
(2007) or Gapen at al. (2008) who propose a new approach to measure, analyze, and 
manage sovereign risk based on the theory and practice of modern contingent claims 
analysis. 
 
4.2 Review of empirical research 
 
According to the Adams et al. (2010), three different approaches in empirical assessment 
of the fiscal sustainability can be identified: 
 
 Testing the stationarity of time series 
 Testing compliance with fiscal rules 
 Scenario or stress testing 
 
The time series approach tries to assess whether public indebtedness, measured in level or 
as a ratio to GDP, is stationary time series. If the debt dynamics has a unit root, this would 
indicate that debt is not sustainable (Jha). Beside public indebtedness, time series approach 
can be extended to assessment of stationarity of other fiscal variables such as government 
spending and revenues or interest payments (Trehan & Walsh, 1991; Haug, 1991). The 
alternative time series approach utilizes literature on asset price bubbles to test whether the 
time series for debt stocks include a bubble term that implies fiscal policy being 
unsustainable (Chalk and Hemming, 2000). Nevertheless, such simple approach to 
empirical assessment of fiscal sustainability in the recent years has been upgraded up to the 
methodology of testing of cointegration relationships that would be expected to hold 
among various variables if policy fiscal policy is sustainable, see, Ozkaya (2013) or 
Amankwah et al. (2018) as the recent example of empirical studies based on cointegration 
testing. 
 
Testing compliance with fiscal rules referred to estimation of fiscal reaction and 
consistency of estimated coefficients with values stipulated by the fiscal rule, such as those 
specified in equation (3.11). Based on US data for the period 1916-1995, Bohn (1998) 
shows that after controlling for temporary spending (military outlays) and output 
fluctuations, primary balance positively responds to debt to GDP ratio and draw two 
important conclusions: for given period, US debt to GDP was mean-reverting process and 
US fiscal policy was sustainable in sense of satisfying inter-temporal constraint. This result 
is confirmed using even longer US data series for the period 1793-2003 (Bohn, 2005).  
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Since Bohn (1998) initial research, literature on estimating fiscal reaction and examining 
debt vis-à-vis primary balance relationship has extensively grown. IMF (2003) estimates 
FRF for the period 1970-2002, for large sample of emerging and industrialized economies, 
and finds significant positive reaction of balance to debt. Afonso (2005) provides a 
summary of early literature30 focuses on examining relationship between public debt and 
primary balance in industrialized countries, emphasizing that all of these works confirms 
positive responds of primary balance to debt dynamic in favor of responsible behavior of 
governments. This result was also found to hold in his analysis for the sample of EU 15 
countries in four different sub-periods: pre- and post-Maastricht, and pre- and post-SGP 
period31. Mendoza & Ostry (2007) examine the issue of fiscal solvency in industrial and 
emerging market countries using Bohn’s (2005) approach, finding positive conditional 
response of primary fiscal balances to changes in government debt. 
 
Beside simple interpretation of positive response of balance to debt as an indicator of 
responsible fiscal behavior, FRF becomes a tool of more explicit model-based framework 
for assessment of solvency and debt sustainability. Abiad & Ostry (2005) use the 
estimations of FRF in analysis of government overborrowing in emerging countries to 
calculate benchmark levels of sustainable debt. European Commission (2011) estimates 
FRF for EU 27 countries, and uses it for forecasting primary balances and derivations of 
debt sustainability thresholds. Celasun et al. (2006) incorporate FRF as a building block of 
stochastic Debt Sustainability Assessment (DSA) framework, which deterministic mode is 
widely used by the IMF exercises of forecasting debt to GDP ratio. Medeiros (2012) 
applies similar DSA methodology to assess FRF and forecast debt dynamic for selected 
EU member states. Ostry et al. (2011) use data for 23 advanced economies over 1970–
2007 period, and find evidences on so-called “fiscal fatigue”, i.e. non-linear marginal 
response of primary balance to lagged debt with threshold around 90-100 percent of debt 
to GDP. 
 
Empirical estimations of FRF mainly confirm positive response of primary balance to 
government debt, regardless of countries and time span comprised by samples. However, 
when it comes to cyclical character of fiscal policy and response of balance to GDP 
fluctuations, situation is not so straightforward. Empirical findings suggest that fiscal 
policy and government spending are pro-cyclical in developing countries, opposite to 
developed countries where they are counter- or a-cyclical. Ilzetzki & Vegh (2008) provide 
                                                        
30 Literature from the period 1998 – 2005. 
31 Many economists expressed concerns that Maastricht Treaty and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) put 
constraints to EU countries on conducting stabilizing fiscal policy; this issue was quite often explored in 
other works on fiscal policy of EU members. 
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an overview of literature supporting this view, while results of their own analysis also 
confirm the pro-cyclical character of fiscal policies in developing countries.  
 
The most frequently cited explanations of the pro-cyclical behavior in developing countries 
blame credit constraints binding government borrowing and weakness of political and 
institutional infrastructure. Credit constraint argument (Gavin & Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky 
et al., 2004) is popular economic explanation advocating that during good times low cost 
of borrowing gives incentive to the governments to borrow, while during bad times high 
cost ties borrowing capacities of government. Weakness of political and institutional 
infrastructure as a possible explanation is related to pro-cyclicality in economic upturns, 
including the voracity effect of Tornell & Lane (1999) and the "starve the Leviathan" 
argument of Alesina et al. (2008). Voracity effect claims that pro-cyclical response is 
motivated by struggle of groups with political power to acquire surge in wealth caused by 
positive GDP shocks, putting a pressure on fiscal authorities for more than proportional 
increase in spending. “Starve the Leviathan" argument claims that voters demand more 
public goods or fewer taxes to prevent corrupted governments from appropriating rents 
when the economy is doing well. On the other hand, some other authors like Rigobon 
(2004) has questioned methodological approach in studies finding differences in cyclical 
behavior between developing and industrialized countries, asserting it doesn’t properly 
deal with different shocks to which these two groups of countries are exposed. 
 
Some of the works dealing with assessment of fiscal policy cyclicality engage FRF to 
estimate character of its behavior. In this strand of research, FRF is considered as a model 
of “fiscal rule”, i.e. cyclical relation between an indicator of fiscal policy (cyclically-
adjusted balance) and an indicator of business cycle (output gap), controlled for effects of 
debt-stabilization motive of fiscal authorities (lagged debt). In such FRF setup, systematic 
positive response of balance to change in output gap indicates counter-cyclical character of 
fiscal policy, for example if negative output gap is widening, deficit rises (or surplus falls) 
meaning that government persuade expansionary fiscal policy. Some early works on this 
issue (Fatas & Mihov, 2002; Wyplosz 2002) regress unadjusted balances to output gap, 
however Gali & Perotti (2003) criticized this approach, pointing out that automatic 
adjustments of the primary balance and interest expenditure to the cyclical conditions 
could be non-negligible in size relative to discretionary value of balance. In addition, they 
also warn that even discretionary value of balance could be imprecise representation of 
systematic response of government fiscal policy to business cycle, as it often encompasses 
exogenous a-cyclical component, in line with Bohn’s observation on influence of war 
outlays while estimating FRF in USA. 
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Contrary to Fatas & Mihov (2002) findings that size of the counter-cyclical policy of EU 
countries declines in post-Maastricht period, Gali & Perotti (2003) find evidences that 
counter-cyclicality of EMU and industrialized countries increase over time. Hagen and 
Wyplosz (2008) adopted Gali & Perotti (2003) FRF specification32 and also find evidence 
that fiscal policy in EMU became more counter-cyclical and more used to restore 
competitiveness instead of simple boosting demand. Another issue that raise attention of 
researchers is possibly different response during the “good” and “bad” times33, for example 
Turini (2008) used FRF that regresses change of CAPB to lagged debt and output and find 
evidences that fiscal policy in EMU countries tends to be pro-cyclical in good times, and 
that this phenomenon is completely driven by expenditure dynamic. 
 
Few existing empirical studies of fiscal policy behavior in EEC, based on FRF estimation, 
are almost exclusively limited to CEE 10 group of countries34 – ten EEC that accessed EU 
as the new member states, and mostly concentrated on cyclical behavior of fiscal policy. 
Eller & Urvova (2012) estimate FRF within DSA framework, based on data of seven 
countries out of CEE 10 group and Croatia, and find persistent positive response of non-
adjusted primary balance to both lagged debt and output gap. Zdravkovic et al. (2013) 
obtained very similar results for broader group of EEC. In both studies authors hypothesize 
that counter-cyclical response of primary balance stems from automatic stabilizers. Staehr 
(2007) compares cyclicality of old EU members and CEE 10 using the non-adjusted 
balance in FRF modeling, and find that CEE 10 fiscal response were more counter-cyclical 
than EU old members. In latter work, he again provides evidences on counter-cyclical 
response of overall balance of CEE 10, which is entirely driven by the revenue side 
(Staehr, 2010). Some papers attempt to analyze fiscal behavior of single EEC, for example 
Angelovska Bezovska et al. (2011) find that the fiscal policy behavior of FRY Macedonia 
was pro-cyclical prior to adoption of new monetary policy framework in 1996, but turned 
to counter-cyclical afterwards. 
 
A third group of tests relies on the DSA approach by the IMF, that utilizes scenario or 
stress tests. As previously mentioned, stochastic modeling to DSA framework was 
introduced by Ferruci & Penalver (2003) and Garcia & Rigobon (2004) was followed by 
Debrun, Celasun & Ostry (2006), who applied stress testing to the five emerging market 
countries.  In order to relax the assumption on passive acting of fiscal authorities to the 
deterioration of public debt, they extended the DSA stochastic methodology with the fiscal 
reaction function, estimated on panel data on 34 emerging countries. Penalver & Thwaites 
                                                        
32 Opposite to FRF specifications focused on contemporaneous output gap vis-à-vis balance, “fiscal rule” 
FRF specification in Gali & Perotti (2003) manner use expectation of output gap from previous year 
instead. 
33 Good times meaning that output gap is positive and bad times that is negative. 
34 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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(2005) estimate an econometric model of the determinants of public debt dynamics and use 
this model to simulate the effect of different fiscal policy rules for future paths of debt and 
to derive the set of fiscal policy rules which stabilize public debt dynamics.  
 
Tanner & Samake (2006) assess both retrospectively and prospectively the sustainability of 
fiscal policy under uncertainty in three emerging market countries. Their employ similar 
VAR framework as in the previous DSA related approaches, and use Monte Carlo 
techniques to reveal the primary surplus that is required to keep the debt/GDP ratio from 
rising in all but the worst 50 percent, 25 percent, and 10 percent of circumstances. Di Bella 
(2008) proposes a framework for public debt sustainability analysis that include the 
estimation of an appropriate, and country-specific debt threshold, following the approach 
proposed by Reinhart, Rogoff & Savastano (2003).  
 
Gray at al. (2008) paper proposes a new framework for the analysis of public sector debt 
sustainability, based on contingent claims analysis. By incorporating uncertainty into 
sovereign risk-adjusted balance sheets, this framework ties together DSA with early 
indicators of vulnerabilities. Giovanni & Gardner (2008) introduce DSA approach akin to 
that of Celasun at al. (2006), but instead of the baseline scenario around which confidence 
intervals are built they introduce adjustment scenario intended to reverse explosive debt 
dynamics. Finally, Kawakami & Romeu (2011), extend the work of Celasun at al. (2006) 
with the second-round effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic projections. Their 
forecasting framework thus reflects the impact of the primary balance on the forecast of 
macro aggregates. 
 
While the majority of the empirical research that apply FRF approach utilizes panels of 
countries to make “average” assessments of sustainability, stochastic DSA approach is 
typically based on the single-unit Vector Autoregression modeling, so that sample in these 
studies usually covers only one to five countries. Opposite to the FRF approach in 
empirical research wherein uniform criterion exists to make a conclusion about fiscal 
sustainability (which in case of FRF approach is obeying of fiscal reaction to fiscal rules), 
assessments about fiscal sustainability in research papers applying DSA approach are not 
based on some theoretically grounded and uniformed criterion. On the contrary, 
qualifications of fiscal sustainability in empirical papers are often based on rule of thumb, 
loose application of some subjectively chosen criterion, or sometimes even inconclusive 
(only forecast of the debt dynamics are presented) Therefore, strict systematization of the 
findings from DSA-wise empirical research to those that claims sustainability versus those 
which claims unsustainability is not possible to conduct. Instead, the Table 4.1 presents the 
overview of the empirical studies that apply stochastic DSA approach to fiscal 
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sustainability assessment with simple description of the period and countries covered by 
the sample.  
 
Table 4.1: Review of the empirical studies that apply stochastic DSA approach to fiscal 
sustainability assessment 
 
Study Sample coverage of the countries Sample coverage of the period 
Garcia & Rigobon (2004) Brazil 1994-2003 
Lewis (2004) Jamaica 1996-2004 
Debrun, Celasun & Ostry (2006) Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South 
Africa, Turkey 
1990-2004 
Penalver & Thwaites (2005) Brazil 1999-2005 
Tanner & Samake (2006) Brazil, Mexico, Turkey 1995-2005 
Di Bella (2008) Dominican republic 1980-2007 
Giovanni & Gardner (2008) Lebanon 1998-2007 
Kawakami & Romeu (2011) Brazil 1995-2009 
Abel & Kobor (2011) Hungary 1995-2006 
Zdravkovic & Bradic-Martinovic 
(2012), Zdravkovic (2013) 
Serbia 2008-2012 
Ferrarini & Ramayandi (2012) Developing Asia 2000-2010 
Eller & Urvova (2012) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia 
1995-2011 
Medeiros (2012) EU 1976-2010 
Cuerpo & Ramos (2015) Spain 1986-2014 
 
It can be noticed also that some of this studies were already discussed within FRF 
approach. These studies basically combines debt-stochastic modeling with FRF estimation 
to allow both stress testing (using stochastic simulation of shocks) and scenario analysis 
(using assumptions on future fiscal scenarios). Such approach is henceforth referred to as 
VAR-FRF DSA framework. 
 
4.3 Critical assessment of existing literature 
 
Putting all together, despite the considerable progress in development and improvement of 
the methodologies for the empirical assessment of the fiscal sustainability, broadly 
speaking existing literature has little said about following very important issues: 
 
 Out-of-sample performance. Almost all of the literature which is dealing with 
stress testing of public debt based on the stochastic DSA approach makes 
projection of the future debt dynamics that goes beyond of historical data in the 
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sample, so there is a little empirical evidence on the back testing and out-of-sample 
performance of this approach.  
 Likelihoods of scenarios and shocks. Most of the models routinely imposed 
shocks simulation based on estimated historical variance-covariance matrix of the 
VAR residuals, assuming that shocks follows the joint normal distribution;   
 Compliance with market perception of risk. Despite some of the models like 
Gray, Merton & Bodie (2007), Gapen at al. (2008) and Xu & Ghezzi (2003) model 
the sovereign spreads on government debt, majority of DSA related literature is not 
concerned with correlation of computed default probabilities with market spreads, 
except in Garcia & Rigobon (2004), Gray at al. (2008) and several other works; 
 Threshold levels of debt. Except for Di Bella (2008) paper, DSA related literature 
is mostly concerned with estimation of probabilities of public debt evolution 
around baseline scenario without explicit assessment of debt threshold level.  
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5 DYNAMICS AND DECOMPOSITION OF THE PUBLIC DEBT OF 
SERBIA AND PEER COUNTRIES 
 
The previous discussion reveals that reliability of fiscal sustainability assessment critically 
depends on the reliability of the macroeconomic assumptions used to produce forecast of 
the key debt determinants. While backward-looking analysis based on historical data can 
not provide full set of analytical inputs for the long-term debt forecasting, it remains 
starting point of the debt sustainability analysis in the mid run. Country-specific historical 
analysis of debt dynamics characteristics, such as debt structure, correlation patterns 
between macroeconomic variables and fiscal policy behavior, gives the solid ground which 
can be further utilized in forward-looking analysis of the fiscal sustainability.  
 
This chapter provides analysis of the historical evolution of the public debt, debt 
dynamics’ determinants and debt dynamics’ composition, on the sample of eight Emerging 
European Countries henceforth referred as EEC 8. The main objective of the empirical 
analysis is comprehensive testing of the hypotheses 1 and 2: 
 
 H1: Dynamics and cost of the public debt are correlated with change in non-fiscal 
and fiscal variables; 
 H2: Dynamics and cost of the public debt are more sensitive to impact of fiscal 
than non-fiscal variables. 
Sample naturally includes Serbia, while other seven peer countries from Emerging Europe 
are particularly selected for being EU members, geographically close and comparable with 
Serbia in terms economy, population and territorial size. The analysis covers annualized 
quarterly data mainly in the period 2000/01-2017, except in cases where data are available 
only for shorter time span. Since in this work two datasets are used in analysis, this one is 
referred as DS1. DS1 data sources and approach to annualization of the quarterly data are 
depicted in details in Annex 1.  
 
The debt accumulation equation in relative terms (2.32) represents a milestone of this 
analysis, with several modifications in line with theoretical discussions in second and third 
chapter. These modifications include: 
 
Use of implied interest rate as a debt dynamics’ determinant. Since there is no natural 
aggregate interest rate that can be applied to accumulated debt, implied interest rate 
defined in (2.41) as 𝑟𝑡 =
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐷𝑡−1
 is used. As implied interest rate incorporates effects of the 
change in nominal exchange rate on debt dynamics, the DAE in (2.32) is then simplified to  
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𝑑𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡−1 =
𝑟𝑡−𝜋𝑡(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)−𝑟𝑔𝑡
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡)(1+𝜋𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1 −  𝑝𝑏𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡 . (5.1) 
 
Use of real exchange rate as a debt dynamics’ determinant. Use of nominal foreign 
exchange would be a big limitation since only 4 out of EEC 8 has some form of floating 
exchange rate regime, while the other are either Euro zone members (Slovenia, Slovak 
Republic) or have some form of pegged regimes (Bulgaria, Croatia). Thus I use change in 
real effective exchange rates 𝛥𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡 as a debt determinant variable rather than nominal rate, 
This is in line with other similar work, as well as with equation (2.52) that depicts real 
exchange rate as a function of nominal exchange rate and domestic and foreign price 
levels.  
 
Decomposition of public debt with respect to the cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
and potential GDP. Since the effects of the cyclical fluctuations affects the economic 
output in the mid run, use of potential GDP as a scaling factor in the DAE in relative terms 
is arguably more accurate approach from the standpoint of mid-term fiscal sustainability 
analysis. If the DAE is rescaled by the potential GDP instead of actual, primary balance as 
an contributor to debt dynamics can be decomposed to a cyclically-adjusted component 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑡  and an effect of automatic stabilizers, 𝑎𝑠𝑡 . As being discussed previously, 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance is arguably better indication of the fiscal policy stance 
than actual balance.  
 
Explicit incorporation of the economic cyclicality into the fiscal sustainability analysis 
imposes needs to pay special attention to the performance of the macroeconomic variables 
before and after the occurrence of the global economic crisis. The first quarter of 2009 is 
arbitrary chosen as a time point of crisis outbreak in EEC 8, since spillover of global crisis 
in the Western economies gradually spread over Eastern Europe economies. Indeed, 
descriptive analysis in the rest of this chapter confirms that dynamics of public debt and its 
determinants exhibit evident differences in dynamics prior and after the crisis. 
 
5.1 Public debt dynamics analysis 
 
Analysis of public debt dynamics of EEC 8 covers the period 2000-2017, except for 
Croatia and Serbia where available time series on debt are bit shorter. Public debt time 
series cover data on government debt according to the Maastricht definition, except in case 
of Serbia where data corresponds to the public debt definition stipulated by the Law on 
Public Debt for the reasons discussed in the first chapter. The individual dynamics of the 
public debt is presented in the Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: Public debt in EEC 8 – dynamics 
Source: DS1 
 
  
 
 
103 
 
Public debt dynamics depicted in the Figure 5.1 shows that with notable exception of 
Bulgaria, other 7 countries followed the similar pattern in public debt dynamics: period of 
slight decrease or stagnation of indebtedness up to the late 2008, and then growth of public 
debt-to-GDP ratio till the end of period covered. This is more explicitly confirmed by the 
cross-country correlation structure of debt-to-GDP among EEC 8. In some cases, co-
variations of public indebtedness between two countries exceeded 85%, like in case of 
Slovenia-Croatia or Slovenia-Serbia (Table 5.1b). Larger scales of government borrowings 
in the aftermath of the crisis leaves the average indebtedness of EEC 8 at 48%, around 11 
pp higher than it was before the crisis (Table 5.1a) . 
 
 
Table 5.1a Public debt in EEC 8 – descriptives 
 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN Mean 
Mean BC 44.53 38.73 25.56 59.32 42.98 19.34 40.73 26.31 37.19 
Stdev BC 19.99 1.85 4.65 4.83 8.29 4.73 7.08 1.26 6.58 
Min BC 16.32 35.50 15.32 51.93 29.70 11.43 29.14 22.83 26.52 
Max BC 77.62 42.01 31.08 66.78 51.92 25.66 50.91 28.26 46.78 
Mean AC 19.20 66.45 38.34 77.50 52.35 31.02 46.12 56.31 48.41 
Stdev AC 6.13 16.42 5.40 4.39 16.48 9.18 9.79 21.95 11.22 
Min AC 12.72 35.64 26.82 64.21 25.13 10.53 26.40 21.76 27.90 
Max AC 29.49 86.19 45.55 83.46 75.17 39.10 57.66 83.87 62.56 
Mean  30.62 54.63 32.58 69.31 49.88 25.75 43.69 42.79 43.66 
Stdev  18.93 18.58 8.15 10.19 15.27 9.48 9.03 22.10 13.97 
Min  12.72 35.50 15.32 51.93 25.13 10.53 26.40 21.76 24.91 
Max 77.62 86.19 45.55 83.46 75.17 39.10 57.66 83.87 68.58 
 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
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Table 5.1b Public debt in EEC 8 – cross-country correlation 
 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN 
BGR 1.00 -0.37 -0.70 -0.79 0.65 -0.11 0.27 -0.30 
HRV -0.37 1.00 0.88 0.76 0.87 0.90 0.76 0.98 
CZE -0.70 0.88 1.00 0.85 0.65 0.75 0.46 0.77 
HUN -0.79 0.76 0.85 1.00 0.32 0.58 0.24 0.67 
SRB 0.65 0.87 0.65 0.32 1.00 0.79 0.87 0.90 
ROU -0.11 0.90 0.75 0.58 0.79 1.00 0.90 0.86 
SVK 0.27 0.76 0.46 0.24 0.87 0.90 1.00 0.73 
SVN -0.30 0.98 0.77 0.67 0.90 0.86 0.73 1.00 
 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
5.2 Analysis of the non-fiscal public debt determinants 
 
The non-fiscal drivers of public debt include implied real interest rate, real GDP growth, 
real effective exchange rates and inflation (based on GDP deflator). In this section I 
discuss stylized facts on non-fiscal drivers in EEC 8, including dynamic, descriptive 
statistics and cross-country correlation. 
 
5.2.1 Interest rate  
 
During the period 2001-2017, implied interest rates steadily decline in most of EEC 8 
countries, except in Serbia (Figure 5.2). In some countries decline was especially 
emphasized up to 2004. Within the crisis window there was a tendency of increase in 
interest rates, especially in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, but this trend was only 
temporary and gradually faded in the crisis aftermath. 
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Figure 5.2: Implied interest rate in EEC 8 – dynamic 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
On average, implied interest rate in post-crisis period dropped for 1.7 pp, from 6.2% to 
4.5% (Table 5.2a). Also, the volatility of interest rates, measured by standard deviation, 
seems to decline in the aftermath of crisis, from 1.67% to only 0.9%. In general, interest 
rate seems to be the most stable macroeconomic variable, having the lowest level of 
volatility among the other macroeconomic variables. The cross-country correlation is very 
exhibited in EU member states – correlation coefficients mostly exceeded 0.75 (Table 
5.2b), with exception of Bulgarian and Croatian, which interest rates are less correlated 
with other EU countries in the sample. On the other side, Serbian implied interest rates 
seems to be negatively correlated with rates of EU member states, which is probably 
caused by the specific structure of the Serbian public debt. In the early 2000’s, Serbian 
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public debt was reprogrammed and some interest payments were written off. In addition, 
Serbian debt portfolio was dominated by the concessional loans contracted at interest rates 
lower than those at the market. Following a progress of Serbian integration into EU 
financial space and changes in debt portfolio structure in a favor of market debt 
instruments, interest rates on government borrowing have been gradually rising and 
converging to the market values comparable to other EU countries. 
 
Table 5.2a: Implied interest rate in EEC 8 – descriptives 
 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN Mean 
Mean BC 5.30 5.28 4.46 7.81 2.78 10.89 6.10 7.15 6.22 
Stdev BC 0.80 0.26 0.90 1.22 0.50 5.75 1.60 1.82 1.61 
Min BC 3.77 4.85 3.44 6.34 2.29 5.88 4.39 4.75 4.46 
Max BC 6.51 5.73 6.76 9.96 3.60 25.50 9.53 10.45 9.76 
Mean AC 4.76 4.64 3.25 5.35 4.15 5.93 3.74 4.52 4.54 
Stdev AC 0.91 0.68 0.65 0.77 0.83 2.05 0.70 0.58 0.90 
Min AC 2.87 3.47 2.15 3.97 2.21 4.02 2.82 3.38 3.11 
Max AC 6.25 6.10 4.36 6.95 5.30 11.38 5.70 5.73 6.47 
Mean  5.01 4.90 3.82 6.51 3.79 8.27 4.85 5.76 5.36 
Stdev  0.90 0.63 0.98 1.59 0.96 4.87 1.69 1.86 1.68 
Min  2.87 3.47 2.15 3.97 2.21 4.02 2.82 3.38 3.11 
Max 6.51 6.10 6.76 9.96 5.30 25.50 9.53 10.45 10.01 
 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
  
Table 5.2b: Implied interest rate in EEC 8 - cross-country correlation 
 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN 
BGR 1.00 0.65 0.59 0.37 -0.61 0.38 0.36 0.25 
HRV 0.65 1.00 0.86 0.74 -0.73 0.73 0.73 0.60 
CZE 0.59 0.86 1.00 0.87 -0.75 0.88 0.90 0.86 
HUN 0.37 0.74 0.87 1.00 -0.60 0.83 0.93 0.95 
SRB -0.61 -0.73 -0.75 -0.60 1.00 -0.73 -0.81 -0.54 
ROU 0.38 0.73 0.88 0.83 -0.73 1.00 0.89 0.89 
SVK 0.36 0.73 0.90 0.93 -0.81 0.89 1.00 0.94 
SVN 0.25 0.60 0.86 0.95 -0.54 0.89 0.94 1.00 
 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
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5.2.2 Real growth  
 
Similar to other EEC countries, EEC 8 also experienced a period of fast growth interrupted 
by the crisis, when actual growth rates significantly dropped never recovering to pre-crisis 
values (Figure 5.3). Thus, structural breaks in GDP growth time series in crisis window are 
visible for all EEC 8. With notable exemption of Poland, other countries experienced sharp 
recession with GDP fall in crisis time. Beside actual growth rates, potential growth rates 
based on the estimation of potential GDP, are also presented in the Figure 5.3. Potential 
GDP for EEC 8, with an exception of Hungary, is estimated using Kalman numerical 
solution to the state-space representation of the economic output, given in (2.55). Potential 
GDP for Hungary is computed using HP filtering applied to the state-space representation 
of the economic output as in (2.56), since procedure of Kalman filtering failed to find 
numerical solution in case of Hungarian GDP data. Potential growth rates partially mitigate 
cyclical effects on GDP growth, but it seems that fall in economic activity in post-crisis 
period was structural, heavily damaging growth potentials of the EEC 8.  
 
  
` 
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Figure 5.3: Potential and actual real growth rates in EEC 8 - dynamic 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
Average actual growth rates dropped for more than 4 pp, going from impressive 5.2% in 
pre-crisis period to only 1% in post-crisis period (Table 5.3a), and volatility of growth also 
increased. Cross-country correlations of GDP growth rates were also pronounced – in most 
cases they exceeded 0.7 (Table 5.3b). 
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Table 5.3a: Actual real growth rates in EEC 8 - descriptives 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN Mean 
Mean BC 6.07 4.51 4.47 3.53 6.06 6.23 6.25 4.35 5.18 
Stdev BC 1.19 0.91 1.70 1.36 2.11 1.64 2.37 1.31 1.57 
Min BC 3.56 2.04 1.65 0.43 0.55 2.64 2.34 2.80 2.00 
Max BC 7.85 5.66 6.91 5.00 10.11 9.33 10.80 7.13 7.85 
Mean AC 1.51 -0.43 1.27 0.92 0.49 1.87 2.09 0.21 0.99 
Stdev AC 2.15 2.82 2.59 2.98 1.70 3.35 2.27 3.29 2.64 
Min AC -3.77 -7.29 -4.80 -6.60 -3.12 -5.95 -5.42 -7.80 -5.59 
Max AC 4.00 3.54 5.31 4.23 2.80 6.97 5.04 4.88 4.60 
Mean  3.66 1.78 2.78 2.15 2.13 3.92 4.05 2.16 2.83 
Stdev  2.88 3.29 2.72 2.69 3.06 3.45 3.11 3.28 3.06 
Min  -3.77 -7.29 -4.80 -6.60 -3.12 -5.95 -5.42 -7.80 -5.59 
Max 7.85 5.66 6.91 5.00 9.88 9.33 10.80 7.13 7.82 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
Table 5.3b: Actual real growth rates in EEC 8 – cross-country correlation 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN 
BGR 1.00 0.91 0.87 0.68 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.90 
HRV 0.91 1.00 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.86 0.83 0.90 
CZE 0.87 0.83 1.00 0.77 0.60 0.73 0.85 0.92 
HUN 0.68 0.81 0.77 1.00 0.56 0.70 0.57 0.79 
SRB 0.84 0.79 0.60 0.56 1.00 0.73 0.69 0.68 
ROU 0.86 0.86 0.73 0.70 0.73 1.00 0.75 0.82 
SVK 0.88 0.83 0.85 0.57 0.69 0.75 1.00 0.89 
SVN 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.79 0.68 0.82 0.89 1.00 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
5.2.3. Exchange rate  
 
Dynamics of real effective exchange rate (REER) is characterized by the period or pre-
crisis appreciation fueled by the large foreign capital inflows creating external imbalances, 
that was corrected by the post-crisis depreciation (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4: Real effective exchange rates in EEC 8 - dynamics 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
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Among the other non-fiscal determinants of public debt, change in REER is the most 
volatile variable, which volatility is persistently high throughout total observed period 
(Table 5.4a). Average growth rate of REER in pre-crisis period dropped for almost 5 pp, 
from 4.4% appreciation rate to 0.5% percent depreciation rate in post-crisis period. Cross-
country correlation is rather lower than in case of other non-fiscal variables, yet somewhat 
higher correlation is exhibited between countries that adopted EUR or have currency 
pegged to EUR (Table 5.4b). 
 
Table 5.4a: Real effective exchange rates in EEC 8 - dynamic 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN Mean 
Mean BC 4.72 1.90 6.12 5.11 6.08 3.69 6.77 0.78 4.40 
Stdev BC 2.75 1.51 5.68 6.49 6.45 7.28 4.86 1.45 4.56 
Min BC -0.31 -0.68 -4.84 -8.79 -1.98 -6.51 -1.02 -1.67 -3.22 
Max BC 12.15 5.28 19.23 15.71 17.74 21.63 15.70 3.29 13.84 
Mean AC 0.17 -0.72 -0.46 -1.44 -0.43 -0.86 0.23 -0.34 -0.48 
Stdev AC 2.63 2.18 4.37 5.04 6.77 4.18 3.52 1.65 3.79 
Min AC -4.61 -5.46 -6.72 -10.59 -12.68 -9.25 -4.75 -4.26 -7.29 
Max AC 6.15 2.58 9.85 12.58 14.81 7.46 14.56 2.28 8.78 
Mean  2.22 0.46 2.51 1.51 2.05 1.19 3.18 0.16 1.66 
Stdev  3.51 2.30 5.96 6.58 7.33 6.18 5.28 1.65 4.85 
Min  -4.61 -5.46 -6.72 -10.59 -12.68 -9.25 -4.75 -4.26 -7.29 
Max 12.15 5.28 19.23 15.71 17.74 21.63 15.70 3.29 13.84 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
Table 5.4b: Real effective exchange rates in EEC 8 – cross-country correlation 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN 
BGR 1.00 0.78 0.61 0.38 0.58 -0.01 0.70 0.69 
HRV 0.78 1.00 0.61 0.42 0.44 0.12 0.49 0.64 
CZE 0.61 0.61 1.00 0.57 0.57 0.18 0.15 0.42 
HUN 0.38 0.42 0.57 1.00 0.48 0.27 0.27 0.33 
SRB 0.58 0.44 0.57 0.48 1.00 0.34 0.44 0.54 
ROU -0.01 0.12 0.18 0.27 0.34 1.00 0.03 -0.05 
SVK 0.70 0.49 0.15 0.27 0.44 0.03 1.00 0.60 
SVN 0.69 0.64 0.42 0.33 0.54 -0.05 0.60 1.00 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
5.2.4 Inflation 
 
Similar to implied interest rates, inflation rates (computed from GDP deflator) exhibit the 
same tendency of steady decline during the observed period, with moderate temporary 
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increase in crisis window (Figure 5.5). Some countries also experienced short-term 
disinflation in the post-crisis period.  
 
  
 
 
  
  
Figure 5.5: Inflation rates (GDP deflator) in EEC 8 - dynamic 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
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Average inflation rate felt from 7.4% in pre-crisis to 2.3% in post-crisis period, and also 
became more stable as volatility almost halved (Table 5.5a).  Cross-country correlation is 
also present as most of correlation coefficients exceed 0.5, but apparently lower than in 
case of interest or growth rates (Table 5.5b). 
 
Table 5.5a: Inflation rates (GDP deflator) in EEC 8 - descriptives 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN Mean 
Mean BC 6.17 3.96 2.35 6.09 11.46 20.55 4.06 4.73 7.42 
Stdev BC 2.34 0.63 1.52 2.92 2.01 9.64 1.97 2.28 2.91 
Min BC 2.27 3.14 -0.60 0.99 8.22 10.04 1.07 1.18 3.29 
Max BC 11.09 5.75 5.17 11.72 14.48 42.89 8.81 8.68 13.57 
Mean AC 2.33 1.14 1.17 2.77 5.42 3.93 0.37 1.21 2.29 
Stdev AC 2.54 1.35 1.10 0.80 2.65 2.39 0.83 1.29 1.62 
Min AC -1.97 -0.17 -1.43 0.96 1.98 1.36 -1.16 -0.99 -0.18 
Max AC 8.66 5.50 2.81 4.40 9.86 13.56 1.70 4.75 6.40 
Mean  4.13 2.40 1.72 4.33 7.07 11.75 2.11 2.86 4.55 
Stdev  3.10 1.78 1.43 2.66 3.68 10.76 2.36 2.53 3.54 
Min  -1.97 -0.17 -1.43 0.96 1.98 1.36 -1.16 -0.99 -0.18 
Max 11.09 5.75 5.17 11.72 14.48 42.89 8.81 8.68 13.57 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
Table 5.5b: Inflation rates (GDP deflator) in EEC 8 – cross-country correlation 
\ BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN 
BGR 1.00 0.78 0.26 0.35 0.60 0.46 0.38 0.40 
HRV 0.78 1.00 0.38 0.59 0.82 0.75 0.65 0.69 
CZE 0.26 0.38 1.00 0.58 -0.10 0.56 0.33 0.72 
HUN 0.35 0.59 0.58 1.00 0.57 0.92 0.75 0.86 
POL 0.60 0.82 -0.10 0.57 1.00 0.77 0.73 0.55 
ROU 0.46 0.75 0.56 0.92 0.77 1.00 0.86 0.90 
SVK 0.38 0.65 0.33 0.75 0.73 0.86 1.00 0.67 
SVN 0.40 0.69 0.72 0.86 0.55 0.90 0.67 1.00 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
5.3 Analysis of the fiscal public debt determinants 
 
In previous chapters I have already discussed importance of difference between primary 
balance from non-fiscal variables in the context of debt sustainability assessment. Being 
more exogenous to external spillovers and under control of fiscal authorities, primary 
balance is expected to be more country-specific and thus less correlated between the 
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countries. In addition, debt-deficit adjustments should be also country-specific, reflecting 
individual issues and policy actions to preserve economic stability. 
 
5.3.1 Primary balance 
 
Similar to real growth, primary balance in the most of EEC 8 also displayed structural 
breaks that occur in the crisis window, when trends of primary surpluses or declining 
deficits turned to persistent primary deficits that gradually improved in the crisis aftermath 
(Figure 5.6). The exceptions were Hungary and Serbia; Hungary struggled with large 
deficits that were the subject of Excessive Deficits Procedure long time before the crisis 
emergence, while Serbian fiscal consolidation was belated relative to other EEC 8. Based 
on equation (3.15), I computed cyclically-adjusted primary balances to correct them for 
effects of automatic stabilizers. Effects of automatic stabilizers varied in size among the 
EEC 8 countries, but had expected patterns: before the crisis, they were positive increasing 
actual balance, while in the crisis aftermath they turned to negative values eventually 
getting close to zero by the end of covered period. 
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Figure 5.6: Cyclically-adjusted and actual primary balance in EEC 8 - dynamic 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
On average, EEC 8 recorded primary deficits both in pre- and post-crisis period, but 
average value in post-crisis period was almost 1 pp lower than in pre-crisis period (Table 
5.6a). On the other hand, volatility of primary balance did not change substantially. As 
expected, cross-country correlations are considerably lower than in case of growth or 
interest rate, only occasionally exceeding 0.5 (Table 5.6b). 
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Table 5.6a: Actual primary balance in EEC 8 - descriptives 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN Mean 
Mean BC 3.20 -1.78 -2.65 -2.21 -0.01 -0.49 -2.04 -0.30 -0.78 
Stdev BC 1.32 1.27 2.13 2.37 1.73 1.70 1.91 0.86 1.66 
Min BC 1.06 -3.38 -6.92 -5.42 -2.33 -4.72 -8.02 -2.20 -3.99 
Max BC 6.48 0.60 0.42 2.23 2.49 2.72 0.41 1.16 2.06 
Mean AC -1.09 -1.67 -0.96 0.92 -2.14 -2.54 -2.38 -2.98 -1.60 
Stdev AC 2.10 2.48 1.88 1.25 2.50 2.80 2.14 3.56 2.34 
Min AC -4.97 -5.01 -4.22 -1.27 -4.94 -8.32 -6.71 -12.12 -5.94 
Max AC 1.76 3.42 2.35 3.49 3.89 1.18 0.35 2.53 2.37 
Mean  0.96 -1.71 -1.77 -0.57 -1.57 -1.56 -2.22 -1.70 -1.27 
Stdev  2.78 2.09 2.16 2.43 2.49 2.54 2.02 2.95 2.43 
Min  -4.97 -5.01 -6.92 -5.42 -4.94 -8.32 -8.02 -12.12 -6.96 
Max 6.48 3.42 2.35 3.49 3.89 2.72 0.41 2.53 3.16 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
Table 5.6b: Actual primary balance in EEC 8 – cross-country correlations 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN 
BGR 1.00 0.30 -0.02 -0.32 0.53 0.45 0.31 0.47 
HRV 0.30 1.00 0.78 0.40 0.74 0.26 0.60 0.58 
CZE -0.02 0.78 1.00 0.46 0.64 0.05 0.53 0.14 
HUN -0.32 0.40 0.46 1.00 -0.25 -0.22 0.01 -0.29 
POL 0.53 0.74 0.64 -0.25 1.00 0.50 0.52 0.66 
ROU 0.45 0.26 0.05 -0.22 0.50 1.00 0.48 0.22 
SVK 0.31 0.60 0.53 0.01 0.52 0.48 1.00 0.31 
SVN 0.47 0.58 0.14 -0.29 0.66 0.22 0.31 1.00 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
5.3.2 Debt-deficit (stock-flow) adjustments 
 
The debt-deficit adjustments in EEC 8 were quite large, frequently accounting 5 and more 
percentage points of debt increment (Figure 5.7). This is not a surprising result, as study of 
Campos, Jaimovich and Panizza (2006) show that fiscal deficits often account only small 
fraction of debt changes. Despite the authors’ efforts to find common factors that can 
explain dynamics of debt-deficit adjustments, they succeed only to explain 20% of the 
within-country variations in adjustments.  
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Figure 5.7: Debt-deficit adjustment in EEC 8 – dynamic 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
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Debt-deficit adjustments in EEC 8 on average was debt reducing in pre-crisis period and 
debt-enhancing in post-crisis period (Table 5.7a). Cross-country correlations were low and 
often negative (Table 5.7b), confirming findings from previous discussion that debt-deficit 
adjustments are the most country-specific components of debt dynamic. 
 
Table 5.7a: Debt-deficit adjustment in EEC 8 - descriptives 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN Mean 
Mean BC -1.96 -0.45 -0.56 -0.14 -1.26 0.72 -3.15 -0.09 -0.86 
Stdev BC 3.55 1.19 1.69 1.76 5.22 2.76 3.23 0.98 2.55 
Min BC -9.41 -2.92 -3.32 -3.31 -8.19 -3.42 -9.64 -1.55 -5.22 
Max BC 4.99 1.67 3.81 6.07 8.98 6.87 2.65 2.79 4.73 
Mean AC 0.27 0.76 -0.11 0.61 2.73 0.42 -0.05 2.08 0.84 
Stdev AC 2.93 2.13 1.51 3.84 3.28 1.03 2.80 3.34 2.61 
Min AC -5.36 -4.33 -3.59 -7.67 -5.40 -1.27 -4.97 -4.19 -4.60 
Max AC 6.30 5.84 3.04 12.79 9.57 3.01 6.28 10.85 7.21 
Mean  -0.78 0.26 -0.32 0.26 1.61 0.56 -1.51 1.06 0.14 
Stdev  3.40 1.89 1.60 3.05 4.27 2.03 3.37 2.73 2.79 
Min  -9.41 -4.33 -3.59 -7.67 -8.19 -3.42 -9.64 -4.19 -6.31 
Max 6.30 5.84 3.81 12.79 9.57 6.87 6.28 10.85 7.79 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
Table 5.7b Debt-deficit adjustment in EEC 8 – cross-country correlation 
 
BGR HRV CZE HUN SRB ROU SVK SVN 
BGR 1.00 -0.29 0.25 -0.05 -0.06 -0.23 0.30 0.09 
HRV -0.29 1.00 -0.02 0.24 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.27 
CZE 0.25 -0.02 1.00 -0.15 -0.31 -0.01 0.25 -0.28 
HUN -0.05 0.24 -0.15 1.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 0.23 
POL -0.06 0.26 -0.31 0.02 1.00 0.46 0.16 0.06 
ROU -0.23 0.17 -0.01 -0.06 0.46 1.00 -0.18 0.04 
SVK 0.30 0.13 0.25 -0.07 0.16 -0.18 1.00 0.15 
SVN 0.09 0.27 -0.28 0.23 0.06 0.04 0.15 1.00 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
5.4 Contribution of the determinants to public debt dynamics 
 
Following the introductory notes in this chapter, the final form of the DAE used to 
decompose the debt reads as 
 
𝑑𝑡
𝑝
− 𝑑𝑡−1
𝑝
=
𝑟𝑡−𝜋𝑡(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
)−𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
(1+𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
)(1+𝜋𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1
𝑝
−  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑡
𝑝
− 𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑝
+ 𝑑𝑑𝑡
𝑝
, (5.2) 
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where the superscript p means that the variable is rescaled by potential GDP and where  
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
 is the growth rate of potential GDP. Based on equation (5.2), we can isolate five main 
drivers of the public debt dynamics, namely the contributions of: 
 
 the real implied interest rate reflecting the influence of the financial market 
variables; 
 the potential real growth rate reflecting the influence of the long-term production 
capacities, i.e. trend of economic output; 
 the cyclically-adjusted primary balance reflecting the fiscal policy stance; 
 the automatic stabilizers reflecting the influence of the economic cyclicality; 
 the debt-deficit adjustment reflecting a residual between overall fiscal balance (sum 
of all four previous components) and recorded change in government liabilities. 
 
Since debt-deficit adjustments are primarily one-off transactions, and automatic stabilizers 
reflects temporary fluctuations of the economic output, removal of these two components 
results in debt-to-potential GDP ratio that I considered to be the closest possible 
“structural” measure of change in public indebtedness that should be used to assess fiscal 
sustainability over mid- to long run. Hereafter, I used term adjusted change in debt to 
denote value of change in public debt scaled by the potential GDP after removal of cyclical 
and debt-deficit adjustment component. 
 
Following the DAE (5.2), in this section we present decomposition of the public debt 
increments (in percentage points) to non-fiscal, fiscal, cyclical and residual contributions. 
Series of figures 5.8a to 5.8h present quarterly decomposition of public debt annualized 
changes for each EEC 8 country. Black line in the figures (debt_dif) shows values of debt 
change ∆𝑑𝑡
𝑝
, while red line (debt_adj_dif) shows values of change in structural 
indebtedness, ∆𝑠𝑑𝑡
𝑝
= ∆𝑑𝑡
𝑝
+ 𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑝
− 𝑑𝑑𝑡
𝑝
. The contributions of real implied interest rate, 
real growth, cyclically-adjusted primary balance, automatic stabilizers and debt-deficit 
adjustments in the figures are denoted as ir_cont, rg_cont, ca_pb_cont, as_cont and 
dd_cont, respectively.  
 
Bulgaria (Figure 5.8a) 
 
The debt increments in Bulgaria were negative in the pre-crisis period, imposing steady 
decline in public debt. Automatic stabilizers and debt-deficit adjustments were the main 
sources of debt decline in terms of contribution size, which resulted in a big discrepancy 
between actual and structural debt dynamics. Since the crisis outbreak, effects of 
stabilizers gradually faded, while debt-reducing effects of DDA were offset with 
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increasing values of CA primary deficits. As a result, debt increments were mainly positive 
in the crisis aftermath. Contribution of interest rates and growth seems to be quite smaller 
relative to other drivers. Throughout the total period observed, structural debt increment 
was mostly neutral (around zero), except in crisis window, implying that indebtedness of 
Bulgaria didn’t change substantially.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.8a: Public debt growth decomposition – Bulgaria 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
 
Croatia (Figure 5.8b) 
 
Due to the limited data available for some variables, decomposition of debt is possible only 
apply in the period 2004-2017. In the pre-crisis period, bot actual and structural debt 
increments were close to zero, as debt dynamics’ contributions were offsetting each other. 
By the end of 2008, debt increments rapidly increased, since all debt drivers had a positive 
contribution to debt incremental. In the period surrounding crisis, the biggest contributors 
were CA primary deficits and automatic stabilizers, but over time they faded and 
significance of real interest rate to debt dynamics increased. This results in divergence of 
the actual debt increments above structural values. Eventually, in 2016 and 2017 CAPB 
went to surplus bringing back neutral debt dynamics.  
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Figure 5.8b: Public debt growth decomposition – Croatia 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
Czech Republic (Figure 5.8c) 
 
In the pre-crisis period Czech Republic was generating large primary deficits, which 
effects on debt dynamics were partially compensated by the cyclical effects of automatic 
stabilizers and debt-deficit adjustments. Therefore, structural debt increments were 
exceeding actual values most of the time prior to 2009. Since crisis outbreak, primary 
deficits were gradually reduced and eventually turned into surpluses, reverting the trend of 
rising positive debt increments in the first couple of post-crisis years. It is also remarkable 
that structural values of debt increments steadily decline over the total period covered by 
the sample. The contributions of other debt determinants were considerably smaller, with 
somewhat higher negative contribution of real growth in pre-crisis and positive 
contribution of interest rates at the beginning of post-crisis period. 
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Figure 5.8c: Public debt growth decomposition - Czech Republic 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
Hungary (Figure 5.8d) 
 
Hungary was the only EEC 8 country running high public debt throughout the whole 
observed period. Except in the crisis window wherein large debt-deficit contributions 
strongly pushed debt up, debt increments were stable swinging between the range of -5 to 
5 percentage points, both in actual and structural terms. The most persistent contributions 
to public debt dynamics came from interest rate and real growth, which tended to offset 
each other. Thus, structural dynamics is apparently correlated with swings of CA primary 
balance apart from crisis window. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8d: Public debt growth decomposition – Hungary 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
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Serbia (Figure 5.8e) 
 
The public debt dynamics in Serbia in pre-crisis period is characterized by unusually 
negative contribution of interest rate, which is probably consequence of the real negative 
interest rate during the period of debt reprogramming. Yet, during time size of those 
contributions faded and eventually turned to be positive as expected. The contribution of 
other determinants are in line with expectations; automatic stabilizers opposed 
contributions of the CA primary balance, so that actual debt increments mostly coincided 
with debt-deficit adjustments. The disappearance of the large contributions of debt-deficit 
adjustments corresponds with period of fiscal consolidation and more credible fiscal 
policy, leading to fall in both actual and structural indebtedness.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.8e: Public debt growth decomposition – Serbia 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
Romania (Figure 5.8f) 
 
The contributions of the interest rate to debt dynamics in Romania followed the similar 
pattern as in Serbia during the pre-crisis period, in line with the fact that Romanian 
inflation rate was high above the implied interest rate. On the other hand, contribution of 
CA primary balance in the pre-crisis period was minor, opposite to the very emphasized 
automatic stabilizers that kept debt increments negative. In the aftermath of the crisis 
situation overturned as CA primary balance became overwhelming contributor to debt 
increment. Eventually, all contributions of all debt determinants shrank stabilizing the debt 
dynamics. 
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Figure 5.8f: Public debt growth decomposition – Romania 
Source: own calculation 
 
Slovak Republic (Figure 5.8g) 
 
Deficit-debt adjustments and automatic stabilizers played important role in reduction of 
public debt of Slovak Republic, offsetting growing positive contributions of CA primary 
deficits to debt increase. This in turn created large discrepancy in rising structural 
indebtedness relative to reduction of actual indebtedness. Eventually, structural and actual 
indebtedness converged, since the contribution of the CA primary balance drooped nearly 
zero value.  
 
 
Figure 5.8g: Public debt growth decomposition - Slovak Republic 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
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Slovenia (Figure 5.8h) 
 
During the pre-crisis period, Slovenia experienced low volatility in public debt-to-GDP 
growth, with mutual offsetting of positive and negative debt growth contributions. 
Situation severely changed in the aftermath of the crisis, when growth of public debt 
exploded, being among the fastest rising debts in CEE 8. Until 2014, almost all debt 
determinants contributed to the rise of public debt, but in the last three years of period 
covered debt increments dropped and debt stabilized.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.8h: Public debt growth decomposition – Slovenia 
Source: DS1, own calculation 
 
5.5 Econometric modeling of the public debt dynamics 
 
In this section, I use linear regressions to assess whether the variations in EEC 8 public 
debt dynamics can be and to which extent explained by the macroeconomic variables 
theoretically assumed to be debt drivers. This question may appears trivial if the debt 
increments perfectly correspond to overall fiscal balances, but we saw in the previous 
section that automatic stabilizers and debt-deficit adjustment were among the dominant 
forces in public debt formation. The regression model specification is based on the DAE in 
relative terms. The generic representation of a panel regression model is given by  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡;   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇. (5.2) 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  denotes the dependent variable for country i in the period t,  𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of 
explanatory variables, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a disturbance term, 𝑁 is the number of countries and 𝑇 is the 
number of time observations in the sample. A disturbance term typically comprises of 
time-invariant individual specific effect 𝜈𝑖  and “true” random error, i.e. white noise 
process 𝑢𝑖𝑡: 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜈𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.  (5.3) 
 
EEC 8 sample consists of 8 countries and covers 𝑇 = 68 observations, except for Croatia 
and Serbia where 𝑇 = 56  and 𝑇 = 49 , respectively. Such panel structure where 𝑇  is 
considerably higher than 𝑁  is also known as time series cross-section data (TSCS). 
Modeling of the TSCS datasets requires additional caution, as the issues of non-
stationarity, autocorrelation, cross-sectional dependence and heteroscedasticity must be 
taken into account in the statistical inference. We already illustrate in previous section that 
some time series of non-fiscal and fiscal variables exhibit heteroscedasticity and  cross-
country correlation, so I discuss in details potential issues of panel econometric analysis 
when variables do not meet OLS requirements. 
 
Batalgi et al. (2007) discuss different underlying data generating processes of the 
explanatory variables and the disturbance term. Assuming that 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 follow an AR(1) 
process 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡; (5.4) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 , (5.5) 
 
where 𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 are white noise processes. If 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is first-order integrated process, Batalgi 
et al. (2007) distinguish the cases of panel cointegration model, where 𝜃 = 1 and |𝜌| <1, 
and the panel spurious regression, where 𝜃 = 1 and 𝜌 =1, and show that the efficiency of 
panel estimators can differ in those cases. Further, Hoechle (2007) provides an excellent 
summary of pros and cons of different panel estimators with respect to misspecifications of 
the classic OLS assumptions regarding the disturbance term. Under the assumption that 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
follows the IID process 𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎
2), the covariance matrix of the disturbances, Ω𝜀𝜀 =
𝐸[𝜀𝜀′], will be diagonal block matrix  
 
Ω𝜀𝜀 = [
𝜎2𝐼 … 0
… ⋱ …
0 … 𝜎2𝐼
] (5.6) 
 
where 𝜎2𝐼 represents the covariance matrix of single unit disturbances. If we assume that 
disturbances are heteroscedastic, Ωεε has the form 
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Ω𝜀𝜀 = [
𝜎11
2𝐼 … 0
… ⋱ …
0 … 𝜎𝑁𝑁
2𝐼
], (5.7) 
 
where 𝜎𝑖𝑖
2 denotes specific variance of given panel unit. By relaxing the assumption that 
disturbances are non autocorrelated within the units, Σ𝜀𝜀 can be written as  
 
Ω𝜀𝜀 = [
𝜎11
2Ω11 … 0
… ⋱ …
0 … 𝜎𝑁𝑁
2Ω𝑁𝑁
], (5.8) 
 
where Ω𝑖𝑖  specifies correlation structure of disturbances within the given unit. Further 
relaxation of the assumption that disturbances are not independent (non-correlated) across 
the units gives the most generic form of the Ω𝜀𝜀 
 
Ω𝜀𝜀 = [
𝜎11
2Ω11 … 𝜎1𝑁 Ω1𝑁
… ⋱ …
𝜎𝑁1 Ω𝑁1 … 𝜎𝑁𝑁
2Ω𝑁𝑁
], (5.9) 
 
where matrices 𝜎𝑖𝑗Ω𝑖𝑗  specifies cross-sectional correlation of disturbances between two 
units. Literature provides various approaches to TSCS modeling in attempt to overcome 
violation of classic OLS assumption, which will be discussed further in this section. 
 
Based on the DAE, I specified the following empirical model: 
 
∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
+ 𝛽3𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽4Δ𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑡
𝑝
+ 𝛾𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (5.10) 
 
where ∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑡 denotes the change in indicator of public indebtedness. On the RHS of the 
equation, the variables 𝑟𝑡, 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
, 𝜋𝑡, 𝛥𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡 and 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑡
𝑝
 denote the implied interest rate, real 
growth of potential GDP, inflation rate (GDP deflator), real exchange rate depreciation, 
and the cyclically-adjusted primary balance scaled by potential GDP, respectively. The 
dummy variable 𝐷𝑡 is equal to one in the period during and after the spillover of the global 
financial crisis (and European sovereign debt crisis), zero otherwise. In line with previous 
discussion, three feasible indicators of public indebtedness are used to specify debt 
dynamics as dependent variable: 
 
 change in actual indebtedness, ∆𝑑𝑡; 
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 change in cyclically-adjusted indebtedness, computed as an actual debt increment 
corrected by automatic stabilizers, both scaled by potential GDP, ∆𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑡
𝑝
= ∆𝑑𝑡
𝑝
+
𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑝
; 
 change in structural indebtedness, computed as the difference between change in 
cyclically-adjusted indebtedness and debt-deficit adjustments, both scaled by 
potential GDP, ∆𝑠𝑑𝑡
𝑝
= ∆𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑡
𝑝
− 𝑑𝑑𝑡
𝑝
 
 
In order to guard our analysis against the effects of possible TSCS data deficiencies, 
procedure of econometric analysis is applied in three steps. First, I handle stationarity 
issues to avoid the above-mentioned cases of cointegration and spurious regression. 
Subsequently, I examine properties of the disturbance term. Finally, I consider a variety of 
applicable estimators to provide the reliable estimation of the model parameters under the 
different assumptions on random disturbances 𝜀𝑖𝑡 discussed above.  
 
5.5.1 Panel unit root tests 
 
The panel unit root tests can be roughly grouped to “first generation” and “second 
generation” (Hossfeld, 2010).  The tests of the first generation are derived from the 
generalization of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), which is most commonly used unit 
root test in single time series analysis. The panel specification of the ADF equation 
(deterministic components like constant, trend or time dummies are neglected for 
simplicity) can be written as  
 
𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝑝𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑝
𝑃𝑖
𝑝=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇. (5.11) 
 
where 𝜌𝑖  denotes the unit-specific AR(1) coefficient, while the disturbance terms are 
normally and independently distributed across units. The simplest case of the ADF panel 
unit-root tests is the Levin-Lin-Chu test (LLC), assuming the common unit root across 
individuals. Under this simplifying assumption, the LLC tests the null that 𝐻0: 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌 =
0 ∀𝑖, against the alternative 𝐻1: 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌 < 0 ∀𝑖. The Im-Pesaran-Shin test (IPS) allows the 
possibility of unit-specific common roots, and therefore to test the null that 𝐻0: 𝜌𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖 
against the alternative 𝐻1: ∃𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑁}, 𝜌𝑖 < 0. It is computed as a group-mean of unit-
specific t-statistics, so it does not require a strongly balanced panel. Yet, the IPS test still 
suffers from the restricting assumption on independency between panel units, particularly 
unrealistic in case of macroeconomic time series. A cross-sectional demeaning of the data 
improves the reliability of the first generation tests, but the unit-root tests of the second 
generation completely relaxes this assumption. The notable solution of this issue is the 
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cross-sectional IPS test (CIPS), proposed by Pesaran (2007). Instead of the simple 
extension of the univariate ADF regression over units, he proposes a cross-sectional ADF 
regression (CADF), which adds lagged cross-sectional means of units ?̅?𝑡 to control for a 
common factor  
 
𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑖?̅?𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑖∆?̅?𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇. (5.12) 
 
The equation neglects the lagged differences of  𝑦𝑖,𝑡  and ?̅?𝑡  for simplicity. The testing 
procedure of the CIPS is the same as in case of the IPS test. 
 
Following the unit root testing framework, I applied the LLC, the IPS and the CIPS tests to 
the set of variables included in the econometric specification of the model. I considered 
both cases of ADF deterministic terms: case of constant only, and case of trend and 
constant. Due to panel nature of analysis, I neglected the structural breaks in the individual 
time series and discuss that issue in the next chapter in which individual time series are 
analyzed. The LLC test requires balanced panel data, so I adjusted scope of sample for 
each variable to make it strongly balanced. In case of the LLC and the IPS tests, I 
demeaned the data cross-section to mitigate impact of correlated disturbances across the 
units. Results of the unit root testing are presented in the Table 5.8. Column “Sample” 
refers to a country whereby lack of observations on certain variable reduces coverage of 
strongly balanced data needed for LLC testing, and respective cut-off quarter.  
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Table 5.8: Panel unit root tests 
 
Variable Test type Constant Constant and trend  Sample 
∆𝑑𝑡 
LLC -2.1462** -0.9612 2005 Q3 (SRB) 
IPS -2.6225*** -2.7980*** full 
CIPS -3.653*** -2.545*** full 
∆𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑡
𝑝
 
LLC -2.5579*** -1.3811* 2005 Q3 (SRB) 
IPS -3.4919*** -4.5177*** full 
CIPS -4.020*** -3.230*** full 
∆𝑠𝑑𝑡
𝑝
 
LLC -3.0512*** -0.9317 2005 Q3 (SRB) 
IPS -1.1982 -2.4934*** full 
CIPS -0.850 -1.622** full 
𝑟𝑡 
LLC -1.7291** -2.0138** 2005 Q4 (SRB) 
IPS -5.2696*** -4.3894*** full 
CIPS -1.732** -0.746 full 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
 
LLC -0.7167 -0.4406 2002 Q2 (HRV) 
IPS -4.2431*** -2.3482*** full 
CIPS -3.298*** -3.114*** full 
𝜋𝑡  
LLC -4.5301*** -6.1750*** 2003 Q1 (SRB) 
IPS -3.9858*** -3.1536**** full 
CIPS -4.979*** -4.666*** full 
Δ𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡  
LLC -8.8835*** -8.8678*** 2003 Q1 (SRB) 
IPS -5.1387*** -5.2869*** full 
CIPS -7.943*** -6.738*** full 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑡
𝑝
 
LLC -1.3700* -1.7345** 2005 Q4 (SRB) 
IPS -1.0023 -1.5874* full 
CIPS -1.360* -2.581*** full 
Note: Null hypothesis: Panels are non-stationary; IPS and CIPS tests based on ADF and CADF group-mean 
t-test statistics, respectively. 
Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
The results of unit roots testing varies across variables. In case of inflation and real 
exchange rate depreciation, all variations of applied tests uniformly indicate stationarity of 
time series at 0.01 significance. For other variables majority of tests applied also indicate 
stationarity for at least 0.05 significance, with ∆sdt
p
 being the only case where results are 
mixed. Altogether, there is no indication of major rejection of stationarity in case of some 
variable, so I disregard the possibilities of cointegration and spurious regression as a matter 
of concern. 
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5.5.2 Model estimation 
 
Traditional OLS-based panel estimators like Pooled OLS (POLS) or Fixed Effects OLS 
(FE OLS) estimators do not take into account possible violations of IID assumption of 
disturbance terms. Yet, various methods are proposed to compute consistent standard 
errors, like Huber-White errors robust to heteroscedasticity (Huber, 1967; White, 1980) or 
Rogers clustered standard errors robust to autocorrelation (Rogers, 1993), which work fine 
as long as disturbances are independent across units. The latter issue was alleviated by the 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares method (FGLS) proposed by Kmenta (1986),  Beck & 
Katz (1995) panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) based on Prais –Winsten GLS 
estimator, or Driscoll & Kraay (1998) correction of OLS standard errors. The other 
possible source of estimation inefficiency in macroeconomic panels is a presence of 
endogeneity, i.e. correlation of disturbances with explanatory variables, typically caused 
by either unobserved heterogeneity or reverse causality. The first issue can be easily 
overcome by time demeaning or differentiating. If endogeneity comes from reverse 
causality, estimators based on Instrumental Variables (IV) approach turns to be more 
efficient than OLS/GLS based estimators in case that instruments are relevant and valid. 
The Table 3.11 summarizes discussed pros and cons of the selected panel data estimators. 
 
Table 5.9: Panel data estimators pros and cons 
 
 
Handle  
endogeneity due to… 
Standard errors estimates robust to  
disturbances being… 
Estimator type 
Unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Reserve 
causality 
Hetero 
scedastic 
Auto 
correlated 
Cross-sectionally 
dependent 
POLS no no yes yes no 
FE OLS yes no yes yes no 
FGLS no no yes AR(1) contemporaneous 
2SLS IV yes yes no no no 
DK OLS yes no yes MA(q) yes 
PCSE GLS no no yes yes yes 
 
Source: author, based on Hoechle (2007) 
 
As the sample consists of macroeconomic TSCS data, it is reasonably to expect that each 
of the disturbance and endogeneity issues may affect the efficiency of estimation. To 
handle the issues of OLS violations related to disturbance term, I use residuals obtained by 
the OLS estimation of equation (5.2) and apply the following tests: 
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 Autocorrelation issue. Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data, proposed 
by Wooldridge (2002), is used to test H0: “there is no first-order autocorrelation of 
residuals”. Under the null, test statistic will follow F distribution. 
 Heteroscedasticity issue. Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in 
fixed effect regression model, proposed by Greene (2000), is used to test H0: 
“variance of residuals is homoscedastic”. Under the null, test statistic will follow 
Chi-squared distribution. 
 Cross-sectional dependency issue. Breusch–Pagan LM test (1980), valid for small 
N and large T, is used to test H0: “there is no cross-sectional dependency of 
residuals”. Under the null, test statistic will follow Chi-squared distribution. 
 
All of these tests are robust to the presence of unobserved hetegoregeneity 𝜈𝑖, specified in 
composite representation of the disturbance term in (5.3). Tests are applied to all three 
versions of the model with respect to choice of dependent variable. The results of the 
testing are shown in the Table 5.10. 
 
Table 5.10: Test of OLS violations 
 
Test / Dependent variable ∆𝑑𝑡 ∆𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑡
𝑝
 ∆𝑠𝑑𝑡
𝑝
 
Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation 
15.711*** 15.050*** 285.164*** 
Wald test for 
heteroscedasticity 
144.51*** 182.67*** 737.22*** 
Breusch–Pagan LM test 
(1980) of independence 
82.241*** 67.523*** 426.322*** 
Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
In case of all three versions of the dependent variable, test statistics clearly reject OLS 
assumptions on disturbance term. Therefore, I estimate the model using 6 different 
estimators that reads in the Table 5.9, taking into account disturbance-related issues. In 
particular, Roger’s clustered errors correction is applied to POLS, FE OLS and 2SLS 
estimation to obtain standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
estimation is conducted using Stata 13.0 software package. The estimation results for each 
version of dependent variable are presented in three subsequent tables denoted as 5.11a – 
5.11c, respectively. 
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Table 5.11a: Estimation results for change in actual indebtedness as a dependent variable 
 
∆𝑑𝑡 Pooled OLS FE OLS 2SLS IV FGLS DK OLS PCSE GLS 
crisis -5.2192*** -5.9890*** -6.3482*** -2.6074*** -5.9890*** -3.0592*** 
 
(1.1908) (1.1537) (0.9131) (0.5835) (0.7383) (0.6792) 
𝑟𝑡 0.7516** 0.9280** 0.8763** 0.7311*** 0.9280*** 0.9222*** 
 
(0.2402) (0.3425) (0.4367) (0.1142) (0.2009) (0.1323) 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
 -0.4575*** -0.2289 -0.3860** -0.2267 -0.2289 -0.2589* 
 
(0.1146) (0.1412) (0.1631) (0.1485) (0.1440) (0.1490) 
𝜋𝑡  -0.1650 -0.1882 -0.1103 -0.2688*** -0.1882* -0.2811*** 
 
(0.0894) (0.1106) (0.1520) (0.0615) (0.0950) (0.0701) 
Δ𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡  -0.0988 -0.0685 -0.0594 -0.0838*** -0.0685 -0.1294*** 
 
(0.0632) (0.0742) (0.0710) (0.0270) (0.0443) (0.0319) 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑡
𝑝
 -0.9075*** -0.9243*** -1.2411*** -0.4801*** -0.9243*** -0.4969*** 
 
(0.1415) (0.1774) (0.2683) (0.0886) (0.1313) (0.0990) 
const 0.0509 -1.1882 
 
-0.6797 -1.1882 -1.5918* 
 
(1.1454) (1.2697) 
 
(0.7326) (1.0599) (0.8671) 
No. of Obs. 513.00 513.00 507.00 513.00 513.00 513.00 
R-Squared 0.51 0.55 0.54  
 
0.21 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis 
Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Source: own calculations 
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Table 5.11b: Estimation results for change in cyclically-adjusted indebtedness as a 
dependent variable 
 
∆𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑡
𝑝
 Pooled OLS FE OLS 2SLS IV FGLS DK OLS PCSE GLS 
crisis -3.8686*** -4.3687*** -4.5218*** -1.8715*** -4.3687*** -2.0752*** 
 
(1.0683) (1.0984) (1.0048) (0.5226) (0.7184) (0.5329) 
𝑟𝑡 0.6946*** 0.8057** 0.8792*** 0.6806*** 0.8057*** 0.8332*** 
 
(0.1848) (0.3086) (0.3366) (0.1041) (0.1753) (0.1183) 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
 -0.7209*** -0.5606*** -0.5384*** -0.5057*** -0.5606*** -0.5933*** 
 
(0.1466) (0.1519) (0.1335) (0.1285) (0.1376) (0.1253) 
𝜋𝑡  -0.1679** -0.1903 -0.1841 -0.2555*** -0.1903** -0.2679*** 
 
(0.0675) (0.1131) (0.1228) (0.0548) (0.0740) (0.0609) 
Δ𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡  -0.1066 -0.0818 -0.0847 -0.0965*** -0.0818* -0.1393*** 
 
(0.0639) (0.0738) (0.0674) (0.0254) (0.0433) (0.0286) 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑡
𝑝
 -0.8124*** -0.8166*** -0.8122*** -0.4857*** -0.8166*** -0.5192*** 
 
(0.1203) (0.1519) (0.1700) (0.0796) (0.1091) (0.0871) 
const 0.6371 -0.1489 
 
0.1883 -0.1489 -0.5354 
 
(0.9083) (1.1645) 
 
(0.6220) (0.8859) (0.6809) 
No. of Obs. 513.00 513.00 507.00 513.00 513.00 513.00 
R-Squared 0.55 0.57 0.57  
 
0.25 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis 
Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Source: own calculations 
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Table 5.11c: Estimation results for change in structural indebtedness as a dependent 
variable 
 
∆𝑠𝑑𝑡
𝑝
 Pooled OLS FE OLS 2SLS IV FGLS DK OLS PCSE GLS 
crisis -1.9018** -1.9625** -2.0504*** -0.6398*** -1.9625*** -0.7801*** 
 
(0.7191) (0.7404) (0.6395) (0.1016) (0.2268) (0.1645) 
𝑟𝑡 0.5627** 0.5662* 0.5831** 0.3363*** 0.5662*** 0.3060*** 
 
(0.1742) (0.2848) (0.2929) (0.0276) (0.1201) (0.0278) 
𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
 -0.6586*** -0.6029*** -0.6178*** -0.6678*** -0.6029*** -0.7121*** 
 
(0.1041) (0.1032) (0.1048) (0.0321) (0.0350) (0.0349) 
𝜋𝑡  -0.2895*** -0.3039** -0.2921** -0.2963*** -0.3039*** -0.2881*** 
 
(0.0671) (0.1229) (0.1267) (0.0156) (0.0572) (0.0161) 
Δ𝑟𝑓𝑥𝑡  -0.0409* -0.0299 -0.0285 -0.0053 -0.0299 -0.0056 
 
(0.0176) (0.0208) (0.0177) (0.0045) (0.0255) (0.0054) 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑡
𝑝
 -0.9226*** -0.9040*** -0.9361*** -0.9789*** -0.9040*** -0.9729*** 
 
(0.0806) (0.0804) (0.0970) (0.0154) (0.0337) (0.0151) 
const 0.5844 0.5066 
 
1.0042*** 0.5066 1.3271*** 
 
(0.5326) (0.7670) 
 
(0.2297) (0.4535) (0.3129) 
No. of Obs. 513.00 513.00 507.00 513.00 513.00 513.00 
R-Squared 0.80 0.83 0.83  
 
0.91 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis 
Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
Before commenting results of estimation, it is also important to clarify 2SLS IV estimator, 
being the only one that handles issue of potential endogeneity of the CA primary balance 
as a regressor in the model. The issue of endogeneity is stemming from the specification of 
the fiscal reaction function at (3.10): since autocorrelation of the change in indebtedness is 
very likely, there will be reverse contemporaneous causality between primary balance and 
change in debt. In order to address this issue, primary balance is instrumentalized by the 
sample averages of the potential GDP growth and the first lag of cyclically-adjusted debt, 
as well as by the sample average of the first lag of CA primary balance. Following the 
specification of the FRF, such instruments should be relevant explanatory variables of CA 
primary balance, but also uncorrelated to random error. This is checked by the following 
post-estimation test: 
 
 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F test of underidentification. The null hypothesis is 
that number of instruments is less than number of endogenous variables. Under the 
null, test statistics will follow F distribution. 
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 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F test of weak identification. This test basically does 
not have null hypothesis, but rather figures out whether IV estimation is inferior to 
OLS estimation, Inferiority of the IV estimation indicates that instruments are weak, 
i.e. not relevant enough to instrument endogenous variable. There are two ways in 
which this statistics can be interpreted: 
1. inference based on rule of tumb (Staiger & Stock, 1997); if value of F 
statistics is less than 10, instruments are regarded as weak; 
2. inference based on Stock-Yogo critical values (Stock & Yogo, 2005); 
comparison of F statistics with tabulated Stock-Yogo critical values gives an 
assessment of IV estimator maximal bias relative to OLS, or in other version 
assessment of the maximal size of F test (probability that correct null is 
rejected); 
 Hansen J test of overindentification. The null hypothesis is that instruments are 
valid, i.e. not correlated with model random errors. Under the null, test statistics 
will follow Chi-squared distribution. 
 
The results of the IV post-estimation tests are given in the Table 5.12. As Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F tests of under- and weak identification do not depend on dependent variable, test 
statistics is common for the all three versions of the model. Since underidentification null 
is rejected at 1% significance and maximal bias is 5%, instruments can be regarded as 
relevant. In addition, Hansen J test does not reject null that instruments are valid. 
 
Table 5.12: 2SLS IV Post-estimation test 
 
Test / Dependent variable ∆𝑑𝑡 ∆𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑡
𝑝
 ∆𝑠𝑑𝑡
𝑝
 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F test of 
underidentification 
6.759*** 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F test of weak 
identification (relative bias to OLS) 
5% maximal bias 
Hansen J statistics 1.952 0.309 3.304 
Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
When estimation results of all three versions of the model are compared, several important 
findings can be noted. In cases when dependent variables are actual and CA debt 
increments, available estimated values of R-squared are modest and even low for PCSE. 
On the other side, when dependent variable is change in structural indebtedness, R-squared 
sharply increases, especially in case of PCSE estimator. This indirectly indicates that debt-
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deficit adjustments are very significant explanatory factor of the debt increment variations; 
once when it is removed, explanatory power of the model substantially increased.  
 
When particular impact of debt determinants is considered in case of change in actual 
indebtedness as a dependent variable, implied interest rate and CA primary balance 
appears as the only two regressors which significance is robust to all estimators applied. 
Results on significance of the other determinants are mixed and do not indicate robust 
power in explanation of actual debt dynamics variation. Situation changes when cyclically-
adjusted debt increment is dependent variable. Potential GDP growth gained robust 
significance, when temporarily swings of public debt due to primary balance and output 
cyclicality are removed, which is in line with expectations.  
 
When the change in structural indebtedness appears as a dependent variable, inflation also 
became robustly significant debt driver. The results indicate statistically significant 
negative response of debt changes in the EEC to higher inflation. Interpreting this response 
is not straightforward though. On the GDP side, higher inflation should lead to higher 
value of nominal GDP in denominator and therefore reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. On the 
debt servicing cost side, higher inflation should lead to higher nominal interest rates and 
depreciation of nominal exchange rates due to the PPP principle and therefore should 
increase the debt-to-GDP ratio. Which of the two effects prevails seem to be ultimately an 
empirical question, but negative estimated value of the regression coefficient indicates that 
in case of EEC 8 denominating effect prevailed.  
 
The dynamics of the public debt seems to be very sensitive to interest rates. It should be 
noted that the implied interest rate used in this analysis reflects both changes in market 
interest rates and changes in the nominal exchange rate for countries with floating 
exchange rate regimes. The high sensitivity of public debt to interest rate should not be 
confused with relatively lower contribution of real interest rate differential to debt 
increment, illustrated in debt decomposition exercise. Instead, interest rates, apart from the 
rear situations when they are negative, covariate in the same direction as public debt. 
 
Eventually, size and significance of estimated impact of real appreciation is unstable, but 
direction is clearly negative and its significance was confirmed in several cases of 
estimation. This is a bit tricky for explanations. Real exchange rate appreciation is 
typically associated with worsening of international competitiveness and rising current 
deficits, as it was a case in EEC in general. According to the principle of twin deficits, real 
exchange rate should be also associated with rising fiscal deficits, and consequently with 
growing debt. Yet, in case of economic cyclicality driven by foreign capital inflows, so-
called situation of “twin divergence” can occur; automatic increase in government revenue 
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reduces deficits and public debt, along with real exchange rate appreciation and worsening 
of current deficits, and vice versa. Which is the most likely reason of observed negative 
association between real exchange rate appreciation and public debt dynamic. 
 
Taking all findings into account, it can be claimed that both H1 and H2 hypotheses are 
proved. Explanatory power of the model is solid and increases when structural measure of 
indebtedness is used, indicating existence of significant correlation between change of debt 
dynamics and debt determinants. Descriptive analysis of debt decomposition imposes that 
debt-deficit adjustments and CA primary balance as the fiscal variables are the most 
important contributors of public debt dynamics. In addition, when the change in structural 
indebtedness is used as a dependent variable in the model, debt dynamics is most sensitive 
to the variations in CA primary balance since the impact of interest rate considerably falls 
relative to cases of actual and CA debt increments being dependent variable. Therefore, 
second hypothesis that dynamic and cost of public debt are more sensitive to fiscal than 
non-fiscal driver is claimed to be proved.  
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6  FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT OF SERBIA  
AND PEER COUNTRIES 
 
Literature review revealed that the most important drawback of the academic literature on 
the public debt sustainability and cost-risk analysis in general is lack of the out-of-sample 
performance. While the international organizations working according to the standardized 
DSA and CaR methodologies have started to pay attention on forecasting reliability in the 
recent years, the academic literature mostly approached to this topics ad hoc and ex ante, 
without check out how the forward-looking empirical results stemming from the proposed 
models and methodologies feet actual data. 
 
With this in mind, empirical strategy in this work has an unusual approach. Instead of 
producing empirical research on future debt sustainability beyond 2019 (which is basically 
task of international organizations and national governments), empirical work in this 
chapters employs use methods of forecasting of the debt determinants and respective debt 
dynamics to discuss and assess quality of its out-of-sample performance. Therefore, 
empirical strategy is set to simulate kind of “experiment”, in which analyst back in time 
assesses mid-term debt sustainability using data and methodologies available at that 
moment, and then compare the results of such forward-looking analysis with actual 
realizations of debt and debt determinants’ dynamics, but also with other benchmark 
forecasts. Since scope of the DS1 database which is used in empirical analysis in the 
previous chapter cover data up to 2017, and that usual time range of mid-term period is 3-5 
years, 2012 is set to be base year, so that forecasts starts in 2013. 
 
6.1 Forecasts of the public debt determinants 
 
From the theoretical point of view, government expenditure together with money supply 
are typically perceived as the most exogenous macroeconomic variables, being under 
control of the fiscal and monetary authorities. Following the standard macroeconomic 
concepts such as IS-LM-BoP or AS-AD frameworks, economic activity, interest rate, 
exchange rates and inflation are considered as variables that endogenously adjust to 
achieve macroeconomic equilibrium. On the other side, fiscal authorities in small open 
economies in practice usually apply forecasting procedure other way around: first, non-
fiscal variables are predicted (or assumed), and then decisions on fiscal targets are made. 
The rational for such approach is very clear: in one small open economy, domestic market 
variables are strongly affected by their counterparts on international markets. If domestic 
market variables are not credibly adjusted to international swings, this will create large 
market distortions and unsustainable external imbalances, distracting stable economic 
growth at least in the long run. Thus, baseline scenario in fiscal strategy reflects 
  
 
 
140 
 
government expectations about revenues and expenditures dynamics, based on a set of 
assumptions about envisaged dynamics non-fiscal variables.  
 
This brief introductory discussion points out the main forecasting issues in practice: how to 
make joint forecast of the macroeconomic variables that will maintain contemporaneous 
and intertemporal consistency of macroeconomic relations and balances? To illustrate this 
point lets assume a simple example that government forecasts the following changes in 
macroeconomic variables in the 10-year period: 
 
 real interest rate: does not change 
 nominal interest rate: 2% – 6% 
 inflation rate: 2% – 4%  
 interest payment to GDP: does not change 
 real growth: does not change 
 
As first, it can be noticed that there is contemporaneous inconsistency between forecasts of 
nominal interest rate and inflation. Since real interest rate does not change, the Fisher 
equation imposes that increase in nominal interest rate will coincide with rise in inflation 
rate. Further, if real growth rate does not change, GDP will grow at inflation rate, while 
interest payments will grow at nominal interest rate; consequently, growth of interest 
payments at higher rate than GDP growth over 10-year period will increase its share in 
GDP, making the forecast of constant share of interest payment inconsistent in 
intertemporal terms. 
 
Since the long term forecasting requires large equilibrium macroeconomic model to 
maintain intertemporal consistency, focus on short to mid run forecasting brings about 
important benefit. If mid run deviations from equilibrium are allowed, it is reasonable to 
arbitrary declare some variables as endogenous and model their forecasts separately, taking 
projections of other interrelated variables as exogenous inputs. For instance, non-fiscal 
market variables can be forecasted separately of forecasting fiscal variables, assuming that 
in the mid run changes in interest and exchange rate will not affect government fiscal 
decisions. Additionally, such approach is in line with mid-term budgeting practices of the 
fiscal authorities, in which forecast are updated each year to accommodate recent 
economic developments. 
 
In this section I elaborate two approaches of the debt determinants forecasting:  
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1. Deterministic approach to joint modeling of market determinants of debt (interest 
rate and exchange rate), based on common economic theory presented in subsection 2.3.2, 
independently from inflation rate, real GDP growth and primary balance. Primary balance 
and inflation are regarded as the fully exogenous variables in line with reasoning that 
government and national bank will stick to mid-term fiscal and monetary targets. In 
addition, it is assumed that real GDP growth is also exogenous variable predetermined by 
the production capacities of economy, and not affected in the mid run by non-fiscal 
variables. Eventually, it is assumed that fiscal and real variables does not have impact on 
market variables, while forecast of inflation enters into modeling framework as an 
exogenous input. 
 
2. Stochastic approach to joint modeling of all debt determinants, based on 
econometric modeling of historical data. In this approach, all variables are regarded as 
endogenous.  
 
6.1.1 Deterministic approach to forecasting of debt market determinants 
 
Deterministic approach to forecasting of the interest rate basically follows the 
operationalization of the equation (2.39), which in nominal terms reads  
 
𝑖𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑚𝑖  (6.1) 
 
where 𝑧𝑡 is nominal spot rate, and 𝑟𝑝𝑚𝑖 is risk premium for debt instrument i which is 
assumed to be time-invariant. In reality, value of the interest rate does not depend only on 
time, but also on maturity of the respective instrument. If index i of the instrument is 
neglected for a sake of simplicity and maturity T of the instrument is added into equation, 
it can be written as  
 
𝑖𝑇;𝑡 = 𝑧𝑇:𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑚𝑇  (6.2) 
 
This relation can be rewritten in forward-looking form as 
 
𝑖𝜏,𝑇;𝑡 = 𝑧𝜏,𝑇;𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑚𝜏,𝑇  (6.3) 
 
where 𝑖𝜏,𝑇;𝑡  is future interest rate of the debt instrument of maturity 𝑇 − 𝜏 that will be 
issued at 𝑡 + 𝜏, while 𝑧𝜏,𝑇;𝑡 is a future spot rate of maturity 𝑇 − 𝜏 that will be realized at 
𝑡 + 𝜏. Mechanics of the future spot interest rates projections is derived from the theoretical 
concept known as expectations hypothesis (EH), that represents basic and the most popular 
model explaining interest rate term structure. The term structure of interest rates, defined 
  
 
 
142 
 
as the mapping of risk-free interest rates with respect to their maturities, empirically 
corresponds to the equation: 
 
(1 + 𝑧𝑇;𝑡) = [(1 + 𝑧1;𝑡)(1 + 𝑓1,2;𝑡) … (1 + 𝑓𝑇−1,𝑇;𝑡)]
1/𝑇
  (6.4) 
 
where 𝑓𝑇−1,𝑇;𝑡  is interpreted as a short-term forward interest rate of the risk-free bond 
issued at time T-1, falling due at T,  which is known at time t. Generally speaking, the EH 
states that term structure of interest rates at a given time reflects the market expectations of 
future spot rates, based on the assumption that risk-free bonds of different maturities are 
perfect substitutes for investors. The EH mechanics can be mathematically expressed as 
 
(1 + 𝑧𝑇;𝑡) = (1 + 𝑧1;𝑡)𝐸𝑡[(1 + 𝑧1;𝑡+1) … (1 + 𝑧1;𝑇)]
1/𝑇
  (6.5) 
 
which corresponds to the reasoning that yield on T-period bond is equal to expected return 
from rolling over one-period bonds for T periods. Under the assumption that short-term 
forward rates are reliable forecasts of the future spot rates, this relation can be generalized 
as 𝐸𝑡[𝑧𝜏,𝑇;𝑡] = 𝑓𝜏,𝑇;𝑡, where 𝑡 is a referent period, 𝑓𝜏,𝑇;𝑡 is forward interest rate on the debt 
instrument issued in 𝜏 periods after 𝑡 and falls due at 𝑇. For instance, if t=2017, 𝜏 = 2, and 
T=5, the best forecast in 2017 of the 3-year future spot rate, that will be realized in 2019, is 
forward rate 𝑓2,5;2017  derived from yield curve known in 2017. The forward rate are 
derived from the yield using generalized formula: 
 
𝑓𝜏,𝑇;𝑡 = (
(1+𝑧𝑇;𝑡)
𝑇−𝑡
(1+𝑧𝑇−𝜏;𝑡)
𝜏−𝑡)
1
𝑇−𝜏
− 1.  (6.6) 
 
In regard to the previous example, this equation tells that forward rate 𝑓2,5;2017 will be 
derived from yield curve using relationship between spot rates of the maturities 𝑇 and 𝑇 −
𝜏. Once when future spot rates are forecasted, estimated risk premium for the particular 
debt instrument can be added in order to get full forecast of the future interest rate 𝑖𝜏,𝑇;𝑖,𝑡. 
 
Application of this approach in practice is quite straightforward in the advanced economies 
with developed financial markets, where full scope yield curve and respective risk 
premiums can be derived using market yields. On the other side, in emerging economies 
with shallow financial markets, lack of long-term bonds in domestic currency shrinks the 
longevity of  respective yield curve, whilst frequency of trading is insufficient to assess full 
scope of risk premiums 𝑟𝑝𝑚𝑇;𝑖 with respect to debt instruments and maturities. 
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Here I present example of simple framework for forecasting interest rate on RSD and EUR 
denominated Serbian T-bonds. The example is illustrated based on the referent period 
April 2019, which is regarded as starting time point t=0. The first step is forecast of the 
EUR future spot rates derived from ECB yield curve computed using rates of highest-
graded T-bonds (available at ECB website), presented in the Figure 6.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: EUR yield curve up to 20 years maturity, April 2019 
Source: ECB 
 
The forward interest rates up to 10-year maturity for the forecasting period of 8 years 
ahead is computed using formula 6.6 and presented in the Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: EUR Forward rates based on EUR yield curve in April 2019 
 
Maturity 
𝑇 − 𝜏 
𝜏 1 2 3 4 5 
𝜏 in years 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 
𝑧𝑇;0 𝑓1,𝑇;0 𝑓2,𝑇;0 𝑓3,𝑇;0 𝑓4,𝑇;0 𝑓5,𝑇;0 
1 -0.59% -0.58% -0.43% -0.21% 0.03% 0.26% 
2 -0.58% -0.50% -0.32% -0.09% 0.15% 0.37% 
3 -0.53% -0.40% -0.20% 0.03% 0.25% 0.46% 
4 -0.45% -0.30% -0.09% 0.14% 0.35% 0.54% 
5 -0.35% -0.18% 0.03% 0.24% 0.44% 0.61% 
6 -0.25% -0.08% 0.13% 0.33% 0.52% 0.67% 
7 -0.15% 0.03% 0.22% 0.41% 0.58% 0.73% 
8 -0.05% 0.12% 0.31% 0.48% 0.64% 0.77% 
9 0.04% 0.21% 0.38% 0.55% 0.69% 0.81% 
10 0.13% 0.29% 0.45% 0.60% 0.74% 0.85% 
Source: own calculations 
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EUR forward rates are regarded as a forecast of the future EUR spot rates 𝑧𝜏,𝑇;𝑡
𝐸𝑈𝑅 . In an ideal 
case, similar procedure would be repeated to obtain RSD forward rates using RSD yield 
curve. Yet, since RSD yield curve is not available, it is assumed that EUR yield curve is a 
proxy of the RSD yield curve in real terms, following description of real spot rates in 
(2.39). RSD future rates are then computed as a sum of 𝜏-period ahead RSD inflation 
forecast 𝜋𝜏
𝑅𝑆𝐷  (assumed to be exogenous35) and relevant EUR future spot rate, 𝑧𝜏,𝑇;𝑡
𝑅𝑆𝐷 =
𝑧𝜏,𝑇;𝑡
𝐸𝑈𝑅 + 𝜋𝜏
𝑅𝑆𝐷 . Consequently, two types of risk premiums are needed to forecast future 
interest rates on Serbian T-bonds: 
 
1. risk premium on EUR denominated bonds, being a difference between realized trading 
yields of EUR T-bonds and forecasted EUR future rates,  
 
𝑟𝑝𝑚𝜏,𝑇
𝐸𝑈𝑅 = 𝑖𝜏,𝑇;0
𝐸𝑈𝑅 − 𝑓𝜏,𝑇;0
𝐸𝑈𝑅  ;  (6.7) 
 
2. risk premium on RSD denominated bonds, being a difference between realized trading 
yields of RSD T-bonds and RSD forecasted RSD future rates,  
 
𝑟𝑝𝑚𝜏,𝑇
𝑅𝑆𝐷 = 𝑖𝜏,𝑇;0
𝑅𝑆𝐷 − 𝑓𝜏,𝑇;0
𝑅𝑆𝐷 .   (6.8) 
 
As being said, due to data deficiency it is not possible to cover estimate of risk premiums 
for full range of maturities up to 10 years, nor get the fresh data on traded yields in base 
period April 2019. Therefore, taking into account that interest rates and inflation were 
stable in 2017 and 2018, yields at which T-bonds are traded at primary auctions from last 
two years are used to estimate risk premiums. T-bond issuance in 2017-2018 are 
summarized in the Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2: Serbian T-Bonds issued in 2017-2018 
 
Maturity 
EUR denominated T-Bonds RSD denominated T-Bonds 
ISIN 
Issue 
date 
Due 
date 
Market 
yield 
ISIN 
Issue 
date 
Due 
date 
Market 
yield 
1 RSMFRSD66665 5/21/18 5/29/19 0.45% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 RSMFRSD96779 3/22/18 3/26/20 1.00% RSMFRSD60304 1/10/17 1/12/19 3.50% 
3 RSMFRSD41981 4/20/18 4/24/21 1.25% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
5 RSMFRSD36601 4/16/18 4/18/23 1.75% RSMFRSD76292 1/23/18 1/25/23 4.50% 
6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
                                                        
35 Forecasts of inflation rate are retrieved from the World Economic Outlook database of the IMF 
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7 RSMFRSD59421 6/11/18 6/13/25 2.50% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
10 RSMFRSD20605 3/26/18 3/28/28 3.50% RSMFRSD55940 2/6/18 2/8/28 5.88% 
 
Source: PDA data 
 
Insufficiency of  data on yields is particularly visible in case of RSD T-bonds, where only 
three maturities are available. Applying the equations (6.7) and (6.8) on the available 
maturities for 𝜏 = 0, 𝑟𝑝𝑚0,𝑇
𝐸𝑈𝑅 = 𝑖0,𝑇;0
𝐸𝑈𝑅 − 𝑧𝑇;0
𝐸𝑈𝑅  and 𝑟𝑝𝑚0,𝑇
𝑅𝑆𝐷 = 𝑖0,𝑇;0
𝑅𝑆𝐷 − 𝑧𝑇;0
𝑅𝑆𝐷 , risk premiums 
are calibrated for the available EUR and RSD maturities, while the risk premiums for the 
missing maturities are simply interpolated. The calibrated risk premiums are given in the 
Figure 6.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Calibrated risk premiums on EUR and RSD T-bills 
Source: own calculations 
 
Eventually, calibrated risk premiums by current spot rates (𝜏 = 0) are used to project full 
range of interest rates for 𝜏 = 1, … ,5. The projections of the EUR and RSD interest rates 
are presented in tables 6.3a and 6.3b. As can be noticed by comparison of tables 6.2b and 
6.3b with table 6.2, modeled current interest rates in the column 2019 fits actual yields at 
which T-bonds were traded.   
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Table 6.3a: Forecasted interest rates on future issuance of EUR denominated T-bonds, 
April 2019 
 
Maturity/year of 
issuance 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 
1 0.45% 0.46% 0.61% 0.83% 1.07% 1.30% 
2 1.00% 1.01% 1.16% 1.38% 1.62% 1.85% 
3 1.25% 1.26% 1.41% 1.63% 1.87% 2.10% 
4 1.50% 1.51% 1.66% 1.88% 2.12% 2.35% 
5 1.75% 1.76% 1.91% 2.13% 2.37% 2.60% 
6 2.12% 2.14% 2.29% 2.51% 2.75% 2.98% 
7 2.50% 2.51% 2.66% 2.88% 3.12% 3.35% 
8 2.83% 2.85% 3.00% 3.21% 3.45% 3.69% 
9 3.16% 3.18% 3.33% 3.55% 3.79% 4.02% 
10 3.50% 3.51% 3.66% 3.88% 4.12% 4.35% 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
Table 6.3b: Forecasted interest rates on future issuance of RSD denominated T-bonds, 
April 2019 
 
Maturity/year of 
issuance 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 
1 2.95% 2.96% 3.61% 3.83% 4.07% 4.30% 
2 3.50% 3.51% 4.16% 4.38% 4.62% 4.85% 
3 3.83% 3.85% 4.50% 4.71% 4.95% 5.19% 
4 4.16% 4.18% 4.83% 5.05% 5.29% 5.52% 
5 4.50% 4.51% 5.16% 5.38% 5.62% 5.85% 
6 4.80% 4.82% 5.46% 5.68% 5.92% 6.15% 
7 5.10% 5.12% 5.76% 5.98% 6.22% 6.46% 
8 5.36% 5.38% 6.02% 6.24% 6.48% 6.71% 
9 5.62% 5.64% 6.28% 6.50% 6.74% 6.97% 
10 5.88% 5.89% 6.54% 6.76% 7.00% 7.23% 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
Forecast of the exchange rate is stemming from the operationalization of the previously 
discussed concepts of Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP). Following the equation (2.48), 
forward-looking application of the UIP concept requires prior knowledge on short-term 
interest rates to estimate expected depreciation of exchange rate one period ahead. This 
equation can be generalized for any maturity 𝜏 as 
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(1 + 𝑧𝜏;𝑡
𝑑 ) = (1 + 𝐸(∆𝑓𝑥𝜏;𝑡)) (1 + 𝑧𝜏;𝑡
𝑓 ). (6.9) 
Since actual value of the Serbian spot rates are not known (they are approximated using 
EUR yield curve), forecast of the RSD/EUR is indirectly computed using USD spot rates 
(for which yield curve is available, too), based on the combination of the UIP and relative 
PPP concepts. Computation is done under assumption that forecast of domestic and foreign 
inflation rates are known exogenous inputs (here they are retrieved from the WEO). First, 
applying USD and EUR spot rates to UIP formula, USD/EUR exchange rate depreciation 
is forecasted. In the second step, applying relative PPP formula to forecasts of the RSD and 
EUR inflation, nominal depreciation of RSD/EUR is computed. Eventually, using forecasts 
of the USD/EUR, nominal depreciation of the RSD/USD is derived. Results of the 
forecasted exchange rates RSD/EUR i RSD/USD are presented in Table 6.4 
 
Table 6.4: Forecasted interest rates on future issuance of RSD denominated T-bonds, April 
2019 
 
 Variable 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 
RSD/EUR 118 119.07 120.545 121.84 123.11 124.35 
RSD/USD, via EUR 104.4248  108.59   109.87   110.98   112.14   113.09  
inflation RSD 2.006 2.5 2.959 3 3 3 
inflation EUR 1.31 1.567 1.691 1.883 1.926 1.968 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
6.1.2 Stochastic approach to forecasting of all debt determinants 
 
Debt accumulation mechanics implies straightforward transmission of variations in debt 
drivers to public debt dynamics. Nevertheless, as discussed in the Section 2.3, transmission 
mechanics gets significantly complex when various interlinks between debt determinants 
are considered, for instance primary balance is under the influence of economic output, 
exchange rates are under the influence of interest rates and inflation rate. In addition, the 
fiscal reaction function defined in (3.10) imposes that primary balance is also responsive to 
the past values of debt accumulated. Discussion in this subsection revolves around idea 
that debt determinants should be jointly modeled utilizing correlations patterns observed in 
historical data. More particularly, econometric strategy utilizes Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) approach to model non-fiscal debt determinants and FRF setting to model fiscal 
stance. Opposite to case of deterministic approach, here I provide only methodological 
aspects of the modeling, while empirical estimations are conducted in the sections 6.3 and 
6.4. 
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VAR Modeling 
 
The pioneering work of Garcia & Rigobon (2004) propose the use of VAR to model the 
joint dynamics of risk factors driving the public debt. They do not make distinction 
between different public debt drivers and use a single VAR model including the debt-
deficit adjustment instead. Assuming that all risk variables are fully stochastic in nature 
and correlated to a certain degree, the joint dynamics of risk variables 𝒙𝒕  follow a 
multinomial normal distribution with mean 𝛍 and variance-covariance matrix 𝚺𝐱𝐱: 
 
 
𝑥𝑡~𝑁(𝜇, 𝛴𝑥𝑥),
 (4.2)
 𝑥𝑡 = {𝑟𝑡, 𝑟𝑔𝑡 , ∆𝑓𝑥𝑡, 𝜋𝑡, 𝑝𝑏𝑡 , }  
 
Under the assumption of joint distribution, the VAR model in vector terms reads 
 
 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑐 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑡−𝑖 +
𝑝
𝑖=1  𝑣𝑡, (4.3) 
𝑣𝑡~𝑁(0, Σvv) 
 
where 𝑨𝒊  is the matrix with i-th lag coefficients, 𝒗𝑡~𝑁(𝟎, 𝚺𝐯𝐯)  and 𝚺𝐯𝐯  is variance-
covariance matrix of the reduced-form residuals. 
 
However, as the reduced-form residuals are linear combination of structural shocks, they 
are not suitable for performing the impulse response analysis of innovations in risk 
variables dynamic, which requires a structural VAR (SVAR) model. The main issue in the 
structural VAR specification is the identification of the model. As there is no some specific 
theory about the contemporaneous relations structure, Garcia & Rigobon (2004) use 
recursive ordering approach by an arbitrarily proposed exogeneity of variables and set a 
simple AB specification of structural VAR model to 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑡 = 𝐵𝑢𝑡 (4.4) 
 
where A is the matrix defining contemporaneous relations (not to be confused with Ai 
matrices of VAR regression coefficients), ut represent structural shocks and B is the matrix 
of structural form parameters.   
 
The structural model is identified by orthogonalization of the reduced-form residuals using 
the Cholesky decomposition (Sims, 1981), 𝚺𝐯𝐯 = 𝑩𝑩
′, while matrix 𝑨 is assumed to be an 
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identity matrix, such that  𝒗𝑡 = 𝑩𝒖𝑡. As matrix 𝑩 is a triangular matrix, the last variable 
will be the most exogenous and thus its innovation will have contemporaneous effects on 
all variables, while innovation in the first variable will affect only itself. 
 
Later work of Celasun, Ostry, and Debrun (2006) excluded fiscal variables from VAR 
modeling.  Instead, they propose the fiscal reaction function (FRF) for separate modeling 
of fiscal balance, narrowing range of VAR only to those variables that drive the automatic 
debt dynamics, in particular: interest rates, growth rates and changes in the exchange rates. 
In addition, the scope of debt forecasting shifted from point forecast and impulse response 
analysis to Monte Carlo simulations and fan charts, based on the SVAR. In this work, I 
also adopted such approach, so that the VAR modeling is limited only to non-fiscal 
variables. 
 
FRF modeling  
 
For the evaluation of fiscal policy behavior, I rely on the standard literature of FRFs, which 
encompasses both lagged value of debt and output gap as explanatory variables. Following 
Celasun, Ostry, and Debrun (2006), I specify the regression model of fiscal reaction in a 
panel-data form as 
 
𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑜𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝜃 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,   (4.5) 
 
where 
 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 is a ratio of government balance to GDP or the fiscal stance; 
 𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 is a one-period lagged ratio of debt-to-GDP; 
 𝑜𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is an estimated output gap as a share of potential GDP; 
 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variables; 
 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  is a random error, assumed to be normally independently identically 
distributed (IID), 𝑢𝑖,𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2);  
 essentially, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 represent the fiscal policy shocks. 
 
Estimated values of the regression coefficients allow a straightforward interpretation of the 
fiscal policy behavior. Considering fiscal responsibility, see e.g. Afonso (2008), if 
 
 𝛽 > 0, fiscal policy is responsible; 
 𝛽 ≤ 0, fiscal policy is ambiguous. 
 
Considering the cyclicality, see e.g. Turrini (2009), if 
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 𝛾 > 0, fiscal policy is counter-cyclical; 
 𝛾 < 0, fiscal policy is pro-cyclical; 
 𝛾 = 0, fiscal policy is a-cyclical. 
 
The fiscal balance is usually very persistent. Therefore, the previous studies include lagged 
balance as an explanatory variable in the FRF, see e.g. Gali & Perotti (2003) and Afonso 
(2008). 
 
In the context of debt forecasting, the fiscal reaction function can be also used to simulate 
the development of balance under various scenarios. The underlying idea is to split future 
fiscal response into a pre-determined part, an automatic part and a random part 
 
𝑏𝑖,𝑇+ℎ = 𝛤𝑖,𝑇+ℎ + 𝛽𝑑𝑖,𝑇+ℎ−1 + 𝛾𝑜𝑔𝑖,𝑇+ℎ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑇+ℎ  (4.6) 
 
where Γ𝑖,𝑇+ℎ  represents the pre-determined part of the fiscal reaction, 𝛽𝑑𝑖,𝑇+ℎ−1 +
𝛾𝑜𝑔𝑖,𝑇+ℎ is the automatic part (average response of EEC countries’ balance to lagged debt 
and output gap) and 𝜀𝑖,𝑇+ℎ is the random part (the fiscal policy shock). The predetermined 
response Γ𝑖,𝑇+ℎ  is further divided into the aggregate impact of the non-fiscal variables 
affecting fiscal balance Xi,T+ℎθ, and the future fiscal policy actions 𝜆𝑖,𝑇+ℎ: 
 
𝛤𝑖,𝑇+ℎ = Xi,T+ℎθ + 𝜆𝑖,𝑇+ℎ (4.7) 
 
Eventually, the fiscal policy shocks 𝜀𝑖,𝑇+ℎ are assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean and country-specific variance estimated from the FRF regression residuals, 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡~𝑁(0, ?̂?𝜀𝑖
2 ). The future fiscal policy actions could be calibrated using the information 
about the expected fiscal policy moves, such as announced fiscal consolidation or fiscal 
stimulus.  
 
6.2 Forecasts of the costs and risks of public debt 
 
In the previous section I discussed deterministic approach to modeling and forecasting of 
the debt market determinants. A question that inevitably arise is what is the value added of 
such approach in practical application? To answer this question, lets recall discussion on 
gross borrowing requirements and debt funding strategies raised in subsection 2.2.5. The 
bottom line of this discussion is that the debt accumulation mechanics based on the net 
lending/borrowing as a measure of fiscal balance is not convenient for the public debt 
managers, who have the authority to influence forward-looking debt dynamics by 
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managing structure of newly issued debt. Thus, debt funding strategies are rather based on 
the accumulation of the gross borrowing needs over time, whereby gross borrowing needs 
represents a sum of net lending/borrowing and existing debt maturing within the reporting 
period.  
 
Lets also recall that the main objective of the public debt management is to assure a 
borrowing at lowest possible cost over the medium to long run, consistent with a prudent 
degree of risk. In practice, this means that the DMO needs to chose weights within gross 
borrowing requirements for each debt sub-portfolio with respect to the currency and 
interest rate 𝜔𝑘,𝑡
𝐶𝑆 𝜔𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝑆, as explained in the equation (2.26), which in turn will optimize cost-
risk trade-off. In order to assess effects of the variety of possible debt funding strategies on 
the future costs and risks of the public debt, the DMO needs detailed forecasts of the 
interest rates, such as provided in tables 6.3a and 6.3b, to vary weights 𝜔𝑘,𝑡
𝐶𝑆 𝜔𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝑆 within the 
debt funding strategy.  
 
Serbian Public Debt Administration applies cost-risk modeling of the World Bank MTDS 
framework, to select optimal debt strategy in regard to risk exposure. In line with general 
idea to test out-of-sample performance of the cost-risk analysis conducted back to 2013, 
the output of such analysis that was officially published in Serbian Fiscal Strategy for 2013 
with projections for 2014 and 2015 is presented in the figures 6.3a and 6.3b. 
 
 
Figure 6.3a: Cost and risk analysis of alternative borrowing strategies in terms of debt-to-
GDP ratio, Serbian Debt Strategy, 2013-2015 forecast 
Source: Fiscal Strategy for 2013 with projections for 2014 and 2015 
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Figure 6.3b: Cost and risk analysis of alternative borrowing strategies in terms of interest-
to-GDP ratio, Serbian Debt Strategy, 2013-2015 forecast 
Source: Fiscal Strategy for 2013 with projections for 2014 and 2015 
 
In this section I recomputed cost-risk measures using PDA data on public debt portfolio 
and MTDS template, and extend the analysis from 3-year period up to 5-year period 
(2017), in line with overall research rationale of empirical analysis in this chapter. In the 
first subsection I elaborate debt funding strategies and macroeconomic scenarios. The 
second subsection presents the results of the respective cost-risk analysis. 
 
6.2.1 Debt funding strategies and macroeconomic scenarios 
 
The first step in implementation of the MTDS is aggregation of the large number of debt 
instruments to sub-portfolios according to the common properties with respect to the key 
aspects of public debt structure characteristics, discussed in Chapter 2. This aggregation to 
sub-portfolios according to the MTDS scheme is presented in the Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5: Structure of the Serbian public debt by the end of 2012 
 
MTDS code 
Instrument 
Type 
Interest rate 
type Maturity 
Nominal 
IR Currency 
Residence 
type 
Outstanding 
debt (mil RSD) 
Share in total 
debt 
USD_1 Loan Fix 20 0.75% USD External 112,861 6.80% 
EUR_3 Loan Var 20 0.90% EUR External 337,287 20.31% 
USD_5 Loan Var 20 2.80% USD External 0 0.00% 
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EUR_6 T-Bill Var 1 6.15% EUR External 99,232 5.98% 
EUR_7 T-Bond Fix 3 6.32% EUR External 39,282 2.37% 
EUR_8 Loan Fix 22 5.00% EUR External 519,048 31.26% 
RSD_9 T-Bills Var 1 10.50% RSD Domestic 105,323 6.34% 
RSD_10 T-bonds Fix 2 14.00% RSD Domestic 84,619 5.10% 
RSD_11 T-bonds Fix 3 15.75% RSD Domestic 94,206 5.67% 
RSD_12 T-bonds Fix 5 16.00% RSD Domestic 14,454 0.87% 
USD_13 Eurobond Fix 10 6.65% USD External 253,994 15.30% 
EUR_14 Eurobond Fix 5 6.93% EUR External 0 0.00% 
 
Source: MTDS computation using PDA data 
 
As explained in the Fiscal Strategy for 2013 with projections for 2014 and 2015, four debt 
funding strategies were regarded: 
 
 Basic strategy S1: funding using existing instruments. The majority of new 
borrowing is based on issuing government securities in local and foreign currencies 
in the domestic market and issuing Eurobonds denominated in US dollars; 
 Strategy S2: 5-year Eurobond in EUR. In addition to the existing 10-year 
Eurobond denominated in USD, 5-year Eurobond denominated in EUR will be 
issued (coded as EUR_14); 
 Strategy S3: large-scale dinarization. Increased issuing of dinar-denominated 
government securities; 
 Strategy S4: full-scale dollarization. financing needs in the period 2013–2015 are 
fully covered by Eurobonds denominated in US dollars, without borrowing in the 
domestic market or in local currency. 
 
The funding strategies are formalized in quantitative terms and presented in the Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6: Debt funding strategies 2013 -2015, envisaged by Fiscal Strategy for 2013 
 
MTDS code 
S1: current 
instruments 
S2: 5-year 
Eurobond 
S3: large-scale 
dinarization 
S4: full-scale 
dollarization 
EUR_3 19.78% 19.78% 17.09% 20.00% 
USD_5 5.56% 5.56% 4.16% 9.00% 
EUR_6 7.42% 7.42% 5.54% 19.00% 
EUR_7 3.09% 3.09% 2.31% 10.00% 
RSD_9 19.10% 19.10% 26.90% 0.01% 
RSD_10 7.64% 7.64% 10.76% 0.00% 
RSD_11 7.64% 7.64% 10.76% 0.00% 
RSD_12 3.82% 3.82% 5.38% 0.00% 
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USD_13 25.96% 0.00% 17.09% 21.00% 
EUR_14 0.00% 25.96% 0.00% 21.00% 
Total External 61.80% 61.80% 46.20% 100.00% 
Total Domestic 38.20% 38.20% 53.80% 0.00% 
 
Source: MTDS computation using PDA data 
 
The next step in analysis is conjecture of the baseline macroeconomic scenario. Within 
MTDS, projections of the inflation, GDP and primary balance are also considered as 
exogenous inputs, retrieved from the credible sources such as the World Economic 
Outlook database of the IMF. On the other side, interest and exchange rates are forecasted 
using very similar deterministic approach as described in the previous section. In case of 
interest rates, the main difference is a way in which risk premiums are calibrated, while in 
case of exchange rates main difference is that projection of the EUR/USD exchange rate is 
also exogenous input. The forecasted term structure of future spot rates per sub-portfolios 
covered by MTDS analysis is given in the Table 6.7: 
 
Table 6.7: Forecast of future spot rates on Serbian public debt instruments in 2012, 
baseline scenario 
 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
USD_1 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 
EUR_3 0.52% 0.79% 1.21% 1.73% 2.11% 
USD_5 0.48% 0.60% 0.98% 1.59% 2.85% 
EUR_6 6.27% 6.54% 6.96% 7.48% 7.86% 
EUR_7 6.59% 6.99% 7.44% 7.86% 8.13% 
EUR_8 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 
RSD_9 12.50% 11.50% 10.50% 9.50% 8.50% 
RSD_10 13.00% 12.00% 11.00% 10.00% 9.00% 
RSD_11 14.75% 13.75% 12.75% 11.75% 10.75% 
RSD_12 15.00% 14.00% 13.00% 12.00% 11.00% 
USD_13 6.88% 7.11% 7.35% 7.55% 7.72% 
EUR_14 7.28% 7.67% 8.01% 8.32% 8.60% 
 
Source: MTDS computation using PDA data 
 
In the last step, four alternative risky scenarios are arbitrary defined for the purpose of debt 
sensitivity analysis as described in the Chapter 2. All scenarios assumed deviations from 
the baseline that start in 2014. These scenarios are: 
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 Scenario 1: Depreciation of the dinar against the dollar by 25%. The rationale 
of this scenario was anticipation that recovery of the USA will result in USD global 
appreciation;  
 Scenario 2: Depreciation of the dinar against EUR and USD 25%. The 
rationale of this scenario was anticipation that current account deficit needs to be 
reduced, which in turn will result in RSD depreciation; 
 Scenario 3: Arbitrary jump in all interest rates. The rationale of this scenario 
was anticipation that all interest rates after the global economic recovery will 
increase; 
 Scenario 4: Interest rate increase by 5% on RSD debt. The rationale of this 
scenario was assumption that domestic inflation will remain highly volatile.  
 
6.2.2 Cost-risk metrics  
 
In this subsection I provide results of the cost and risk estimation of the Serbian public 
debt for the period 2013-2017, in regard to the debt funding strategies and macroeconomic 
scenarios. Since the needed exogenous forecasts of the primary balance and GDP for 5-
year time horizon goes beyond 3-year forecasts given in Fiscal Strategy, I used compatible 
forecasts from WEO available in 2012. The projections of the debt and costs are provided 
in the tables 6.8a and 6.8b:. 
 
Table 6.8a: Costs of alternative borrowing strategies in terms of debt-to-GDP ratio, 
Serbian Debt Strategy, 2013-2017 forecast 
 
Scenarios S1 S2 S3 S4 
Baseline 57.0 57.1 57.2 57.2 
Exchange rate shock against USD and EUR (25%) 68.2 68.3 67.7 69.8 
Interest  rate shock 1 (Yield curve up) 60.0 60.1 60.3 59.8 
Interest rate shock 2 (Yield curve up) 61.2 61.4 61.2 61.6 
Combined shock (25% depreciation and interest rate 
shock 1) 64.1 63.1 63.9 63.8 
 
Source: MTDS computation using PDA data 
 
Table 6.8b: Costs of alternative borrowing strategies in terms of interest-to-GDP ratio, 
Serbian Debt Strategy, 2013-2017 forecast 
 
Scenarios S1 S2 S3 S4 
Baseline 3.0 3.1 3.2 2.8 
Exchange rate shock against USD and EUR (25%) 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.4 
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Interest  rate shock 1 (Yield curve up) 4.3 4.4 4.6 3.9 
Interest rate shock 2 (Yield curve up) 4.8 4.9 5.0 4.7 
Combined shock (25% depreciation and interest rate 
shock 1) 4.5 4.5 4.8 4.1 
 
Source: MTDS computation using PDA data 
 
In the next step, associated risk is computed. The rational of the risk metrix is that for the 
given financing strategy, risk is computed as the maximal difference between baseline 
scenario and alternative scenario. This is illustrated in the tables 6.9a and 6.9b. 
 
Table 6.9a: Risks of alternative borrowing strategies in terms of debt-to-GDP ratio, 
Serbian Debt Strategy, 2013-2017 forecast 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 
Scenarios 0 0 0 0 
Baseline 11.1 11.1 10.5 12.7 
Exchange rate shock against USD and 
EUR (25%) 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.6 
Interest  rate shock 1 (Yield curve up) 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.5 
Interest rate shock 2 (Yield curve up) 7.0 6.0 6.8 6.7 
Combined shock (25% depreciation and 
interest rate shock 1) 11.1 11.1 10.5 12.7 
 
Source: MTDS computation using PDA data 
 
Table 6.9b: Risks of alternative borrowing strategies in terms of interest-to-GDP ratio, 
Serbian Debt Strategy, 2013-2017 forecast 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 
Scenarios 0 0 0 0 
Baseline 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 
Exchange rate shock against USD and 
EUR (25%) 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.1 
Interest  rate shock 1 (Yield curve up) 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 
Interest rate shock 2 (Yield curve up) 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.4 
Combined shock (25% depreciation and 
interest rate shock 1) 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 
 
Source: MTDS computation using PDA data 
 
From this analysis, it can be concluded that the most risky debt funding strategy is S4 
which envisaged full-scope funding of gross borrowing needs by foreign debt. 
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6.3 Econometric modeling of the fiscal reaction function 
 
As elaborated in the Literature Review section, there is a lot of the empirical indications 
that fiscal policy stance of Central and Eastern European economies, in this work referred 
to as Emerging Europe, was profoundly pro-cyclical and expansive prior to global crisis 
outbreak. In order to test hypotheses that EEC governments were forced to shrink their 
primary balance in response to rising public debts and that continuation of the pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy would result in unsustainable debt paths, in this section I estimated fiscal 
reaction function for the EEC. More particularly, I use broader sample of 21 EEC in order 
to get more accurate estimation of average fiscal response. The econometric estimation is 
based on the model specification presented in the first subsection of this chapter.  
Following the overall rationale of the analysis in this chapter, the FRF is estimated using 
yearly macroeconomic dataset (referred to as DS2) from the WEO available prior to 
2013 36 . The first subsection discusses stylized facts on debt dynamics and economic 
fluctuations in the pre- and post-crisis period. Second subsections deals with econometric 
issues of the FRF estimation. The last two subsection provides estimation results and their 
interpretation. 
 
6.3.1 Cyclicality and indebtedness in Emerging Europe – stylized facts 
 
During the boom years of the 2000s, many Emerging European countries experienced 
large capital inflows that fueled extensive corporate and household borrowing. The 
bursting of the credit bubbles and the resulting economic shocks following the outbreak of 
the 2008 global financial crisis took a toll on household, corporate, and public balance 
sheets in the region. By looking at the aggregate data on private and public debt and 
growth, it is possible to clearly distinguished two phases in the evolution of EEC 
indebtedness: the run-up to the crisis and the aftermath of the crisis.  
 
Run-up to the crisis (2003-07) 
 
In 2003-07, private debt in EEC increased substantially – corporate debt increased by 20 
percent of GDP on average in the EU New Member States (NMS) and household sector 
debt increased by 17.5 percent of GDP due to very rapid credit growth (Figure 3.2). Rapid 
credit growth was generally driven by catch-up process with advanced European countries, 
as during the 00’s considerable number of EEC countries became the members of 
European Union. World Bank (2007) study find that rapid credit expansion across the EEC 
region was a consequence of the financial integration and deepening; yet, Baltics and 
Southeastern European NMS experienced an outright credit boom with strong detrimental 
                                                        
36 It should be noticed that prior to 2013, only data according to ESA 95 were available. 
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effects on macroeconomic variables, creating bubbles in asset prices, distorting labor 
markets and contributing to large external imbalances and real exchange rate appreciation. 
 
With a notable exception of Montenegro, the Balkans (Western Balkan countries without 
Croatia) were in a more favorable position than the NMS in terms of the level of debt and 
its rate of growth. On average, private sector debt in the Balkan countries was about 60 
percent of GDP in 2007 whereas in NMS it was more than 90 percent of GDP. The growth 
of private debt was followed by rapid growth of real GDP. In 2003-2007, real GDP of EEC 
increased on average for 29% (cumulatively). The increase in debt was counterpart of 
stabilization of government deficits and public debt. Strong economic growth and increase 
in revenues and investments of corporates and income and consumption of households 
reflects positively on public finance. In the same period, public sector debt declined in 
2003-07 in all emerging Europe countries except Hungary and Belarus. 
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Figure 6.4: Debt by sector in EEC, 2003-2007 
Source: DS2 
 
Aftermath of the crisis  
 
McKinsey (2010, 2012) point role of increase in private debt to decrease of subsequent 
economic activity and two distinct phases of deleveraging as a necessary condition for 
economic recovery: the first, households, corporations, and financial institutions reduce 
debt significantly over several years, while economic growth is negative or minimal and 
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government debt rises, while in the second phase, growth rebounds and government debt is 
reduced gradually over many years. This is exactly what was happening in the aftermath of 
the crisis. The rapid growth of household and corporate debt suddenly stooped following 
the sharp fall in economic activity, and by the end of 2011 some EEC countries already 
saw the beginning of the private debt deleveraging (Figure 3.3). On the other hand, public 
debt in most of the EEC began slowly but steadily to rise, as a consequence of the rising 
fiscal deficits. 
 
At the end of the day strong cyclical fluctuations created by large inflow and sudden stop 
of capital inflows leads to co-movements and tremendous cross-country correlation 
between macroeconomic variables in EEC, which is illustrated in more details further in 
the text.  
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Figure 6.5: Debt by sector in EEC, 2007-2011 
Source: DS2 
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6.3.2 Econometric issues and control variables 
 
The typical econometric issue when it comes to macroeconomic panel models is 
endogeneity. Explanatory variables could be endogenous to errors in the model due to 
reverse causality i.e. dependence of lagged debt on accumulated past values of primary 
balance. If capacity to generate primary surplus is time-invariant and differs across 
countries, then error term ui,t in the equation (4.5) will consists of an idiosyncratic error 
𝜈𝑖,𝑡  and a country-specific effect 𝜂𝑖 . Therefore, the lagged values of debt will be 
endogenous to 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. Even if the individual country effects are removed by time-demeaning 
of the data, having serially correlated policy shocks 𝐸(𝑢𝑖,𝑡𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1) ≠ 0, lagged debt will be 
an endogenous variable as 𝐸(𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1𝑢𝑖,𝑡) ≠ 0. Celasun, Ostry, & Debrun (2006) discuss 
the endogeneity issues in estimating fiscal reaction in detail and notice that these two 
endogeneity sources will trigger a downward bias in the OLS estimation of 𝛽, since higher 
country specific capacity to generate surplus or positive realizations of the idiosyncratic 
shocks would both tend to reduce the stock of public debt.  
 
They also point to the third possible source of endogeneity, i.e. that output gap may be 
endogenous to the contemporaneous fiscal policy shocks, 𝐸(𝑜𝑔𝑖,𝑡𝑢𝑖,𝑡) ≠ 0. Another issue 
of endogeneity arises when lagged dependent variable is added to the model with country-
specific effects, as it is inevitably correlated with the error term for the same reason as in 
case of the lagged debt. Thus, a pooled OLS estimator applied to the model (4) would most 
likely produce the inconsistent estimations. 
 
Apart from output gap and the level of indebtedness, additional factors might influence the 
government decisions on discretionary measures of fiscal policy. They can be divided in 
three categories: economic, institutional and political, and common factors.  
 
Regarding the economic factors, current account and inflation rate are shown to be 
significant explanatory variables, see European Commission (2011) and Eller & Urvova 
(2012). The institutional and political factors of relevance include political conditions such 
as elections, size of the government's parliamentary majority, government fragmentation 
and the Fiscal Rules Index (FRI), an indicator of institutional quality and average strength 
and coverage of fiscal rules in each country, see European Commission (2011). Finally, the 
common factors affecting all the countries in a sample can be institutional factors such as 
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, see Turini (2008), the oil prices, see Celasun, 
Ostry & Debrun (2006), or global crisis spillovers, see Eller & Urvova (2012). 
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Finally, all these factors are taken into consideration as much as possible. Regarding the 
economic factors, I choose the terms of trade to account for international competitiveness, 
the country openness to account for the impact of foreign business cycles, the private 
investments to account for the domestic business conditions and inflation to account for the 
monetary policy actions. To the best of our knowledge, there are no consistent indicators 
of institutional quality and political factors for the EEC in my sample except of 
parliamentary elections cycles. That particular variable is the most frequently used political 
factor in the FRF estimations, see for example Afonso (2008), Afonso & Hauptmaier 
(2009) and Turini (2008). Regarding the common factors, I account for the outbreak of the 
global financial crisis that likely had strong adverse impact on economic activity in the 
EEC, interrupting the credit-driven economic boom until 2008 and resulting in widely 
opened output gaps in 2009.   
 
6.3.3 Estimation results 
 
I applied Fedelino, Ivanova & Horton (2009) approach to adjust overall and primary 
government balance, as their assumptions considerably eliminate needs for longer series of 
disaggregated data on government revenue and expenditure that could not be gathered 
from a unique source. That is also in line with finding of Markus Eller (2009) that in the 10 
CEE countries the average elasticity of government revenue and expenditure was 0.94 and 
-0.1, respectively, for the period 1995-2004.  
 
Fiscal reaction function in equation is estimated in several versions depending on the 
choice of the left-hand-side variable (non-adjusted vs. adjusted, overall vs. primary), the 
scaling factor of the left-hand-side variable (potential vs. actual GDP) and the estimation 
method. Regarding the estimation method, I consider the panel regression with fixed 
effects - FE, the two-stage least squares - 2SLS (Instrumental Variables) and the one-step 
Arellano & Bond (1991) - AB (Generalized Method of Moments). The estimates of 
standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and intra-group correlation. In the 2SLS 
estimation, fixed effects are removed and debt and output gap are instrumented by the 
lagged values of the explanatory variables, which is usual approach in the literature, see 
e.g. Medeiros (2012). The Stock-Yogo maximal relative bias procedure is applied to test 
whether the instruments are weak in case of the 2SLS estimation The validity of the 
instruments is tested by Hansen J test in case of the IV 2SLS estimation. The validity of 
instruments in AB GMM estimation is checked using AR(1) and AR(2) tests of the first-
differenced errors as the Hansen-Sargan test is prone to over-rejection in case of 
heteroscedasticity (see Arellano & Bond,1991). 
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The estimated regression coefficients for the full sample are presented in Table 6.10. The 
results show that the primary balance responds positively to lagged debt. An increase in 
debt-to-GDP ratio of one percentage point implies an increase in the balance of 3-6 basis 
points in the following year, which is comparable with the results in the literature on EEC. 
Positive response indicates that, in general, EEC governments behaved responsibly during 
the period of observation. The non-adjusted primary balance seems to react a-cyclically to 
the output gap. Moreover, this reaction appears to be even counter-cyclical when estimated 
by FE and 2SLS estimators. After adjustment, a-cyclical and counter-cyclical responses 
become strongly pro-cyclical throughout the sample. Altering actual GDP with potential as 
a scaling factor does not affect the estimated coefficients, so these estimations are omitted 
from the tables. 
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Table 6.10: Estimation of Fiscal Reaction Function – full sample 
 
Estimator FE IV 2SLS AB GMM 
Dependent var capb pb capb pb capb pb 
L.gd 0.0396** 0.0385** 0.0619** 0.0569* 0.0282** 0.0411*** 
lagged debt (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.03) (0.0295) (0.0124) (0.012) 
og -0.2202*** 0.1300* -0.2276*** 0.1238** -0.1863*** 0.0466 
output gap (0.0725) (0.0751) (0.0461) (0.0491) (0.0348) (0.0458) 
gcr -0.0239*** -0.0252*** -0.0260*** -0.0271*** -0.0084 -0.0274*** 
crisis dummy (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0043) 
elec -0.003 -0.0032 -0.003 -0.0029 -0.0007 -0.0002 
election dummy (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0024) 
d_tot 0.0002 0.0003* 
  
0.0003 0.0006* 
change in terms of trade (0.0002) (0.0001) 
  
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
open 0.015 0.0153 
  
0.0051 0.0094 
openness (0.0194) (0.0192) 
  
(0.0104) (0.01) 
pr_inv 0.0072 0.0237 
  
-0.0814 -0.0515 
private investments (0.0844) (0.0888) 
  
(0.0525) (0.0583) 
infl 0.0249 0.027 
  
0.0505*** 0.0236 
inflation (0.0371) (0.0344) 
  
(0.0184) (0.0162) 
L.capb 
    
0.5172*** 
 lagged capb  
    
(0.0664) 
 L.pb 
     
0.5110*** 
lagged pb 
     
(0.0822) 
Cragg-Donald 
  
60.541** 60.541** 
  Hansen J 
  
5.099 5.576 
  AB AR(1) z 
    
-2.58*** -2.65***
AB AR(2) z 
    
0.22 0.36 
No. of Obs. 238 239 229 229 208 210 
R-Squared 0.55 0.54 0.29 0.24 
  Notes: Standard errors in the parenthesis;  
levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Source: own calculation 
 
The baseline estimation is further extended to the subsamples of “good” and “bad” times. 
This kind of approach is similar to Turrini (2008), but differs in definition of good and bad 
times. Turrini (2008) characterized years in which output gap has positive sign as good 
times, an opposite for bad times. Considering the clear cyclicality in economic fluctuations 
prior and following the crisis, I simply define the sub-period of economic expansion 2000-
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2008 as good times, and the sub-period of decline and stagnation 2009-2012 as bad times. 
The results of good and bad times analysis (only for cyclically adjusted values of balance) 
are presented in the Table 6.11. However, good and bad times analysis reveals that strong 
positive response (ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 pp.) of primary balance is observed only in bad 
times, while response seems to be non-systematic and even negative in good times. The 
lack of response in good times is not necessary problematic, under reasonable assumption 
that period of stable or declining debt coincides with economic boom. Effect of automatic 
adjustments seems to be irrelevant for the size and direction of response of primary 
balance to lagged debt. 
 
Table 6.11: Good and Bad Times Analysis 
 
 
capb, IV 2SLS capb, AB GMM 
2000-2008 2009-2012 2000-2008 2009-2012 
L.gd -0.019 0.272*** -0.0057 0.101** 
 
(0.0234) (0.0594) (0.0195) (0.045) 
og -0.384*** -0.2318 -0.217*** -0.1035 
 
(0.0592) (0.2101) (0.0415) (0.0745) 
elec -0.0025 -0.0039 -0.0029 0.0012 
 
(0.0039) (0.0055) (0.0037) (0.0036) 
d_tot 
  
0.0002 0.0004 
 
  
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
open 
  
0.0395*** 0.0232 
 
  
(0.0152) (0.024) 
pr_inv 
  
-0.1919** -0.172** 
 
  
(0.0874) (0.0815) 
infl 
  
0.1114* -0.0012 
 
  
(0.0592) (0.0204) 
L.capb 
  
0.4931*** 0.2580*** 
 
  
(0.0853) (0.0936) 
L.caob 
    
 
    Cragg-Donald 30.483** 5.42
  Hansen J 10.167** 5.738 
  AB AR(1) z 
  
-2.08** -2.07**
AB AR(2) z 
  
0.09 -0.85 
No. of Obs. 137 80 116 80 
R-Squared 0.35 0.32 
  Notes: Standard errors in the parenthesis;  
levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Source: own calculation 
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The good and bad times analysis reveals that pro-cyclical reaction has not been detected in 
bad times, which is opposite to usual finding that fiscal policy is particularly pro-cyclical 
in bad times (Gavin & Perotti 1997; Perotti 2007). On the contrary, pro-cyclical reaction 
was especially pronounced during good times, when increase in the output gap for one 
percentage point was followed by 0.2-0.4 pp. decrease in balance. Term “increase” here 
means that incremental change of output gap is a positive value, and should not be 
confused with term “widening”, which means increase in absolute value of output gap. 
 
Our results on the pro-cyclicality are supported by findings of other studies particularly 
appraising fiscal behavior in the EEC countries, using analytical tools different than FRF. 
Darvas (2010) argues that positive response of government consumption to GDP shock is 
an indicator of pro-cyclical bias in fiscal policy. He estimates SVAR models for 20 EEC 
countries, and finds that impulse responses of government consumption to unexpected 
GDP shocks were pro-cyclical, with a few exceptions. Rahman (2010) estimates the 
relationship between revenues and expenditures with respect to output and domestic 
demand in CEE 10 and Croatia for the period 1995-2007 and provides evidence on pro-
cyclical behavior of revenues, especially pronounced during the years of economic boom 
(2003-2007). The IMF (2012) country-by-country analysis of EEC macroeconomic 
performance also supports view that fiscal behavior in the EEC during the boom years was 
predominantly pro-cyclical, with Hungary as an exception.  
 
The estimated responses of primary to other regressors is mostly in line with the theory. 
The outbreak of the global financial crisis caused a drop in both primary and overall 
balances in 2009. This result holds across various specifications of the estimated FRF. The 
effects of election cycles on balances are negative, as expected, but only occasionally 
significant. Interestingly, Eller & Urvova (2012) obtain similar results in a comprehensive 
treatment of election cycles that uses six election indicators to control for the effects of 
early elections and spending in year preceding election. Fixed effects and Arellano-Bond 
estimations show that none of the economic factors is significant.  
 
6.3.4 Pro-cyclicality discussion 
 
This subsection provides some of the possible explanations of fiscal pro-cyclicality in the 
EEC: 
 
Political economy factors. The political factors are likely to be very important cause of 
pro-cyclical behavior in the EEC. Many of these countries are likely to display a weak 
institutional framework inherited from previous political and economic systems. However, 
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the key difficulty in estimating the impact of political economy factors is to measure the 
prudency of fiscal policy. Alesina et al. (2008) propose the corruption index as an indicator 
of government policy credibility. Although they show a significant association of the 
corruption index and fiscal policy behavior, their index is still an indirect and qualitative 
measurement of government dedication to implement a prudent fiscal policy. For this 
purpose, use of the budget balance forecast errors can make a stronger connection between 
political motivation and economic results. If government is trying to maintain high 
approval rates, it has an incentive to reveal overoptimistic forecasts. In such a case, the 
forecast errors of the budget balance are likely to be higher, especially in good times when 
the fiscal space for excessive deficits is large. Empirical research on this issue is scarce but 
confirms this consideration. Most notably, Frankel (2011a) finds that positive biasness of 
budget balance forecasts is pronounced during good times and pro-cyclical fiscal policies. 
Similar research applied to EEC is a good starting point for further analysis of political 
economy factors and the cyclical response of balances. 
 
Credit constraint argument. This argument is likely to be the least important among 
possible causes of pro-cyclical fiscal policy. To begin with, the perceived riskiness of the 
region was declining during the period from 2003 to 2008 with CDS spreads reaching very 
low levels, see Bakker & Gelde (2010). Secondly, the patterns of emphasized pro-
cyclicality in bad times due to credit constraints in the Latin American countries, see for 
example Gavin & Perotti (1997) or Daude et al. (2010), do not correspond to those 
observed in the EEC. Third, there is no evidence that any of the EEC governments tend to 
over-borrow in the period of prosperity. As shown in Becker et al. (2010), the share of 
government debt to GDP was stable or declining in most of the EEC during the period 
from 2003 to 2008. 
 
Beyond-the-cycle factors. I conjecture that commodity prices are not relevant for the 
EEC. With the exception of Russia, these countries are typically not export-oriented. On 
the contrary, asset prices and output composition are arguably important determinants of 
fiscal behavior in the EEC. The EEC most likely experienced asset prices and absorption 
booms in previous two decades and in particular from 2003 to 2008. In the run up to the 
Global financial crisis, the house prices rose faster in some EEC, especially in the Baltics, 
than in the US, see Walterskirchen (2010). Yet, the correction of balances for automatic 
response to absorption cycle according to existing methodologies, such as IMF (2007) or 
Lendvai, Moulin & Turrini (2011), would be too challenging in the case of the EEC. The 
reason is that there is a large number of required inputs such as budget sensitivity to output 
gap and to absorption gap or the share of indirect revenues. The association of the 
absorption cycle to pro-cyclical policy has been previously documented in the emerging 
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economies, see Dobrescu & Salman (2011), and in the EEC during the pre-crisis years, see 
Rahman (2010) and IMF (2007).  
 
 
6.4. Public debt dynamics forecasting 
 
The basic idea behind debt accumulation forecasting is to model its two main components, 
the interest rate-growth differential and the cyclically adjusted primary balance, separately. 
As discussed, a reason for separation is to account for different types of economic policy 
decisions and different risk factors that drive these debt aggregates. Therefore, the h-step 
ahead point forecast of debt 𝑑𝑇+ℎ  is computed as a sum of h-step ahead forecasts of 
interest rate-growth differential, i.e. the automatic change of debt (1 + 𝑟𝑇+ℎ − 𝑟𝑔𝑇+ℎ), and 
the primary balance 𝑝𝑏𝑡+ℎ  
 
𝑑𝑇+ℎ = (1 + 𝑟𝑇+ℎ − 𝑟𝑔𝑇+ℎ)𝑑𝑇+ℎ−1 − 𝑝𝑏𝑇+ℎ (4.8) 
 
The interest rate growth differential is forecasted using Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
framework along the lines of Celasun, Ostry, and Debrun (2006), whereas the primary 
balance is forecasted using the fiscal reaction function. 
 
Following overall approach of out-of-sample analysis, public debt dynamics is forecasted 
for the period 2013-2017. Since the data time series for some macroeconomic variables in 
Serbia are substantially shorter relative to other peer countries in the EEC 8 sample, and 
thus VAR modeling substantially less reliable, for the sake of this analysis I substitute 
Serbia with Poland within EEC 8 sample. In addition, since back to the beginning of 2013 
macroeconomic data were available only according to the ESA 95, I used dataset denoted 
as DS3, which is basically the same as DS1 in terms of variable coverage but with original 
ESA 95 data. Since ESA 95 has been discontinued after 2013, for the sake of out-of-
sample comparison ESA 2010 data are used, but this should not be an issue for the out-of-
sample analysis because there correlation of the ESA 95 and ESA 2010 data in the 
overlapping period is almost 99%. 
 
6.4.1 VAR-FRF forecasting framework 
 
I propose the following procedure to generate the synthetic debt projections, combining the 
VAR and the FRF framework. The procedure consists of the following building blocks: 
 
1. Estimation of VAR coefficients and Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the reduced-form residuals,  𝚺𝐯𝐯 = 𝑩𝑩
′, for the non-fiscal variables; 
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2. Simulation of the sequence of random vectors {𝒗𝑇+ℎ} up to the forecasting horizon H, 
ℎ = 1, … 𝐻, to generate non-fiscal shocks. Simulations are based on the standard normal 
distribution, 𝒗𝑇+ℎ = 𝑩𝒖𝑇+ℎ, 𝒖𝑇+ℎ~𝑁(0,1). 
 
3. For each simulated sequence of non-fiscal shocks, the values of non-fiscal variables are 
forecasted as  
 
𝑥𝑇+ℎ = 𝑐 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑇−𝑖+ℎ +
𝑝
𝑖=1  𝑣𝑇+ℎ; (4.9) 
 
4. Modeling of cyclically-adjusted primary balance’ response to output gap and lagged 
public debt, using the FRF setup as given in equation (4.5); 
 
5. For each simulated path of forecasted non-fiscal variables, the cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance and debt increment and are simultaneously computed in recursive manner, 
up to the forecasting horizon H: 
 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑇+ℎ = 𝛤𝑖,𝑇+ℎ + 𝛽𝑑𝑖,𝑇+ℎ−1 + 𝛾𝑜𝑔𝑖,𝑇+ℎ + 𝛿𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑇+ℎ−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑇+ℎ; (4.10) 
 
𝑑𝑇+ℎ
𝑝
− 𝑑𝑇+ℎ−4
𝑝
=
𝑟𝑇+ℎ−𝜋𝑇+ℎ(1+𝑟𝑔𝑇+ℎ
𝑝
)−𝑟𝑔𝑇+ℎ
𝑝
(1+𝑟𝑔
𝑇+ℎ
𝑝
)(1+𝜋𝑇+ℎ)
𝑑𝑇+ℎ−4
𝑝
− 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑇+ℎ . (4.11) 
 
The debt accumulation equation is specified to fit annualized quarterly data used in the 
sample. Calibration of the predetermined response of primary balance 𝛤𝑖,𝑇+ℎ  under the 
different assumptions on fiscal policy actions is further discussed in the following sections.  
 
Having the primary balance separately modeled, the VAR modeling is reduced to non-
fiscal variables that enters the DAE: 
 
𝑥𝑡 = {𝑟𝑡, 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
, ∆𝑓𝑥𝑡, 𝜋𝑡} (4.12) 
 
It corresponds to the selection of explanatory variables in empirical model estimated in the 
third chapter. My specification is close to Celasun et al. (2006), but distinctive in several 
ways. First, I use implied interest rate which eliminates the need to have both domestic and 
foreign interest rates in the model. Second, I bring back inflation to the VAR, having found 
that inflation has significant influence on public debt dynamic in panel regression 
modeling.  In addition, I substitute actual with potential GDP growth rate, following the 
model shifts from actual to structural values.  
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6.4.2 Unit root testing 
 
The theory of multivariate time-series modeling approves the use of the basic VAR 
approach only if all the model variables follow the weak stationary stochastic process. I 
discuss and analyze the issues of stationarity and unit root testing related to panel 
regressions in the third chapter. The unit root tests in panel regressions consider the null 
that all panels are non-stationary against the alternative that some panels are stationary. 
While this may work for the requirements of the panel regression, the VAR modeling on 
the country level requires more rigorous testing of the stationarity of individual time-series. 
 
To examine the univariate stationarity of the time-series, I use the two alternatives: the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Zivot-Andrews (ZA) test. The former test is 
the most frequently used test in the time-series analysis and here I apply it as the primary 
unit root test. The latter test provides more reliable inference on stationarity of time-series 
in the presence of structural breaks and I apply it whenever a time-series is suspected to 
exhibit a structural break according to the figures presented in the previous chapter. I 
report the results of the unit root testing in the Table 6.12.   
 
Table 6.12: Non-fiscal variables unit root tests for EEC 8 
 
 
𝑟𝑡 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
 ∆𝑓𝑥𝑡  𝜋𝑡  
 
break 
 
stat break stat break stat break stat 
BGR no 
 
-1.541** 2008Q2, interc. -5.123** no -2.062** no -0.98 
HRV no 
 
-2.786*** 2007Q4,  interc. -5.293*** no -2.975*** 2009Q3, interc. -5.66*** 
CZE no 
 
-1.778** 2005Q1, both -5.52** no -2.365** no -1.528* 
HUN no 
 
-1.897** 2007Q1, interc. -4.449* no -3.029*** no -1.615** 
POL no 
 
-1.331* 2005Q3, both -5.023** no -2.729*** no -3.114*** 
ROU no 
 
-3.539*** 2008Q1,  interc. -5.342*** no -2.372** no -2.999*** 
SVK no 
 
-2.561*** 2008Q1,  interc. -4.625* no -2.386** no -2.679*** 
SVN no 
 
-2.372** 2008Q2, both -4.778* no -2.527*** no -0.685 
Note: ZA test reported if break exists, otherwise ADF is reported 
Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
Results of unit root tests show that most of the variables are stationary at least at 0.1 level 
of significance. The exceptions are inflation rates for Bulgaria and Slovenia, where the 
ADF test failed to reject the null. Yet, only two isolated cases are not regarded as a matter 
of particular concern for the general reliability of the VAR estimations. The ZE test 
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properly identifies time points in which breaks occurred, most of them being inside crisis 
window.  
 
6.4.3 Estimation results 
 
The lag order in the VAR is typically determined endogenously according to some 
information criterion (Akaike, Swartz). Yet, having a limited number of observations per 
time-series (33 for Croatia and 52 for other countries in the sample), we opt for the second 
lag order of VAR to preserve the degrees of freedom. In that case, each equation in the 
VAR contains nine unknown parameters. Here we report only the R-squared coefficients 
of single equations across countries (Table 6.13). 
 
Table 6.13: Explanatory power of estimated VAR models 
 
Country 𝒓𝒕 𝒓𝒈𝒕
𝒑
 ∆𝒇𝒙𝒕 𝝅𝒕 
BGR 0.82 0.92 0.78 0.90 
HRV 0.64 0.99 0.80 0.97 
CZE 0.89 0.98 0.82 0.94 
HUN 0.98 0.93 0.69 0.91 
POL 0.95 0.92 0.73 0.88 
ROU 0.93 0.94 0.76 0.99 
SVK 0.92 0.96 0.88 0.94 
SVN 0.98 0.98 0.70 0.98 
Average 0.89 0.95 0.77 0.94 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
The explanatory power of the estimated VAR equations is considerably high, never falling 
below 64% (case of Croatian interest rate). Considering the simple average of R-squared 
across equations, change in real effective exchange rate and implied interest rate seems to 
be slightly less explained by the estimated VAR(2) models, while share of explained 
variations in potential real growth and inflation are a bit higher reaching 95%. 
 
I proceed with the forecasting exercise as follows. First, I specify the scenarios and 
calibrate the inputs. Then, I compute the point forecasts and compare them to benchmark 
actual values.  
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Scenario setup and FRF calibration 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the DSA analysis typically starts with the definition 
of a baseline scenario and several alternative scenarios of macroeconomic development. In 
our VAR-FRF framework, the dynamics of non-fiscal variables are endogenously 
determined by the VAR forecasting outcomes, so that discrete scenarios are limited to 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance, which is indeed the most exogenous determinant of 
public debt. Baseline and alternative scenarios are specified by calibrating the pre-
determined and random components of FRF as  
 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑖,𝑇+ℎ = 𝛤𝑖,𝑇+ℎ + 𝛽𝑑𝑖,𝑇+ℎ−1 + 𝛾𝑜𝑔𝑖,𝑇+ℎ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑇+ℎ; 
𝛤𝑖,𝑇+ℎ = Xi,T+ℎθ + 𝜆𝑖,𝑇+ℎ 
 
This effectively means that FRF inputs 𝛤𝑖,𝑇+ℎ, 𝜆𝑖,𝑇+ℎ and 𝜀𝑖,𝑇+ℎ need to be calibrated. I saw 
in the FRF estimation results that effects of control variables Xi,T+ℎ  do not play an 
important role in determining the balance, so there is no need to make dynamic calibration 
of this input. Instead, I suppose that it is fixed and equal to the historical average of 𝛤𝑖,𝑡 
obtained from the FRF estimation for each country in the sample. In a similar fashion, I 
suppose that random shock  𝜀𝑖,𝑇+ℎ  follows the normal distribution  𝜀𝑖,𝑡~𝑁(0, ?̂?𝜀𝑖
2 ) in the 
Monte Carlo simulations, whereas ?̂?𝜀𝑖
2  is estimated from the FRF country-specific 
regression residuals. Calibration of future fiscal policy actions is more peculiar, being a 
forward-looking concept that cannot be determined based on historical data. To preserve 
the notion of generality in the analysis, I prefer to use the country-specific 
recommendations from the European Commission on fiscal policy available in 2012, rather 
than look for the policy actions into country-specific fiscal policy documents. As 
previously mentioned, the EEC countries were subject to Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP) due to their high deficits (mostly) in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
Proposed measures before 2013 by the EC to reduce deficits are summarized in Table 6.14.  
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Table 6.14: Excessive deficit procedure in EEC 
 
Country EDP launched EDP abrogated 
Proposed measures of 
deficit reduction 
BGR 06.07.2010 22.06.2012 at least 0.75 pp 
HRV 10.12.2013 12.06.2017 Not applicable 
CZE 11.11.2009 20.06.2014 1pp 
HUN 24.06.2004 21.06.2013 1pp  
POL 24.06.2009 19.06.2015 1.25pp 
ROU 24.06.2009 21.06.2013 1.25pp 
SVK 11.11.2009 20.06.2014 1 pp 
SVN 11.11.2009 17.06.2016 0.75pp 
 
Source: European Commission website 
 
Most of the EDP were abrogated during the forecast period, except for Croatia, where the 
EDP was launched in 2013. Size of the proposed reduction of deficit during the EDP 
averaged 1 percentage point of GDP, and therefore I calibrate 𝜆𝑖,𝑇+ℎ to be equal to that 
number. Note that Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary were already on the EDP exit by the 
end of 2012. In these cases, I calibrate 𝜆𝑖,𝑇+ℎ to be equal to zero. In case of Croatia, I set it 
also to zero, because the country was not an EU member in 2012. 
 
Described calibrations of  𝛤𝑖,𝑇+ℎ , 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  and 𝜆𝑖,𝑇+ℎ  together with the estimated regression 
coefficients 𝛽  and 𝛾  from the FRF full-sample regression represent the set of baseline 
scenario inputs. I use the regression coefficients obtained by AB estimator, being arguably 
more reliable than FE or IV options. The two alternative scenarios consider pure pro-
cyclical fiscal response (𝛽 restricted to zero) and pure debt-stabilizing fiscal response (𝛾 
restricted to zero). Being aware of the uniqueness of the analyzed period related to strong 
economic cyclicality, I also prefer using the coefficients from the full-sample FRF rather 
than good times/bad times estimation in the alternative scenarios. Indeed, the response of 
the primary balance to debt in bad times is close to 0.1. Such estimate can produce 
oversized forecasts of fiscal response to debt in countries where public debt-to-GDP ratio 
is relatively high.  
 
Finally, the estimation of the fiscal response requires contemporaneous values of real 
output gap, which are not produced by the VAR forecasts. A possible solution is to 
substitute the potential with the actual real growth rate, use the forecasted actual rates to 
project real GDP, and then filter it using HP to get potential real GDP. However, fiscal 
policy decisions are rather driven by forward looking growth expectations, so I decide to 
use GDP forecasts instead of the historical-based estimations. To this end, I use the IMF 
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World Economic Outlook forecasts of GDP being representative source of mainstream 
growth expectations, available by the end of 2012 to keep the consistency with the 
forecasting strategy. These forecasts (Table 6.15) are available only in annual frequency, 
but I assume constant annualized quarterly growth rates equal to annual forecast. 
 
Table 6.15: The IMF real growth forecasts in 2012   
 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 
BGR 1.500 2.500 3.500 4.500 
HRV 0.953 1.500 2.000 2.500 
CZE 0.785 2.801 3.411 3.409 
HUN 0.797 1.553 1.651 1.706 
POL 2.050 2.716 3.108 3.428 
ROU 2.476 3.005 3.316 3.519 
SVK 2.800 3.600 3.600 3.600 
SVN -0.358 1.713 2.080 2.303 
 
Source: the WEO, October 2012 
  
6.4.4. Point forecasts   
 
Point forecasts typically represent the output of deterministic forecasting such as the IMF 
DSA methodology. They describe the central tendency of the variable dynamics without 
the information about the confidence interval.  In this section, I provide a country-
overview of public debt point forecasts and their out-of-sample performance in the 
medium run. To this end, I use ESA 2010 time-series of actual public debt and the IMF 
forecasts by the end of 2012 as the comparison benchmark. The evolution of public debt 
up to last quarter in 2016 is presented in Figure 6.6.  
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Figure 6.6: Public debt in EEC (% of GDP), 2001-2016 
Source: ECB Data warehouse, retrieved in July 2017 
 
When the global financial crisis broke out, most EECs experienced a rise in deficits and 
debts. The amount of public debt relative to GDP stabilized without endangering the fiscal 
solvency. However, it remained relatively high in some countries. The main purpose of 
comparing the medium-run forecasts to the actual data is to assess whether the central 
tendency of forecasted public dynamics has been confirmed by the trends in the actual 
data. Additionally, the IMF forecasts (Table 6.16) are included to assess the accuracy of 
the model forecasts. 
 
Table 6.16: the IMF public debt forecasts in 2012 
 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 
BGR 16.38 18.40 15.26 13.63 
HRV 57.02 59.43 61.29 62.66 
CZE 44.96 45.63 45.74 45.72 
HUN 74.24 75.35 75.86 76.32 
POL 55.34 55.05 54.61 53.43 
ROU 34.46 33.69 32.90 32.09 
SVK 47.22 47.63 48.05 48.38 
SVN 57.45 58.69 59.22 59.13 
 
Source: the WEO, October 2012 
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I produce point forecasts of public debt up to 2016 for each country under the baseline 
(denoted B), pro-cyclical (denoted A1) and debt-stabilizing (denoted A2) scenarios. It 
turns out that, due to the narrow output gaps in observed forecasting period, baseline and 
A2 scenarios produce very close values. Therefore, I do not report the A2 scenario in the 
medium-run analysis. It is also important to mention that I smoothed the forecasted values 
using moving averages to emphasize the tendency of dynamic evolution. I roughly 
categorized the eight point forecasts to those being “more” accurate (Figure 6.7) and those 
being “less” accurate (Figure 6.8). No formal criterion is applied to rank the accuracy of 
the forecasts, but a simple visual match with the actual data and with the IMF forecasts.  
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Figure 6.7: “More” accurate model point forecasts (Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovak R) 
Source: own calculation 
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Figure 6.8: “Less” accurate model point forecasts (Hungary, Croatia, Czech, Slovenia)  
Source: own calculation 
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The first thing to notice is that A1 scenario always produces higher public debt forecasts 
than the baseline, so it can be characterized as a risky scenario of debt-neglecting fiscal 
reaction. Secondly, both IMF and our forecasts fail to match closely the actual values of 
public debt, indicating that impact of debt-deficit adjustments on debt dynamic was high 
after 2012, too. Third, the forecasted value of public debt from either baseline or A1 
scenario tends to slightly increase over horizon, the case of Poland being an exception. 
Fourth, discrepancy between actual and forecasted values tends to increase over the 
forecasting horizon, but not necessarily; for example, in case of Poland it narrows over 
time. Furthermore, the model forecasts are at least as accurate in levels as the IMF 
benchmark, except in case of Hungary. Even in the group of less accurate forecasts, the 
divergence between model forecasts and the actual debt levels never gets dramatically 
high. The exception is Hungary, where there is an obvious and growing divergence 
between the forecasted debt and the actual debt dynamics. Bottom line, none of the 
forecasted debt dynamics in the EECs signals unsustainable debt paths and potential 
insolvencies in the medium run. 
 
Debt sustainability assessment using stochastic debt simulations 
 
In this section, I combine stochastic debt simulations with the key concepts in conducting a 
more explicit analysis of debt sustainability assessment, the stress testing and the debt 
threshold. The notion of the stress testing in deterministic DSA is already discussed. The 
alternative scenarios are typically applied to assess the public debt dynamics assuming 
some moderate changes in macroeconomic environment or policy reactions. On the other 
hand, the stress testing captures the effects of extremely unfavorable moves in 
macroeconomic variables on future debt trajectories, which are more likely to seriously 
deteriorate the fiscal solvency and trigger a default.  
 
6.4.5 Stochastic forecasts 
 
A point forecast indicates the most likely public debt trajectory, but does not indicate the 
risk of debt being higher or lower than the expected value. Deterministic stress testing 
provides some extremely detrimental debt trajectories, but does not report probability of 
their occurrence. In the context of stochastic dynamic forecasting, point forecast of a given 
variable is usually accompanied with upper and lower bands of interval confidence that 
capture 95% of the possible forecast realizations. Such approach is not suitable in the case 
of our VAR-FRF forecasting framework, which combines the two sources of uncertainty, 
non-fiscal and fiscal shocks. Monte Carlo simulations are plausible solution to overcome 
this issue and produce a distribution of possible debt outcomes across the forecast horizon. 
I run 10,000 simulations using the VAR-FRF framework to produce probability 
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distribution of debt outcomes for each country, for both baseline and A1 scenario. 
Simulations are computed in Matlab R2012b, and the Matlab code is supplied in Appendix 
B. The outcomes of the simulation are presented in the figures 6.9 – 6.16. 
 
 
Figure 6.9a BGR, Stochastic forecast of public debt, baseline scenario  
Source: own calculation 
 
 
Figure 6.9b: BGR, Stochastic forecast of public debt, alternative scenario  
Source: own calculation 
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Figure 6.10a HRV, Stochastic forecast of public debt, baseline scenario  
Source: own calculation 
 
 
Figure 6.10b HRV, Stochastic forecast of public debt, alternative scenario  
Source: own calculation 
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Figure 6.11a CZE, Stochastic forecast of public debt, baseline scenario  
Source: own calculation 
 
 
Figure 6.11b CZE, Stochastic forecast of public debt, alternative scenario  
Source: own calculation 
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Figure 6.12a HUN, Stochastic forecast of public debt, baseline scenario  
Source: own calculation 
 
 
Figure 6.12b HUN, Stochastic forecast of public debt, alternative scenario  
Source: own calculation 
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Figure 6.14a POL, Stochastic forecast of public debt, baseline scenario  
Source: own calculation 
 
 
Figure 6.14b POL, Stochastic forecast of public debt, alternative scenario  
Source: own calculation 
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Figure 6.14a ROU, Stochastic forecast of public debt, baseline scenario  
Source: own calculation 
 
 
Figure 6.14b ROU, Stochastic forecast of public debt, alternative scenario  
Source: own calculation 
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Figure 6.15a SVK, Stochastic forecast of public debt, baseline scenario  
Source: own calculation 
 
 
 
Figure 6.15b SVK, Stochastic forecast of public debt, alternative scenario  
Source: own calculation 
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Figure 6.16a SVN, Stochastic forecast of public debt, baseline scenario 
Source: own calculation 
 
 
Figure 6.16b SVN, Stochastic forecast of public debt, alternative scenario 
Source: own calculation 
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Fan charts are popular way to present the probabilistic properties of simulated random 
outcomes, as they provide an intuitive depiction of probability density function. At the 
same time, the simulations provide an indirect stress testing, as the outcome values in the 
highest quintile describe the most extreme debt trajectories forecasted by the model, which 
probability of realization is less than 5 per cent. As both non-fiscal and fiscal shocks are 
drawn from normal distribution, density function of debt outcome is also bell-shaped. In 
set of our figures it is a bit distorted at the beginning and ending of forecast period, due to 
the smoothing of the forecasted debt trajectories.  
 
The range of simulated debt trajectories across countries is relatively narrow, roughly 5 
percentage points above and below the median. To assess the country-by-country debt 
sustainability (as in Eller & Urvova, 2012), I compare the simulated debt forecasts to the 
assumed 60% debt-to-GDP ratio being generic threshold for the emerging countries (and 
the Maastricht criterion, too).  
 
1. Bulgaria: debt is stable and considerably lower than the threshold under any 
constellations of shocks and scenarios – low risk of unsustainability; 
2. Croatia: debt-to-GDP exceeded 60% even at the start of forecasting period with 
tendency of further growth – high risk of unsustainable debt; 
3. Czech Republic: under some constellation of shocks and scenarios debt-to-GDP can 
come close to the threshold, but risk is estimated to be low; 
4. Hungary: debt-to-GDP was already far above the threshold and under some 
constellation of shocks and A1 scenario even can come close to 100% - high risk of 
unsustainability; 
5. Poland: debt-to-GDP exceeded the threshold in risky scenario, but remained close to 60% 
- moderate risk of unsustainability; 
6. Romania: debt is stable and lower than the threshold under any constellations of shocks 
and scenarios – low risk of unsustainability; 
7. Slovak Republic: debt-to-GDP has may come very close to the threshold, but even in 
case of the most extreme outcomes remains lower than 60% - moderate risk of 
unsustainability; 
8. Slovenia: debt-to-GDP tends to steadily increase over the 60% threshold – moderate 
risk of unsustainability. 
 
I also compare our results to the work of Eller & Urvova (2012), see Figure 4.12. They 
provide a DSA under the similar VAR-FRF approach to produce stochastic simulations of 
debt paths in a 5-year forecasting period from 2011 to 2016, but limit their scope of 
countries only to Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic. I compare the 
outcomes of baseline scenarios only. 
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Figure 6.17 – Comparison of our results with Eller & Urvova (2012) 
Source: own calculation and Eller & Urvova (2012) 
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The forecasted debt trajectories in Eller & Urvova (2012) seem to be close to the median 
values of our simulations. Nevertheless, the distributions of possible outcomes in Eller & 
Urvova (2012) are considerably wider. The difference is most likely given by the different 
methods of FRF estimation: in the case of Eller & Urvova (2012), the estimated residuals 
from the FRF regression seem to produce higher values of country-specific standard 
deviations and consequently higher values of calibrated fiscal shock. 
 
Summarizing all the results of the from the FRF estimation and debt dynamics forecasting 
using VAR-FRF framework, three exceptionally important conclusions can be 
emphasized: 
 
1. There is no evidence that stochastic VAR-FRF estimation outperforms deterministic 
approach used by the IMF. Out-of-sample analysis indicates single-point baseline forecasts 
made by the stochastic VAR-FRF are very close to the IMF baseline. Consequently, only 
in three out of eight considered cases VAR-FRF forecasts clearly outperformed those of 
the IMF.  
 
2. Primary balance is found to respond positively to the lagged government debt, and 
response seems to be stable regardless of structural adjustment. According to standard 
interpretation of model-based fiscal policy assessment, this is seen as an evidence of 
responsible behavior of EEC governments with respect to its inter-temporal budget 
constraint. However, additional analysis reveals that positive response of balance to lagged 
debt may be weaker than it seems at the first glance. Good and bad times analysis suggests 
that cyclically-adjusted primary and overall balance reacted positively to debt only after 
the crisis outbreak. This finding confirms validity of the hypothesis H3, that positive 
response of primary balance to accumulated debt is indeed condition for maintaining fiscal 
sustainability 
 
3. Direct comparison of the projected public debt dynamics under the baseline scenario and 
scenario of the pro-cyclical response for the EEC 8 sample clearly demonstrates that pro-
cyclical response of the primary balance leads to a considerably higher levels of debt-to-
GDP ratio relative to baseline forecasts. Except for Bulgaria wherein public indebtedness 
is apparently, difference between single point forecasts of pro-cyclical and baseline 
scenario at the end of forecasting period ranges between five to ten percentage points. In 
addition, confidence interval of the debt forecasts obtained under A1 is apparently 
narrower than in case of baseline.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Main research results 
 
By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, many small open economies have 
experienced spillovers from one of the worst crises that ever hit economic activity on the 
global level. One of the most important lessons which have been learned in the aftermath 
of the crisis is that records of macroeconomic variables’ actual values may not be the best 
choice of fiscal policy metrics in times of sizable economic fluctuations. 
 
The Emerging European Countries were among those that were most heavily damaged 
since their strong economic momentum was suddenly interrupted and reversed down to the 
point of recession. Stylized facts on cyclicality and indebtedness of EEC clearly illustrate 
that point: prior to crisis, public debt was on the path of decline, but declining trend 
abruptly overturned whereas policymakers were struggling to recover economic growth by 
means of fiscal and monetary policy. Eventually, low initial values of the public debt in 
EEC relative to their advanced counterparts saved the day; precautionary Excessive Deficit 
Procedure was launched in most of EEC EU member states and it seems that fiscal 
sustainability has restored in the region after days of recession have been gone. 
 
Disguised fiscal vulnerabilities in EEC were disclosed shortly after the crisis outbreak, and 
actual macroeconomic records prior to the crisis have to be blamed for a blurred image of 
real fiscal conditions. With this reflection in mind, this thesis put a serious attempt to shift 
the paradigm of making fiscal policy decisions toward application of the structural fiscal 
metrics. To this end, standard methodological approach of VAR-FRF based public debt 
modeling and forecasting is adjusted to reflect structural or at least cyclically-adjusted 
indebtedness rather than actually observed. The introduction of the version of VAR-FRF 
stochastic framework based on potential GDP and structural fiscal stance represents the 
most important result in terms of contribution to the fiscal sustainability assessment.  
 
The empirical research is mostly organized to follow research hypotheses Descriptive 
analysis of debt decomposition for EEC 8 (including Serbia) imposes that debt-deficit 
adjustments and CA primary balance as the fiscal variables are the most important 
contributors of public debt dynamics. Up to my best knowledge, specification of the 
regression model that empirically estimate the impact of the debt determinants on the 
dynamics of public indebtedness was not use in existing empirical studies. The results of 
both descriptive and econometric analysis on relations between debt and its determinants 
provide enough evidence in favor of H1 and H2 acceptance. Yet, it is also important to 
mention that validity of H2 holds with no ambiguity only in case when change in structural 
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indebtedness is dependent variable, which is another result in support of appropriateness to 
use structural measure of fiscal stance in debt sustainability analysis.  
 
The estimation of the FRF using CAPB is also one of the oddities of research in this thesis 
since most of the comparable research use actual primary balance values. The findings that 
after cyclical adjustment reaction of primary balance to output gape turns to be strongly 
pro-cyclical is regarded as valuable empirical result Good and bad time analysis shows that 
pro-cyclicality is emphasized in good times when output gaps are positive, though in bad 
times response is a-cyclical. Eventually, the combined results of the empirical analysis 
related to the VAR-FRF framework of fiscal sustainability assessment supported the 
validity of the H3 and H4 hypotheses. 
 
Beside empirical results that are utilized for the research hypotheses testing, out-of-sample 
exercise give profound overall value added to empirical research in this thesis, being the 
first of such type up to my best knowledge. The lack of evidence that methodological 
complexity of VAR-FRF modeling does not bring expected value added in terms of 
forecasting accuracy (at least for the given countries and time covered by the sample), in 
support of the contemplation of Adams et al. (2010) that “it is frequently argued that fiscal 
sustainability analysis is more of an art than a science”. In light of VAR-FRF failure, 
simple deterministic approach such as MTDS cost-risk analysis that has been applied in 
case of Serbia may provide more reliable results, at least because it utilizes information 
about public debt portfolio structure. 
 
7.2 Research implications to fiscal policy 
 
Despite tremendous advances in statistics, econometrics, financial engineering, 
computational sciences and IT solutions, the global crisis was an ultimate surprise. The 
bottom line of the out-of-sample empirical analysis in this thesis can be interpreted in 
terms of very trivial common knowledge - the future is very hard to predict, despite all 
methodological and technical advances in forecasting practice. Following this remark, 
instead of speeding up the pace of development toward more and more complex analytical 
frameworks, policymakers can be better off by simply putting more focus on what turns to 
be crucial for the still-standing during the bad times, that is minimizing risk exposures by 
minimizing macroeconomic and fiscal vulnerabilities. More specifically, several 
recommendations on precautionary activities to fiscal policymakers are suggested: 
 
Targeting structural values of balance and its components. Empirical findings in this 
thesis illustrated that overwhelming reliance on the fiscal policy on actual values can be 
quite misleading, especially when cyclicality of balance response is regarded. While 
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computing structural balances with respect to cycle, beyond-the-cycle and one-offs in 
standardized manner for a panel of countries can be profoundly challenging tasks, country-
specific estimations are more likely achievable tasks for the fiscal authorities due to greater 
data availability and better insight in national practices of creative public accounting. Thus, 
governments are recommended to regularly appraise and project structural fiscal indicators 
in regard to different scenarios of macroeconomic forecasts and give more weight to such 
indicators in designing the long-term fiscal policy targets.  
 
Application of fiscal rules to structural targets. The application of fiscal rules to actual 
values of budget components may not always be a good solution. Koen and Nord (2005) 
provide evidence that even advanced countries, when faced more binding fiscal rules, tend 
to exploit one-offs and creative accounting to create fiscal gimmicks. Similar results are 
presented by Frankel (2011a), who finds that if country is subject to a fiscal rule (like SGP) 
official forecasts tend to be more biased and more pro-cyclical. Coricelli and Ercolani 
(2002) also noted that application of SGP criterion for budget deficit is not appropriate for 
new EU member states with pro-cyclical fiscal stance and proposes modified rule based on 
structural deficit. According to Frankel (2011b), Chile was the first country that uses 
structural deficit as target (corrected for copper which is Chile’ main export product) to 
fight pro-cyclicality and it has shown as highly successful strategy. Indeed, research of 
Bova et al. (2014) provides empirical evidence that targeting a cyclically-adjusted balance 
as opposed to the headline balance tends to improve the stabilizing properties of the rule in 
emerging economies. 
 
Greater reliance on the early warning vulnerability indicators. Vulnerabilities in 
private sector like absorption booms and asset price bubbles result in large temporary 
components of budget items, especially on the revenue side. Thus, indicator that tracks 
differences between standard cyclically-adjusted balance and structural balance can be 
useful tool for early warning that some beyond-the-cycle factor is affecting fiscal stance. 
 
Making the public familiar with the idea of the concept counter-cyclical policy. As 
mentioned, the public typically makes judgments on effectiveness of the fiscal policy 
based on actual values of macroeconomic variables and often does not understand notion 
of structural values and necessity of counter-cyclical policy. The government may use 
means of public information to advocate successful stories of counter-cyclical policies, like 
case of Chile (Frankel, 2011b), to avoid loss of rating in good times. 
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7.3 Limitations and recommendations for further research 
 
The most important limitations of the research are stemming from not addressing other 
drawbacks identified in the review of the existing literature, apart from the out-of-sample 
performance. This also imposes some directions for future research: 
 
Substantial redefining of the SVAR identification. Since SVAR modeling is added into 
the IMF DSA methodology, Cholesky decomposition has been routinely applied as an 
SVAR identification scheme, with the arbitrary ordering of the variables. The introduction 
of some identification schemes based on the theoretical ground may the good start in 
improving effectiveness of the VAR-FRF forecasting framework. 
 
Use of alternative VAR specifications. As in the previous case, almost all applications of 
VAR-FRF framework in empirical analysis of the debt sustainability uses the same 
specification of the VAR model. More particularly, VAR specification only consists of the 
debt determinants. Empirical experimenting with some alternative VAR specifications may 
turn to be beneficial for the strengthening of the forecasting power. 
 
Novel approach to fiscal sustainability assessment based on endogenously determined 
country-specific debt threshold. The basic VAR-FRF analytical framework is only 
capable of producing stochastic simulations of the possible debt paths under 
macroeconomic shocks. The only way to explicitly compute default probabilities will 
require the use of some arbitrarily chosen debt threshold, like 60% Maastricht criterion. 
Yet, one-size-fits-all approach may not be the best solution and introduction of country-
specific debt threshold will be important methodological advance. 
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Appendix A: Data description and sources 
 
According to existing regulation (Council Regulation 479/2009), EU member states are 
obliged to report so-called the EDP notification tables twice per year (31 March and 30 
September to the European Commission, which is in charge of collecting and providing 
data to European Council for the Excessive Deficit Procedure. The EDP notification tables 
consist the data on actual and planned deficits, level of government debt, and also the link 
between net lending/borrowing (i.e. deficit) and change of public debt.  
 
Data on public debt of EU member states included in our sample are mostly available on 
quarterly and annual levels. I use the European Central Bank as a primary source of data 
on public debt and other relevant government balance items, due to the comprehensiveness 
of coverage of government finance statistics obtained by the centralization of collected 
data from the other sources (National Central Banks, National Statistical Institutes, 
Eurostat)37. Basically, two quarterly and annually datasets related to public debt statistics 
are provided by the ECB, one denoted as “Government Statistics - GST” and second as 
“Government Finance Statistics - GFS”. The GST is the older dataset based on ESA 95 
framework while the GFS is the newer dataset based on ESA 2010. In addition to these 
two datasets, the ECB also provides annual data on public debt reported by the European 
Commission from the EDP tables, which is denoted as EDP dataset. The following table 
summarizes main features of these three datasets: 
 
                                                        
37 As explained on the website of ECB, “The ECB collects the annual government finance statistics (GFS) on 
individual countries directly from the National Central Banks (NCBs) The ECB receives the quarterly non-
financial accounts data from the individual countries via Eurostat. Quarterly financial accounts for general 
government and quarterly Maastricht debt are received directly from the national compilers (NSIs or 
NCBs).” 
 
  
 
 
Available datasets on government debt in EU countries 
 
Dataset GST GFS EDP 
Framework ESA 95 ESA 2010 
Excessive deficit 
procedure 
Frequency Annual, quarterly Annual, quarterly Annual 
Source 
NCBs for annual, 
Eurostat for quarterly 
NCBs for annual, 
Eurostat for quarterly 
European Commission 
Public debt definition 
Maastricht, in line 
with ESA 95 
provisions on financial 
liabilities 
Maastricht, in line 
with ESA 2010 
provisions on financial 
liabilities 
Maastricht, in line 
with ESA 2010 
provisions on financial 
liabilities 
Typical coverage of 
annual data 
1995-2013, 
disconnected since 
2014 
1995-ongoing, the 
most recent available 
2014 
2011-ongoing, the 
most recent available 
2014 
Typical coverage of 
quarterly data 
2000Q1–2014Q1, 
disconnected since 
2014Q2 
2000Q1– ongoing, the 
most recent available  
 
Unit 
Nominal value at 
national currency, % 
of GDP 
Nominal value at 
national currency, % 
of GDP 
Nominal value at 
national currency, % 
of GDP 
 
Source: the ECB website, retrieved at October 2015. 
 
 
The main dataset used in this work denoted as DS1, is based on the quarterly data on 
primary balance, interest paid, gross government consolidated debt, and nominal and real 
growth retrieved from the ECB according to ESA 2010. The auxiliary dataset DS2 used in 
estimating the FRF is based on annual macroeconomic data from the World Economic 
Outlook Database of the IMF. The auxiliary dataset DS3 used in out-of-sample analysis 
and it mirrors DS1, but with ESA 95 data. 
 
 
Dataset DS1 – annualized quarterly data, ECB 
 
The dataset DS1 is derived following the DAE. The general form of the debt accumulation 
equation, as provided in Chapters 2 and 3, assumes the annual frequency of the data 
observations in the empirical analysis. As I work with quarterly observations of annualized 
data, proper form of the DAE (in terms of potential GDP) is: 
 
𝑑𝑡
𝑝
− 𝑑𝑡−1
𝑝
=
𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝) − 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
(1 + 𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝)(1 + 𝜋𝑡)
𝑑𝑡−1
𝑝
−  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑡
𝑝
− 𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑝
+ 𝑑𝑑𝑡
𝑝
, 
  
 
 
 
where time index t refers to quarter instead of year, and the time series consists of quarterly 
observations of annualized data. In order to provide such time series, I made some 
transformations of the raw dataset to assure the correspondence of annualized flow 
variables with stock variables, which is explained in detail in the rest of this section. 
 
Basically, I use three types of variables: pure flow variables, pure stock variables and 
combination of the flow and stock variables (shares in GDP). The frequency of all 
variables is quarterly. Superscript Q refers to quarterly (three-month) values of pure flow 
variables. Otherwise, variables are either annualized flow variables (rolling sum of current 
and previous three quarters), stock variables or combination of stock variables and 
annualized values of flow variables.  
 
The first step in data transformation is getting the missing quarterly observations of time 
series that can be fully derived from the raw dataset, more precisely nominal current GDP, 
overall government balance, equation value of the public debt and debt-deficit adjustment. 
I compute quarterly time series of GDP in nominal terms of the national currency (at 
market prices) using absolute and relative corresponding values of the primary balance: 
 
𝑌𝑡
𝑄 =
𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑄
𝑝𝑏𝑡
𝑄 , 
 
Further, by subtraction of the interest payment from the primary balance, I obtain quarterly 
values of the overall government balance  
 
𝑂𝐵𝑡
𝑄 = 𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑄 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝑄, 
 
calculate equation values of the government debt as given by the debt accumulation 
equation 
 
𝐷𝑡
∗ = 𝐷𝑡−1 − 𝑂𝐵𝑡
𝑄 , 
 
and then compute quarterly values of debt-deficit adjustment 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑡
𝑄 = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡
∗. 
 
Eventually, as values of the potential GDP are needed, I use filters to obtain quarterly 
observations of the potential nominal GDP 𝑌𝑡
𝑝,𝑄
.  
 
  
 
 
Annualized values of all flow variables 𝑍𝑡  (primary balance 𝑃𝐵𝑡 , overall government 
balance 𝑂𝐵𝑡 , actual nominal GDP 𝑌𝑡 , potential nominal GDP 𝑌𝑡
𝑝
,  real GDP 𝑅𝑌𝑡, 
government revenue 𝑅𝑡 ,  government expenditure 𝐺𝑡,  interest payment 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡,   and debt-
deficit adjustment 𝐷𝐷𝑡) are obtained as a rolling sum of the current and the three previous 
quarterly observations, 
 
𝑍𝑡 = ∑ 𝑍𝑗
𝑄
𝑡
𝑗=𝑡−3
. 
 
Once the annualized quarterly observations of the time series in absolute terms are 
computed, I proceed to the next step of getting the relevant inputs for computation of 
interest – growth differential. These include the following annualized rates: implied 
interest rate, inflation rate and real GDP growth rate. Annualized implied interest rate is 
computed as 
 
𝑟𝑡 =
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐷𝑡−4
 
 
to reflect annual rate of change in debt servicing cost. Further, I compute annualized GDP 
deflator 𝑃𝑡 in standard manner: 
 
𝑃𝑡 =
𝑌𝑡
𝑅𝑌𝑡
 . 
 
This allows us to compute inflation rate as the annual change of GDP deflator, 
 
𝜋𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−4
− 1. 
 
The annual real GDP growth rates of actual and potential GDP  are computed as 
 
𝑟𝑔𝑡 =
𝑅𝑌𝑡
𝑅𝑌𝑡−4
− 1,    𝑟𝑔𝑡
𝑝
=
𝑅𝑌𝑡
𝑝
𝑅𝑌𝑡−4
𝑝 − 1 
 
where values of the potential real GDP are previously obtained by deflating nominal values 
of potential GDP with corresponding GDP deflator, 𝑅𝑌𝑡
𝑝
= 𝑌𝑡
𝑝
/𝑃𝑡. 
 
In the last step I decompose primary balance to cyclically-adjusted and automatic 
stabilizers components, according to the methodology described in Chapter 2. After 
computing quarterly observations of the primary expenditures 𝑃𝐺𝑡
𝑄
 by subtracting the 
  
 
 
interest rate from overall expenditures,  𝑃𝐺𝑡
𝑄 = 𝐺𝑡
𝑄 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝑄
, I calculate quarterly 
observations of cyclically-adjusted primary balance according to the equation: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑄 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑄 (
𝑌𝑡
𝑝,𝑄
𝑌𝑡
𝑄 ) − 𝑃𝐺𝑡
𝑄. 
 
Then quarterly series of automatic stabilizers is computed as a difference of headline and 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance, 
 
𝐴𝑆𝑡
𝑄 = 𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑄 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑄 . 
 
Quarterly observations of the cyclically-adjusted primary balance and automatic stabilizers 
are annualized in the same fashion as the other flow variables. 
 
Eventually, I switch from absolute values of the annualized flow variables 𝑍𝑡 to relative 
term 𝑧𝑡 or 𝑧𝑡
𝑝
, by scaling them either with actual or potential nominal GDP, respectively, 
depending on required inputs of the debt accumulation equation: 
 
𝑧𝑡 =
𝑍𝑡
𝑌𝑡
,     𝑧𝑡
𝑝
=
𝑍𝑡
𝑌𝑡
𝑝 . 
 
Dataset DS2 – Annual data, IMF 
 
Data definition and sources 
Variable Definition Abbreviation Source 
Primary balance to 
GDP 
Overall balance minus 
net interest expenditure 
scaled by either actual or 
potential GDP 
PB_A if non-
adjusted; 
CA_PB_A or 
CA_PB_P if 
adjusted 
WEO, IMF except for 
Serbia, Macedonia, B&H 
and Moldova, where data 
are retrieved from IMF 
country reports 
Government debt to 
GDP 
Government debt 
according to ESA95 
definition scaled by 
actual GDP 
gd_GDP or 
L.gd_GDP if 
lagged 
WEO, IMF 
Output gap to GDP 
Difference between 
actual and potential 
GDP scaled by potential 
GDP 
OG 
WEO, IMF for actual 
GDP, author’s 
calculation for potential 
GDP 
Crisis Dummy 
Takes value 1 in year 
2009 for all countries 
cris  
Election Dummy Takes value 1 in year of elec Web presentations of 
  
 
 
parliamentary elections 
for given country 
EEC governments and 
parliaments 
Foreign direct 
investments to GDP 
Inward FDI flow in 
USD at current 
exchange rate scaled by 
GDP in USD 
fdi_GDP 
UNCTAD statistics for 
FDI, WEO IMF for GDP 
in USD 
Terms of trade, 
change 
First difference of terms 
of trade index 
d_tot WEO, IMF 
Openness to GDP 
Sum of export and 
import scaled by actual 
GDP 
open WEO, IMF 
Private investments 
to GDP 
Private gross capital 
formation scaled by 
actual GDP 
pr_inv_GDP WEO, IMF 
Inflation 
Percentage annual 
change of GDP deflator 
infl WEO, IMF 
 
Data coverage per country and year 
Country Primary 
balance 
Albania 1997 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 2004 
Croatia 2002 
Macedonia 2000 
Montenegro 2002 
Serbia 2002 
Bulgaria 2002 
Czech Republic 1995 
Hungary 1995 
Poland 1995 
Romania 2004 
Slovakia 1997 
Slovenia 1995 
Estonia 2003 
Latvia 2003 
Lithuania 2000 
Belarus 1998 
Moldavia 2004 
Russia 1998 
Ukraine 2004 
Turkey 1997 
  
 
 
Appendix B: Matlab code for VAR-FRF analysis (on example of Bulgaria) 
 
% Data import (XY=*_var) 
 
XY=importdata('/Users/AZ1111/Dropbox/RM PD papers/Data/bgr_var.txt'); 
 
H=16 % forecast horizon 
P=4 % out-of-sample cut-off 
 
% computing VAR(2) coefficients, 4 variables (interest rate, growth, fx, infl) 
 
X=XY(1:length(XY)-P,1:4) 
T=length(X)  
Xtran=transpose(X(3:T,1:4)); 
X0=ones(T-2,1); 
X1=X(2:T-1,1:4); 
X2=X(1:T-2,1:4); 
Xbig=[X0 X1 X2]; 
G=Xtran*Xbig*inv(transpose(Xbig)*Xbig); 
C=G(:,1) 
A1=G(:,2:5) 
A2=G(:,6:9) 
 
% computing VCV 
 
Xprim=transpose(X); 
 
Xhat=zeros(4,T-2); 
for t=3:T 
Xhat_t(:,t)= C+A1*Xprim(1:4,t-1)+A2*Xprim(1:4,t-2); 
Xhat(:,t-2)=Xhat_t(:,t); 
end 
 
Uhat=X(3:T,:)-transpose(Xhat); 
 
SigmaU= transpose(Uhat)* Uhat/T; 
 
% SVAR estimation 
 
B_low=chol(SigmaU,'lower') 
B_up=chol(SigmaU,'upper') 
 
 
% point forecast 
 
GGD=XY(:,5) 
 
Xprim=transpose(X); 
Th=T+1 
  
 
 
 
for h=1:H 
Xpred(:,h)=C+A1*Xprim(1:4,Th-1)+A2*Xprim(1:4,Th-2); 
Xprim=[Xprim Xpred(:,h)]; 
Th=Th+1; 
end 
 
GGDprim=transpose(GGD) 
 
Th=T+1 
for h=1:H 
dIRDpred(:,h)= (Xprim(1,Th)- Xprim(4,Th)*(1+Xprim(2,Th)))./((1+ Xprim(2,Th))*(1+ 
Xprim(4,Th))); 
IRDpred(:,h)= GGDprim(1,Th-4)* dIRDpred(:,h); 
dRGDpred(:,h)= -(Xprim(2,Th))./((1+ Xprim(2,Th))*(1+ Xprim(4,Th))); 
RGDpred(:,h)=GGDprim(1,Th-4)* dRGDpred(:,h); 
GGDprim=[GGDprim (IRDpred(:,h)+ RGDpred(:,h)+ GGDprim(1,Th-4))]; 
Th=Th+1; 
end 
 
% stochastic forecast of non-fiscal variables 
 
clear n Xpred_s Xprim_s Xprim_sh 
 
for sim=1:1000 
Xprim_s= transpose(X); 
for h=1:H 
n(:,h,sim)=B_up*normrnd(0,1,[4,1]); 
Xpred_s(:,h,sim)= Xpred(:,h)+ n(:,h,sim); 
Xprim_s =[Xprim_s Xpred_s(:,h,sim)]; 
end 
Xprim_sh(:,:,sim) = Xprim_s; 
end 
 
clear IRDpred_s RGDpred_s GGDprim_s GGDprim_sh 
 
for sim=1:1000 
 
GGDprim_s=transpose(GGD); 
 
Th=T+1; 
for h=1:H; 
dIRDpred_s(:,h,sim)= (Xprim_sh(1,Th,sim)- 
Xprim_sh(4,Th,sim)*(1+Xprim_sh(2,Th,sim)))./((1+Xprim_sh(2,Th,sim))*(1+ 
Xprim_sh(4,Th,sim))); 
IRDpred_s(:,h,sim)= GGDprim_s(1,Th-4)* dIRDpred_s(:,h,sim); 
dRGDpred_s(:,h,sim)= -(Xprim_sh(2,Th,sim))./((1+ Xprim_sh(2,Th,sim))*(1+ 
Xprim_sh(4,Th,sim))); 
RGDpred_s(:,h,sim)= GGDprim_s(1,Th-4)* dRGDpred_s(:,h,sim); 
  
 
 
GGDprim_s=[GGDprim_s (IRDpred_s(:,h,sim)+ RGDpred_s(:,h,sim)+ 
GGDprim_s(1,Th-4))]; 
Th=Th+1; 
end 
GGDprim_sh(:,:,sim)= GGDprim_s; 
end 
 
% output gap 
 
GDP=XY(:,7:8) 
GDPfcs=[ 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.035 0.035
 0.035 0.035  0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045] % 2012 forecast 
 
clear GDPprim OGgap GDPpred OGgap_pred 
 
GDPprim=transpose(GDP); 
OGgap=(GDPprim(1,:)-GDPprim(2,:))./GDPprim(2,:) 
 
Th=T+1 
for h=1:H 
GDPpred(1,h)= GDPprim(1,Th-4)*(1+GDPfcs(:,h)); 
GDPpred(2,h)= GDPprim(2,Th-4)*(1+ Xpred(2,h)); 
OGgap_pred(:,h)=(GDPprim(1,h)-GDPprim(2,h))./GDPprim(2,h); 
GDPprim=[ GDPprim GDPpred(:,h)]; 
OGgap=[OGgap OGgap_pred(:,h)]; 
Th=Th+1; 
end 
 
% deterministic forecasts of debt and primary balance 
 
PB=XY(:,6) 
PBprim=transpose(PB); 
GGDprim0=GGDprim 
 
 
 % point forecast, primary balance historic average scenario 
 
clear GGDpred0 PBpred0 GGDprim0 
 
GGDprim0=GGDprim 
PB_M=mean(PB) 
PBpred0=repmat(PB_M,1,H) 
 
Th=T+1 
for h=1:H 
GGDpred0(:,h)= GGDprim0(:,Th)-PBpred0(:,h); 
Th=Th+1 
end 
GGDprim0(:,T+1:T+H)= GGDpred0; 
  
 
 
 
% FRF BASELINE 
 
 % point forecast: historic Gamma average + no policy change 
 
OG_coeff=[-0.20715] 
GGD_coeff=[ 0.026454] 
Gamma=[ -0.011898256] 
Lambda=[0.00]   
 
% Lambda=[1] % fiscal consolidation 
% Lambda=[-1] % fiscal stimulus 
 
clear GGDpred1 PBpred1 GGDprim1 
 
GGDprim1=GGDprim(:,1:T) 
 
Th=T+1; 
for h=1:H 
PBpred1(:,h)=(Gamma+ Lambda)+GGD_coeff*GGDprim1(:,Th-1)+ OG_coeff* 
OGgap(:,Th); 
IRDpred1(:,h)= GGDprim1(1,Th-4)* dIRDpred(:,h); 
RGDpred1(:,h)=GGDprim1(1,Th-4)* dRGDpred(:,h); 
GGDpred1(:,h)= GGDprim1(1,Th-4)+IRDpred1(:,h)+ RGDpred1(:,h)- PBpred1(:,h); 
GGDprim1=[GGDprim1 GGDpred1(:,h)]; 
Th=Th+1; 
end 
 
GGDpred1_sm=smooth(GGDprim1(:,T+1:T+H)); 
GGDprim1_sm=[GGDprim1(:,1:T) transpose(GGDpred1_sm)]; 
 
% stochastic forecasts: historic Gamma average + fiscal policy expectations 
 
 
PBres_sd=[ 0.014753578] 
 
clear GGDpred1_s PBpred1_s GGDprim1_s GGDprim1_sh 
 
for sim=1:1000 
 GGDprim1_s=GGDprim(:,1:T); 
 Th=T+1; 
for h=1:H 
 PBpred1_s(:,h,sim)= PBpred1(:,h)+ PBres_sd* normrnd(0,1); 
IRDpred1_s(:,h,sim)= GGDprim1_s(1,Th-4)* dIRDpred_s(:,h,sim); 
RGDpred1_s(:,h,sim)=GGDprim1_s(1,Th-4)* dRGDpred_s(:,h,sim); 
GGDpred1_s(:,h,sim)= GGDprim1_s(1,Th-4)+IRDpred1_s(:,h,sim)+ 
RGDpred1_s(:,h,sim)- PBpred1_s(:,h,sim); 
 
GGDprim1_s=[GGDprim1_s GGDpred1_s(:,h,sim)]; 
  
 
 
Th=Th+1; 
end 
GGDprim1_sh(:,:,sim)=GGDprim1_s; 
end 
 
% fanchart 
 
clear GGDprim1_sh_fch GGDpred1_sh_fch 
 
for sim=1:1000 
GGDprim1_sh_fch(sim,:)=GGDprim1_sh(:,:,sim); 
GGDprim1_sh_sm(:,sim)= smooth(GGDprim1_sh_fch(sim,T+1:T+H)); 
GGDprim1_sh_fch(sim,T+1:T+H)=transpose(GGDprim1_sh_sm(:,sim)); 
end 
 
GGDpred1_sh_fch= GGDprim1_sh_fch(:,T+1:T+H); 
 
f1=figure; 
figure (f1) 
fanChart(1:size(transpose(GGDprim1_sh_fch),1),transpose(GGDprim1_sh_fch)); 
 
% FRF debt stabilizing policy, no fiscal consolidation 
 
 % point forecast: historic Gamma average + fiscal policy expectations 
 
OG_coeff=[-0.20715] 
GGD_coeff=[0] 
Gamma=[ -0.011898256] 
Lambda=[0.00]   
 
% Lambda=[1] % fiscal consolidation 
% Lambda=[-1] % fiscal stimulus 
 
 
% Lambda=[1] % fiscal consolidation 
% Lambda=[-1] % fiscal stimulus 
 
clear GGDpred2 PBpred2 GGDprim2 
 
GGDprim2=GGDprim(:,1:T) 
 
Th=T+1; 
for h=1:H 
PBpred2(:,h)=(Gamma+ Lambda)+GGD_coeff*GGDprim2(:,Th-1)+ OG_coeff* 
OGgap(:,Th); 
IRDpred2(:,h)= GGDprim2(1,Th-4)* dIRDpred(:,h); 
RGDpred2(:,h)=GGDprim2(1,Th-4)* dRGDpred(:,h); 
GGDpred2(:,h)= GGDprim2(1,Th-4)+IRDpred2(:,h)+ RGDpred2(:,h)- PBpred2(:,h); 
GGDprim2=[GGDprim2 GGDpred2(:,h)]; 
  
 
 
Th=Th+1; 
end 
 
GGDpred2_sm=smooth(GGDprim2(:,T+1:T+H)); 
GGDprim2_sm=[GGDprim2(:,1:T) transpose(GGDpred2_sm)]; 
 
% stochastic forecasts: historic Gamma average + fiscal policy expectations 
 
PBres_sd=[ 0.014753578] 
 
clear GGDpred2_s PBpred2_s GGDprim2_s GGDprim2_sh 
 
for sim=1:1000 
 GGDprim2_s=GGDprim(:,1:T); 
 Th=T+1; 
for h=1:H 
 PBpred2_s(:,h,sim)= PBpred2(:,h)+ PBres_sd* normrnd(0,1); 
IRDpred2_s(:,h,sim)= GGDprim2_s(1,Th-4)* dIRDpred_s(:,h,sim); 
RGDpred2_s(:,h,sim)=GGDprim2_s(1,Th-4)* dRGDpred_s(:,h,sim); 
GGDpred2_s(:,h,sim)= GGDprim2_s(1,Th-4)+IRDpred2_s(:,h,sim)+ 
RGDpred2_s(:,h,sim)- PBpred2_s(:,h,sim); 
 
GGDprim2_s=[GGDprim2_s GGDpred2_s(:,h,sim)]; 
Th=Th+1; 
end 
GGDprim2_sh(:,:,sim)=GGDprim2_s; 
end 
 
% fanchart 
 
clear GGDprim2_sh_fch GGDpred2_sh_fch 
 
for sim=1:1000 
GGDprim2_sh_fch(sim,:)=GGDprim2_sh(:,:,sim); 
GGDprim2_sh_sm(:,sim)= smooth(GGDprim2_sh_fch(sim,T+1:T+H)); 
GGDprim2_sh_fch(sim,T+1:T+H)=transpose(GGDprim2_sh_sm(:,sim)); 
end 
 
 
GGDpred2_sh_fch= GGDprim2_sh_fch(:,T+1:T+H); 
 
f2=figure; 
figure (f2) 
fanChart(1:size(transpose(GGDprim2_sh_fch),1),transpose(GGDprim2_sh_fch)); 
 
 
% FRF debt stabilizing policy, fiscal consolidation 
 
 % point forecast: historic Gamma average + fiscal policy expectations 
  
 
 
 
OG_coeff=[0] 
GGD_coeff=[ 0.026454] 
Gamma=[ -0.011898256] 
Lambda=[0.00]   
 
 
% Lambda=[1] % fiscal consolidation 
% Lambda=[-1] % fiscal stimulus 
 
clear GGDpred3 PBpred3 GGDprim3 
 
GGDprim3=GGDprim(:,1:T) 
 
Th=T+1; 
for h=1:H 
PBpred3(:,h)=(Gamma+ Lambda)+GGD_coeff*GGDprim3(:,Th-1)+ OG_coeff* 
OGgap(:,Th); 
IRDpred3(:,h)= GGDprim3(1,Th-4)* dIRDpred(:,h); 
RGDpred3(:,h)=GGDprim3(1,Th-4)* dRGDpred(:,h); 
GGDpred3(:,h)= GGDprim3(1,Th-4)+IRDpred3(:,h)+ RGDpred3(:,h)- PBpred3(:,h); 
GGDprim3=[GGDprim3 GGDpred3(:,h)]; 
Th=Th+1; 
end 
 
GGDpred3_sm=smooth(GGDprim3(:,T+1:T+H)); 
GGDprim3_sm=[GGDprim3(:,1:T) transpose(GGDpred1_sm)]; 
 
% stochastic forecasts: historic Gamma average + fiscal policy expectations 
 
 
PBres_sd=[ 0.014753578] 
 
clear GGDpred3_s PBpred3_s GGDprim3_s GGDprim3_sh 
 
for sim=1:1000 
 GGDprim3_s=GGDprim(:,1:T); 
 Th=T+1; 
for h=1:H 
 PBpred3_s(:,h,sim)= PBpred3(:,h)+ PBres_sd* normrnd(0,1); 
IRDpred3_s(:,h,sim)= GGDprim3_s(1,Th-4)* dIRDpred_s(:,h,sim); 
RGDpred3_s(:,h,sim)=GGDprim3_s(1,Th-4)* dRGDpred_s(:,h,sim); 
GGDpred3_s(:,h,sim)= GGDprim3_s(1,Th-4)+IRDpred3_s(:,h,sim)+ 
RGDpred3_s(:,h,sim)- PBpred3_s(:,h,sim); 
 
GGDprim3_s=[GGDprim3_s GGDpred3_s(:,h,sim)]; 
Th=Th+1; 
end 
GGDprim3_sh(:,:,sim)=GGDprim3_s; 
  
 
 
end 
 
% fanchart 
 
clear GGDprim3_sh_fch GGDpred3_sh_fch 
 
for sim=1:1000 
GGDprim3_sh_fch(sim,:)=GGDprim3_sh(:,:,sim); 
GGDprim3_sh_sm(:,sim)= smooth(GGDprim3_sh_fch(sim,T+1:T+H)); 
GGDprim3_sh_fch(sim,T+1:T+H)=transpose(GGDprim3_sh_sm(:,sim)); 
end 
 
GGDpred3_sh_fch= GGDprim3_sh_fch(:,T+1:T+H); 
 
f3=figure; 
figure (f3) 
fanChart(1:size(transpose(GGDprim3_sh_fch),1),transpose(GGDprim3_sh_fch)); 
 
 
% point forecast summary 
 
clear GGDpred_all GGDpred_all_sm 
 
GGDpred_all_sm=transpose([GGDpred1_sm GGDpred2_sm GGDpred3_sm]*100); 
% GGDpred_all=transpose([transpose(GGDpred1) transpose(GGDpred2); 
transpose(GGDpred3)]); 
 
% probability defaults 
 
clear GGDtrash GGDdprob GGDdprob_m 
 
GGDtrash=ones(sim,H)*mean(GGD); 
GGDdprob=transpose((GGDpred1_sh_fch-GGDtrash) ./GGDpred1_sh_fch); 
for h=1:H 
for sim=1:1000 
if GGDdprob(h,sim)<0 
GGDdprob(h,sim)=0; 
end; 
end; 
end; 
GGDdprob_m=sum(transpose(GGDdprob/T)); 
 
 
